World Cup. Group B

Group B. Argentina, USSR, Romania, Cameroon.
Argentina

Head coach: Carlos Bilardo

No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club
1
GK
Nery Pumpido*
30 July 1957 (aged 32)
N/A
Real Betis
2
MF
Sergio Batista
9 November 1962 (aged 27)
N/A
River Plate
3
FW
Abel Balbo
1 June 1966 (aged 24)
N/A
Udinese
4
MF
José Basualdo
20 June 1963 (aged 26)
N/A
VfB Stuttgart
5
DF
Edgardo Bauza
26 January 1958 (aged 32)
N/A
Veracruz
6
FW
Gabriel Calderón
7 February 1960 (aged 30)
N/A
Paris Saint-Germain
7
MF
Jorge Burruchaga
9 October 1962 (aged 27)
52
Nantes
8
FW
Claudio Caniggia
9 January 1967 (aged 23)
N/A
Atalanta
9
FW
Gustavo Dezotti
14 February 1964 (aged 26)
N/A
Cremonese
10
MF
Diego Maradona (c)
30 October 1960 (aged 29)
73
Napoli
11
DF
Néstor Fabbri
29 April 1968 (aged 22)
N/A
Racing Club
12
GK
Sergio Goycochea
17 October 1963 (aged 26)
N/A
Millonarios
13
DF
Néstor Lorenzo
28 February 1966 (aged 24)
N/A
Bari
14
MF
Ricardo Giusti
11 December 1956 (aged 33)
N/A
Independiente
15
DF
Pedro Monzón
23 February 1962 (aged 28)
N/A
Independiente
16
DF
Julio Olarticoechea
18 October 1958 (aged 31)
N/A
Racing Club
17
DF
Roberto Sensini
12 October 1966 (aged 23)
16
Udinese
18
DF
José Serrizuela
16 June 1962 (aged 27)
N/A
River Plate
19
DF
Oscar Ruggeri
26 January 1962 (aged 28)
50
Real Madrid
20
DF
Juan Simón
2 March 1960 (aged 30)
N/A
Boca Juniors
21
MF
Pedro Troglio
28 July 1965 (aged 24)
N/A
Lazio
22
GK
Fabián Cancelarich
20 December 1965 (aged 24)
N/A
Ferro Carril Oeste
No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club

1
GK
Ángel Comizzo
27 April 1962 (aged 28)
N/A
River Plate

*Following a rupture of goalkeeper Pumpido’s tibia and fibula, the Argentine team was authorized to replace him with Comizzo, who joined the team as third goalkeeper.
Under increasing criticism, coming even from the President of Argentina, Billardo was not in great mood most of the time preceding the finals – he had to explain, excuse, explode… but there were facts hard to ignore: shaky form, injuries, pretenses of players, but mostly inevitable aging and sometimes lack of worthy replacements. Argentina often used long and early training camps and 1990 was no exception: Billardo settled camp in Italy early, which kind of kept the flock of increasingly hostile journalists at bay, but it was only a group of 9 players. ‘It is not easy to train free-kicks when the one who should kick the ball in in Madrid and and the receiver of the high ball is in Nantes’, was the tone of Billardo. Eventually, one by one, the players ended their club championship and gathered together. Maradona even lost wait, which particularly pleased Billardo – it was a positive sign. The biggest troublemakers were shaved off (Valdano, Diaz), others seemed pacified, the team was getting into shape and started scoring goals. No matter what troubles Argentina presented, it was big favourite – it was reigning champion, the magic of Maradona and Billardo had a strong spell on everybody, thus, the group favourite.
Soviet Union
Sitting from left: M. Nassibov – masseur, A. Zavarov, V. Ratz, S. Myshalov – doctor, N. Simonyan – team chief, V. Lobanovsky – coach, Yu. Morozov – assistant coach, I. Yaremchuk, I. Dobrovolsky, V. Lyuty, V. Bessonov. Second row: O. Sokolov – masseur, R. Dassaev, S. Gorlukovich, I. Shalimov, O. Kuznetzov, V. Chanov, A. Zygmantovich, A. Borodyuk, V. Broshin. Top row: A. Uvarov, V. Khidiatullin, S. Aleynikov, O. Protassov, A. Tzveyba, G. Litovchenko, A. Demyanenko, S. Fokin.

Head coach: Valeriy Lobanovskyi
No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club
1
GK
Rinat Dasayev (c)
13 June 1957 (aged 32)
90
Sevilla
2
DF
Volodymyr Bezsonov
5 March 1958 (aged 32)
77
Dynamo Kyiv
3
DF
Vagiz Khidiyatullin
3 March 1959 (aged 31)
55
Toulouse
4
DF
Oleh Kuznetsov
22 March 1963 (aged 27)
49
Dynamo Kyiv
5
DF
Anatoliy Demyanenko
19 February 1959 (aged 31)
79
Dynamo Kyiv
6
MF
Vasyl Rats
25 April 1961 (aged 29)
46
Dynamo Kyiv
7
MF
Sergei Aleinikov
7 November 1961 (aged 28)
61
Juventus
8
MF
Gennadiy Lytovchenko
11 September 1963 (aged 26)
54
Dynamo Kyiv
9
MF
Oleksandr Zavarov
20 April 1961 (aged 29)
38
Juventus
10
FW
Oleh Protasov
4 February 1964 (aged 26)
60
Dynamo Kyiv
11
FW
Igor Dobrovolski
27 August 1967 (aged 22)
13
Dynamo Moscow
12
MF
Aleksandr Borodyuk
30 November 1962 (aged 27)
5
Schalke 04
13
DF
Akhrik Tsveiba
10 September 1966 (aged 23)
3
Dynamo Kyiv
14
FW
Volodymyr Lyutyi
24 April 1962 (aged 28)
2
Schalke 04
15
MF
Ivan Yaremchuk
19 March 1962 (aged 28)
16
Dynamo Kyiv
16
GK
Viktor Chanov
21 July 1959 (aged 30)
21
Dynamo Kyiv
17
MF
Andrei Zygmantovich
2 December 1962 (aged 27)
34
Dynamo Minsk
18
MF
Igor Shalimov
2 February 1969 (aged 21)
0
Spartak Moscow
19
DF
Sergei Fokin
26 July 1961 (aged 28)
3
CSKA Moscow
20
DF
Sergei Gorlukovich
18 November 1961 (aged 28)
15
Borussia Dortmund
21
MF
Valeri Broshin
19 October 1962 (aged 27)
2
CSKA Moscow
22
GK
Aleksandr Uvarov
13 January 1960 (aged 30)
1
Dynamo Moscow
Expected to finish second in the group and go ahead quite far. For many it was the best Soviet team ever, a formidable squad which could even reach the World Cup final. Such a view was based on the promising performance of team USSR during the 1980s, crowned with silver medals at the 1988 European championship and Olympic gold in the same year. By now not only Lobanovksy was a big name, but a big number of his players – and because of that deeper look was somewhat ignored: the whole political situation in the USSR, the aging of most key players, the lure of playing abroad, the difficulties of adjustment to playing abroad, the peculiarities of Lobanovsky’s approach. The injury of Mikhailichenko was a big blow to the team – and after the World Cup seen as the biggest cause for the lame performance – but it was not as simple as that. To say this was the strongest team of USSR means only to follow familiar names – all of the stars were at hand (without the relative newcomer Mikhailichenko, of course), but those were regulars for about 10 years now and aging quite dangerously. Demyanenko and Bessonov were not only over 30 now, but they accumulated so many injuries that were no longer the same dependable players, if capable to play at all. The key foreign-based stars had troubles of adjusting to their professional life in foreign lands (Dassaev, Zavarov) and lost form and concentration. Those still playing at home had foreign transfers on their minds, so their concentration was also shaky. Lobanovsky always played Dynamo (Kiev) as a base for the national team, so later accusations that he changed his approach to the peril of the team were wrong: there were 10 current and former Dynamo players in the squad. Add to them those, who Lobanovsky used for years already – Dassaev, Khidiatullin, Aleynikov, Zygmantovich, Gorlukovich – and the old concept was at work: Lobanovsky treated the national team as a club team – same players, with few additions and adjustment as time goes by. His usual dislike for wider range of players and ignoring whenever possible a selection based on Spartak (Moscow) was both easier and more difficult to avoid criticism this time: easier, because the Baltic republics and Georgia already left the Soviet football, so nobody could blame the coach for leaving out of the team players from these regions. More difficult, because the usual core of players was not very big and the additions were quite questionable, looking like hastily included only to make the numbers (Uvarov, Broshin, Fokin), yet, some promising players were ignored (Salenko, from Lobanovsky’s own Dynamo Kiev). And on top of everything was the new unknown situation Lobanovsky found himself – in the past the dictatorial coach had no problems: in the Soviet reality domestic championship would be stopped or rescheduled, so the national team will have the training camp Lobanovsky wanted. Neither players, no clubs could refuse his orders, even if clubs had to use replacements in important games because their stars were training with Lobanovsky. Now, suddenly, one had to negotiate with foreign professional clubs when wanting players for the national team and these clubs could refuse to release their players or make them available only in the last minute – it was entirely unknown reality and Lobanovsky was not prepared for it. It could be said that this was one of the biggest reasons for the teams problems: Lobanovsky was unable to imagine that Dassaev and Zavarov could be out of form and look for other options – he based his team on them and that was that, even when annoyed that he can’t train the team with them. What happened later only uncovered how problematic, if not entirely wrong, was this team, but before the start of the World Cup it was though a formidable team, surely the second finisher in the group. As it turned out, this was the last time team USSR appeared at the World Cup – but that was entirely unknown and unthinkable early in 1990.
Romania

Head coach: Emerich Jenei
No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club
1
GK
Silviu Lung (c)
9 September 1956 (aged 33)
65
Steaua București
2
DF
Mircea Rednic
9 April 1962 (aged 28)
74
Dinamo București
3
DF
Michael Klein
10 October 1959 (aged 30)
78
Dinamo București
4
DF
Ioan Andone
15 March 1960 (aged 30)
49
Dinamo București
5
MF
Iosif Rotariu
27 September 1962 (aged 27)
11
Steaua București
6
DF
Gheorghe Popescu
9 October 1967 (aged 22)
18
Universitatea Craiova
7
FW
Marius Lăcătuș
5 April 1964 (aged 26)
38
Steaua București
8
MF
Ioan Sabău
12 February 1968 (aged 22)
21
Dinamo București
9
FW
Rodion Cămătaru
22 June 1958 (aged 31)
74
Charleroi
10
MF
Gheorghe Hagi
5 February 1965 (aged 25)
59
Steaua București
11
MF
Dănuț Lupu
27 February 1967 (aged 23)
7
Dinamo București
12
GK
Bogdan Stelea
5 December 1967 (aged 22)
3
Dinamo București
13
DF
Adrian Popescu
26 June 1960 (aged 29)
1
Universitatea Craiova
14
FW
Florin Răducioiu
17 March 1970 (aged 20)
3
Dinamo București
15
MF
Dorin Mateuț
5 August 1965 (aged 24)
45
Dinamo București
16
MF
Daniel Timofte
1 October 1967 (aged 22)
4
Dinamo București
17
FW
Ilie Dumitrescu
6 January 1969 (aged 21)
9
Steaua București
18
FW
Gabi Balint
3 January 1963 (aged 27)
24
Steaua București
19
DF
Emil Săndoi
1 March 1965 (aged 25)
8
Universitatea Craiova
20
MF
Zsolt Muzsnay
20 August 1965 (aged 24)
6
Steaua București
21
MF
Ioan Lupescu
9 December 1968 (aged 21)
4
Dinamo București
22
GK
Gheorghe Liliac
22 April 1959 (aged 31)
2
Petrolul Ploiești
Talented coach and players, but relatively unknown yet. Romania did not play at World Cup finals after 1970, and such absences usually relegated teams bellow those who played at them in recent years. Thus, Romania was expected to finish third and go ahead only with luck. The only real problem was the absence of the very strong central defender Belodedici, but nothing could be done about it – he defected to Yugoslavia and for that was sentenced to jail: to include him in the tam meant huge trouble not only for the player. Political problems aside, team Romania was strong and well balanced and Hagi was already a big star.
Cameroon

Head coach:  Valeri Nepomniachi
No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps

Club
1
GK
Joseph-Antoine Bell
8 October 1954 (aged 35)
N/A
Bordeaux
2
DF
André Kana-Biyik
1 September 1965 (aged 24)
41
Metz
3
MF
Jules Onana
12 June 1964 (aged 25)
6
Canon Yaoundé
4
DF
Benjamin Massing
20 June 1962 (aged 27)
N/A
Créteil
5
DF
Bertin Ebwellé
11 September 1962 (aged 27)
16
Tonnerre Yaoundé
6
DF
Emmanuel Kundé
15 July 1956 (aged 33)
82
Prévoyance Yaoundé
7
FW
François Omam-Biyik
21 May 1966 (aged 24)
34
Stade Lavallois
8
MF
Émile Mbouh
30 May 1966 (aged 24)
38
Le Havre
9
FW
Roger Milla
20 May 1952 (aged 38)
56
JS Saint-Pierroise
10
MF
Louis-Paul M’Fédé
26 February 1961 (aged 29)
40
Canon Yaoundé
11
FW
Eugène Ekéké
30 May 1960 (aged 30)
N/A
Valenciennes
12
DF
Alphonse Yombi
30 June 1969 (aged 20)
N/A
Canon Yaoundé
13
DF
Jean-Claude Pagal
15 September 1964 (aged 25)
N/A
La Roche Vendée
14
DF
Stephen Tataw (c)
31 March 1963 (aged 27)
29
Tonnerre Yaoundé
15
MF
Thomas Libiih
17 November 1967 (aged 22)
N/A
Tonnerre Yaoundé
16
GK
Thomas N’Kono
20 July 1956 (aged 33)
57
Espanyol
17
DF
Victor N’Dip
20 August 1967 (aged 22)
16
Canon Yaoundé
18
FW
Bonaventure Djonkep
20 August 1961 (aged 28)
49
Union Douala
19
MF
Roger Feutmba
31 October 1968 (aged 21)
N/A
Union Douala
20
MF
Cyrille Makanaky
28 June 1965 (aged 24)
N/A
Toulon
21
MF
Emmanuel Maboang
27 November 1968 (aged 21)
N/A
Canon Yaoundé
22
GK
Jacques Songo’o
17 March 1964 (aged 26)
38
Toulon
Cameroon was the group outsider – yes, how they played in Spain was well remembered, but that was 8 years ago and the current team compared to the old one was found lacking a lot. It had experience – 10 professionals in France and Spain – but almost all of them played for small clubs. Roger Milla was pretty much the point showing Cameroonian troubles: the inclusion of 38-years old player, who already retired and did not play any kind of organized football, was both exotic and desperate – largely, it meant lack of enough talent in the country. And that was the prime reason for his invitation to the team, no secret at all. Various political maneuvers were also at play, including the old and uncomfortable rivalry and mutual dislike of each other between the great goalkeepers N’Kono and Bell. That aggravated by a third very good goalkeeper – Songo’o. Difficult to defuse tensions, for the keepers had their own supporters in and around the team and it much more than personal rivalries. Milla was also difficult to deal with. The team was quite unbalanced – too many keepers, but not enough good players at other positions, and it was very difficult just to keep the team from falling apart and exploding into internal fights. Thus, it looked like Cameroon had no chance at all in this group.

World Cup. Group A

Group A.

09.06.90 (21.00) Roma, Stadio Olimpico

ITA – AUT 1:0 (0:0)

(+72000) Wright BRA, Pérez COL, Valente POR

ITA: Zenga – F.Baresi, Bergomi (c), Ferri, Maldini – Ancelotti (46 de Agostini),
de Napoli, Giannini – Donadoni, Carnevale (76 Schillaci), Vialli
AUT: Lindenberger – Russ, Pecl, Aigner, Streiter – Schöttel, Linzmaier
(81 Hörtnagl), Artner (61 Zsak), Herzog – Polster (c), Ogris

1:0 Schillaci 78 h

booked: Herzog

10.06.90 (17.00) Florence, Stadio Communale

CZE – USA 5:1 (2:0)

(+33000) Röthlisberger SUI, Schmidhuber GER, Van Langenhove BEL

CZE: Stejskal – Straka, Kadlec, Kocian, Hašek (c) – Kubik, Bilek, Chovanec,
Moravčik (83 Weiss) – Skuhravý, Knofliček (77 Luhový)
USA: Meola (c) – Trittschuh, Windischmann, Armstrong, Wynalda – Caligiuri, Ramos,
Harkes, Stollmeyer (64 Balboa) – Murray (79 Sullivan), Vermes

1:0 Skuhravý 25, 2:0 Bilek 39 p, 3:0 Hašek 50 h, 3:1 Caliguri 61, 4:1 Skuhravý
78 h, 5:1 Luhový 90 (88 Meola saved a penalty by Bilek)

booked: Kubik, Kadlec / Meola, Trittschuh
sent off: Wynalda (52)

ITA – AUT 1:0 (0:0)

(+72000) Wright BRA, Pérez COL, Valente POR

ITA: Zenga – F.Baresi, Bergomi (c), Ferri, Maldini – Ancelotti (46 de Agostini),
de Napoli, Giannini – Donadoni, Carnevale (76 Schillaci), Vialli
AUT: Lindenberger – Russ, Pecl, Aigner, Streiter – Schöttel, Linzmaier
(81 Hörtnagl), Artner (61 Zsak), Herzog – Polster (c), Ogris

1:0 Schillaci 78 h

booked: Herzog

10.06.90 (17.00) Florence, Stadio Communale

CZE – USA 5:1 (2:0)

(+33000) Röthlisberger SUI, Schmidhuber GER, Van Langenhove BEL

CZE: Stejskal – Straka, Kadlec, Kocian, Hašek (c) – Kubik, Bilek, Chovanec,
Moravčik (83 Weiss) – Skuhravý, Knofliček (77 Luhový)
USA: Meola (c) – Trittschuh, Windischmann, Armstrong, Wynalda – Caligiuri, Ramos,
Harkes, Stollmeyer (64 Balboa) – Murray (79 Sullivan), Vermes

1:0 Skuhravý 25, 2:0 Bilek 39 p, 3:0 Hašek 50 h, 3:1 Caliguri 61, 4:1 Skuhravý
78 h, 5:1 Luhový 90 (88 Meola saved a penalty by Bilek)

booked: Kubik, Kadlec / Meola, Trittschuh
sent off: Wynalda (52)

14.06.90 (21.00) Roma, Stadio Olimpico

ITA – USA 1:0 (1:0)

(+73000) Codesal MEX, Ulloa COS, Cardellino URU

ITA: Zenga – F.Baresi, Bergomi (c), Ferri, Maldini – Berti, de Napoli, Giannini,
Donadoni – Carnevale (52 Schillaci), Vialli
USA: Meola (c) – Doyle, Banks (81 Stollmeyer), Windischmann, Armstrong –
Balboa, Caligiuri, Ramos, Harkes – Murray (83 Sullivan), Vermes

1:0 Giannini 11 (20 Vialli missed penalty)

booked: Ferri / Banks

15.06.94 (17.00) Florence, Stadio Communale

CZE – AUT 1:0 (1:0)

(-39000) Smith SCO, Al-Sharif SYR, Lorenc AUS

CZE: Stejskal – Kadlec, Kocian, Hašek (c), Kubik – Bilek, Chovanec (32
Bielik), Moravčik, Nemeček – Skuhravý, Knofliček (83 Weiss)
AUT: Lindenberger – Pfeffer, Pecl, Aigner, Russ (46 Streiter) – Schöttel
(46 Ogris), Hörtnagl, Zsak, Herzog – Rodax, Polster (c)

1:0 Bilek 30 p

booked: Moravčik, Kubik / Pecl, Zsak, Streiter, Pfeiffer

19.06.90 (21.00) Roma, Stadio Olimpico

ITA – CZE 2:0 (1:0)

(+73000) Quiniou FRA, Van Langenhove BEL, Smith SCO

ITA: Zenga – F.Baresi, Bergomi (c), Ferri, Maldini – Berti, de Napoli
(66 Vierchowod), Giannini, Donadoni (52 de Agostini) – R.Baggio, Schillaci
CZE: Stejskal – Kadlec, Kinier, Hašek (c), Bilek – Chovanec, Moravčik, Nemeček
(46 Bielik) – Skuhravý, Knofliček, Weiss (58 Griga)

1:0 Schillaci 9 h, 2:0 R.Baggio 78

booked: R.Baggio, Berti / Chovanec, Skuhravý

19.06.90 (21.00) Florence, Stadio Communale

AUT – USA 2:1 (0:0)

(-35000) Al-Sharif SYR, Lorenc AUS, Petrović JUG

AUT: Lindenberger – Pfeffer, Pecl, Aigner, Streiter – Artner, Ogris,
Zsak, Herzog – Rodax (86 Glatzmeyer), Polster (c – 46 Reisinger)
USA: Meola (c) – Doyle, Banks (55 Wynalda), Windischmann, Armstrong –
Balboa, Caligiuri (83 Bliss), Ramos, Harkes – Murray, Vermes

1:0 Ogris 52, 2:0 Rodax 65, 2:1 Murray 85

booked: Zsak, Pecl, Reisinger, Lindenberger, Streiter / Caliguri, Banks,
Murray, Windischmann
sent off: Artner (34)

1. ITA^ 3 3 0 0 6 4-0
2. CZE^ 3 2 0 1 4 6-3
3. AUT 3 1 0 2 2 2-3
4. USA 3 0 0 3 0 2-8
Anything memorable in this group? Apart from the goals Czechoslovakia scored against USA, very little. Italy struggled terribly and Vicini had to make desperate changes in the striking line – the little known substitute Schillaci was the savior and gradually became the first choice. Czechoslovakia managed to reach its goal and took it easy against Italy. Austria… hard work does not pay off. USA – nothing really.

World Cup. Group A

Group A. Italy, Czechoslovakia, Austria, USA.
Italy

Head coach: Azeglio Vicini
No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club
1
GK
Walter Zenga
28 April 1960 (aged 30)
35
Internazionale
2
DF
Franco Baresi
8 May 1960 (aged 30)
39
Milan
3
DF
Giuseppe Bergomi (c)
22 December 1963 (aged 26)
65
Internazionale
4
DF
Luigi De Agostini
7 April 1961 (aged 29)
24
Juventus
5
DF
Ciro Ferrara
11 February 1967 (aged 23)
16
Napoli
6
DF
Riccardo Ferri
20 August 1963 (aged 26)
29
Internazionale
7
DF
Paolo Maldini
26 June 1968 (aged 21)
19
Milan
8
DF
Pietro Vierchowod
6 April 1959 (aged 31)
29
Sampdoria
9
MF
Carlo Ancelotti
10 June 1959 (aged 30)
22
Milan
10
MF
Nicola Berti
14 April 1967 (aged 23)
11
Internazionale
11
MF
Fernando De Napoli
15 March 1964 (aged 26)
38
Napoli
12
GK
Stefano Tacconi
13 May 1957 (aged 33)
5
Juventus
13
MF
Giuseppe Giannini
20 August 1964 (aged 25)
34
Roma
14
MF
Giancarlo Marocchi
4 July 1965 (aged 24)
7
Juventus
15
FW
Roberto Baggio
18 February 1967 (aged 23)
8
Fiorentina
16
FW
Andrea Carnevale
12 January 1961 (aged 29)
8
Napoli
17
MF
Roberto Donadoni
9 September 1963 (aged 26)
29
Milan
18
FW
Roberto Mancini
27 November 1964 (aged 25)
20
Sampdoria
19
FW
Salvatore Schillaci
1 December 1964 (aged 25)
1
Juventus
20
FW
Aldo Serena
25 June 1960 (aged 29)
18
Internazionale
21
FW
Gianluca Vialli
9 July 1964 (aged 25)
42
Sampdoria
22
GK
Gianluca Pagliuca
18 December 1966 (aged 23)
0
Sampdoria
Traditional favourite, this time number one favourite – at home nothing less was expected and
demanded, internationally the team was considered the most possible new World champion. Naturally, the group favourite and, naturally, the host had the easiest group. Qualifying to the next stage was sure. Vicini promised and built new and younger squad, which looked formidable. However… recent results were rather alarming and the pressure was building: Vicini was given enough comfort – the disappointing performance at the 1988 European finals was forgiven for the aim was to win the World Cup. But in football nothing really is forgotten and the recent weak results brought massive criticism of coach and players. The pressure was disruptive and affected the team negatively. Vicini’s pleading to leave the team in peace to prepare for the task was ignored as usual.
Czechoslovakia

Head coach: Jozef Vengloš

No.

Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club
1
GK
Jan Stejskal
15 January 1962 (aged 28)
16
Sparta Prague
2
DF
Július Bielik
8 March 1962 (aged 28)
16
Sparta Prague
3
DF
Miroslav Kadlec
22 June 1964 (aged 25)
20
TJ Vítkovice
4
MF
Ivan Hašek (c)
6 September 1963 (aged 26)
42
Sparta Prague
5
DF
Ján Kocian
13 March 1958 (aged 32)
13
FC St. Pauli
6
DF
František Straka
21 May 1958 (aged 32)
32
Borussia Mönchengladbach
7
MF
Michal Bílek
13 April 1965 (aged 25)
20
Sparta Prague
8
MF
Jozef Chovanec
7 March 1960 (aged 30)
42
PSV
9
MF
Luboš Kubík
20 January 1964 (aged 26)
21
Fiorentina
10
FW
Tomáš Skuhravý
7 September 1965 (aged 24)
22
Sparta Prague
11
MF
Ľubomír Moravčík
22 June 1965 (aged 24)
16
Plastika Nitra
12
DF
Peter Fieber
16 May 1964 (aged 26)
3
Dunajská Streda
13
MF
Jiří Němec
15 May 1966 (aged 24)
1
Dukla Prague
14
MF
Vladimír Weiss
22 September 1964 (aged 25)
15
Inter Bratislava
15
DF
Vladimír Kinier
6 April 1958 (aged 32)
9
Slovan Bratislava
16
FW
Viliam Hýravý
26 November 1962 (aged 27)
10
Baník Ostrava
17
FW
Ivo Knoflíček
23 February 1962 (aged 28)
28
FC St. Pauli
18
FW
Milan Luhový
1 January 1963 (aged 27)
28
Sporting Gijón
19
FW
Stanislav Griga
4 November 1961 (aged 28)
32
Feyenoord
20
MF
Václav Němeček
25 January 1967 (aged 23)
17
Sparta Prague
21
GK
Luděk Mikloško
9 December 1961 (aged 28)
32
West Ham United
22
GK
Peter Palúch
17 February 1958 (aged 32)
0
Plastika Nitra
The well known and highly respected Jozef Venglos was at the helm with his usual assistant Vaclav Jezek. In 1976 the duo made Czechoslovakia European champion – but 1990 was nothing like 1976… there were not enough high quality players. Political change helped Venglos – the defectors Ivo Knoflicek (FC St. Pauli) and Lubos Kubik (Fiorentina) were forgiven and no longer criminals and traitors, they were back in the team. There was some young talent, but the key players were rather old (Straka, Griga, Chovanec, even Knoflicek) and as whole the team was not great. Most likely second finisher in the group, but going beyond the second stage was highly unlikely.
Austria

Standing from left: Hörtnagl, Polster, Aigner, Pecl, Schöttel and Rodax.
Front row: Russ, Zsak, Lindenberger, Pfeffer and Herzog.
Head coach: Josef Hickersberger
No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club
1
GK
Klaus Lindenberger
28 May 1957 (aged 33)
37
Swarovski Tirol
2
DF
Ernst Aigner
31 October 1966 (aged 23)
7
Austria Vienna
3
DF
Robert Pecl
15 November 1965 (aged 24)
19
Rapid Vienna
4
DF
Anton Pfeffer
17 August 1965 (aged 24)
21
Austria Vienna
5
DF
Peter Schöttel
26 March 1967 (aged 23)
11
Rapid Vienna
6
MF
Manfred Zsak
22 December 1964 (aged 25)
28
Austria Vienna
7
DF
Kurt Russ
23 November 1964 (aged 25)
20
First Vienna FC
8
DF
Peter Artner
20 May 1966 (aged 24)
21
Admira Wacker
9
FW
Toni Polster (c)
10 March 1964 (aged 26)
36
Sevilla
10
MF
Manfred Linzmaier
27 August 1962 (aged 27)
19
Swarovski Tirol
11
MF
Alfred Hörtnagl
24 September 1966 (aged 23)
10
Swarovski Tirol
12
MF
Michael Baur
16 April 1969 (aged 21)
1
Swarovski Tirol
13
FW
Andreas Ogris
7 October 1964 (aged 25)
28
Austria Vienna
14
FW
Gerhard Rodax
29 August 1965 (aged 24)
16
Admira Wacker
15
FW
Christian Keglevits
29 January 1961 (aged 29)
15
Rapid Vienna
16
MF
Andreas Reisinger
14 October 1963 (aged 26)
6
Rapid Vienna
17
FW
Heimo Pfeifenberger
29 December 1966 (aged 23)
3
Rapid Vienna
18
DF
Michael Streiter
19 January 1966 (aged 24)
8
Swarovski Tirol
19
MF
Gerald Glatzmayer
14 December 1968 (aged 21)
5
First Vienna FC
20
MF
Andi Herzog
10 September 1968 (aged 21)
16
Rapid Vienna
21
GK
Michael Konsel
6 March 1962 (aged 28)
5
Rapid Vienna
22
GK
Otto Konrad
1 November 1964 (aged 25)
2
Sturm Graz
With some luck – namely, Czechoslovakian underperformance – Austria could finish second, but most likely 3rd. The current generation was rather short on talent and the squad shows it: only Tony Polster played abroad. Conflicts did not help either – Hickersberger clash with veteran Weber left Austria without its best defender. The team was not happy with the coach, yet, the coach stayed. Only one player remained from the 1982 World Cup squad – the goalkeeper Lindenberger – so there was little old influence to bring up spirit and motivation. Except Polster and Keglewits there were no big stars – all depended on collective play and… Polster. The star was not in great situation, though – there was public hostility to him and accusation of egoism and little motivation to play for his country. It was very questionable Austria could reach the next stage even when 4 out of 6 third-placed teams were going ahead.
United States

Head coach: Bob Gansler
No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club
1
GK
Tony Meola
21 February 1969 (aged 21)
17
Virginia Cavaliers
2
DF
Steve Trittschuh
24 April 1965 (aged 25)
29
Tampa Bay Rowdies
3
DF
John Doyle
16 March 1966 (aged 24)
21
S.F. Bay Blackhawks
4
DF
Jimmy Banks
2 September 1964 (aged 25)
26
Milwaukee Wave
5
DF
Mike Windischmann (c)
6 December 1965 (aged 24)
42
Albany Capitals
6
MF
John Harkes
8 March 1967 (aged 23)
28
Albany Capitals
7
MF
Tab Ramos
21 September 1966 (aged 23)
23
Figueres
8
DF
Brian Bliss
28 September 1965 (aged 24)
23
Albany Capitals
9
FW
Christopher Sullivan
18 April 1965 (aged 25)
15
Győri
10
FW
Peter Vermes
21 November 1966 (aged 23)
20
Volendam
11
FW
Eric Wynalda
9 June 1969 (aged 20)
13
S.F. Bay Blackhawks
12
DF
Paul Krumpe
4 March 1963 (aged 27)
16
Real Santa Barbara
13
FW
Eric Eichmann
7 May 1965 (aged 25)
21
Fort Lauderdale Strikers
14
MF
John Stollmeyer
25 October 1962 (aged 27)
28
Washington Stars
15
DF
Desmond Armstrong
2 November 1964 (aged 25)
14
Baltimore Blast
16
FW
Bruce Murray
25 January 1966 (aged 24)
38
Washington Stars
17
DF
Marcelo Balboa
8 August 1967 (aged 22)
18
San Diego Nomads
18
GK
Kasey Keller
29 November 1969 (aged 20)
6
Portland Timbers
19
MF
Chris Henderson
11 December 1970 (aged 19)
5
UCLA Bruins
20
MF
Paul Caligiuri
9 March 1964 (aged 26)
33
SV Meppen
21
MF
Neil Covone
31 August 1969 (aged 20)
5
Wake Forest Demon Deacons
22
GK
David Vanole
6 February 1963 (aged 27)
13
Los Angeles Heat
Anonymous team, anonymous coach – the typical outsider. Definitely last, may be happy to score a goal, but not to win a point. Perhaps for the team USA qualifying to the World Cup was most important for the future: as getting familiar with World finals which they were to host in 1994. In a way, getting the boys used to such a championship, so not to be entirely hopeless 4 years later at home. Most players had some kind of clubs, but in fact they trained for a long time together and the national team was their club and playing experience. Only four of them played professionally in Europe and their current clubs speak loudly for the low place the Americans had in the world of football: Sullivan played for the strongest foreign club and it was the Hungarian Gyori. Caligiuri and Ramos played Second Division (at best) in West Germany and Spain, Vermes played for lowly Volendam in Holland. The Americans were practically nothing and modestly did not expect miracles. The team was young – clearly the aim was 1994, not 1990.

World Cup. Preliminary

Preliminary troubles. The chosen mascot of the 1990 World Cup proved to be… perfect.
Modern football came to the point of looking as badly constructed robot with easily replaceable, but equally unimpressive parts, a cheap toy of mass production, which is outrageously priced. The name ‘Ciao’ was also symbolic – it means both ‘hello’ and ‘goodbye’: hello to the crowning event of football to say bitter goodbye to the game.
Scandals and problems erupted well before the finals, most of them of political nature. On one hand was the fact – and not a new one – that Italy by the end of 1989 did not even start building and preparing stadiums and infrastructure and FIFA’s inspection was very unhappy about it. The Italian response was indignant: ‘What do you want, this is Italy! We do everything in the last minute.’ And political reasons were sited as an excuse, namely constant elections and changes of government on every level. Of course, corruption was easy to see, but was never mentioned. Meantime Communism was rapidly collapsing and the European map was already changing – Germany was practically unified, although by the start of the World Cup not yet in football terms, so there were no East Germans included in the German national team. USSR started its disintegration, which was not yet affecting the national team, for there were no players from the Baltic republics and Georgia, but the end was approaching and this will be the last time a team named ‘USSR’ to appear. Yugoslavia was also increasingly going to collapse and in the nastier possible way – in a long and messy civil war. Signs of that were present in football already – Zvonimr Boban was involved in fight between Croatian fans and Serbian Police, ‘in the name of Croatia’, as he put it bluntly, and for that he was banned from football, thus, from the national team, thus, weakening the team of Yugoslavia, which was also to appear for the last time in its ‘classic’ kind. Czechoslovakia will appear for the last time too, although its disintegration was civilized – football was affected already, though: Lubos Kubik and Ivo Knoflicek defected to the West before 1990. Politics perhaps played minor role in that – both were unhappy with rules for transfers abroad imposed by the Czechoslovakian Federation and run to the West to join Fiorentina (Kubik) and St. Pauli (Knoflicek). They were promptly banned, creating immediate problem for the national team coach, but the sudden and rapid political changes in 1989 changed things in their favour: 1990 started without official Communism, banishment was voided and both players were returned to the national team. No so lucky Romanian star defender Miodrag Belodedici, who also defected – to Yugoslavia. Running away from Ceausescu’s paradise was unforgetable crime – Belodedice was tried and sentenced in absentia to 10 years in prison. And the Romanian Federation immediately cried to UEFA and FIFA that the player breached his contract with Steaua, so he was banished for 1 year and was able to really join Crvena zvezda (Belgrade) only after serving his ban. By the summer of 1990 he was still the wanted criminal and was not included in the Romanian national team.
The Colombian case – or rather, why was not there a Colombian case? The country was in the deadly grip of, practically, a civil war between whatever government was ruling, the leftist guerillas controlling large parts of the country, largely jungle, and the drug cartels spread from the cities to the jungle. That drug money went to fuel Colombian football was general knowledge. The brutal murder of a referee in 1989 canceled the national championship as a protest and was believed to be related to the cartels. Naturally, nobody in Colombia was thinking of withdrawal from the World Cup – football was national pride and Colombia reached the world finals for only second time. But why FIFA did not take some measures apart from usual threat with sanctions if Colombia decided to forfeit the World Cup? Well, FIFA always maintained the position that it is not political organization… which was not true for quite a long time too: South Africa was expelled from FIFA because of apartheid. Israel was out of participating in Asia because of the Arabic countries insisting on that and was a pariah, attached to Oceania – but a member of Oceania – in World Cup qualifications. From another side, during the 1980s doping became a problem and tests became a routine practice, especially at World Cup finals. Cocaine was one of the forbidden substances and Colombia was the producer of it. Like it or not, FIFA was taking political decisions for a long time already, yet, pretended to be apolitical even when it came to sport’s matters like doping. And FIFA chose to ignore the Colombian case, to stay silent and do nothing… domestic matters. Of course, taking Colombia out of the finals was not going to be simple – if done in the last minute, then Israel was the team to replace the Colombians and that meant… new scandals with the Asian and African Federations, leading to boycottes. It was cynical to avoid the Colombian situation, but that was the taken stance. It was even more cynical that Colombia would have been heavily sanctioned if forfeiting on its own the World Cup, but luckily government, drug cartels and leftist guerillas were united when it came down to football – nobody wanted to miss the finals.
Bellow all that were problems of football politics, quite familiar, long lasting and typical. First, Austria – all concentrated on the coach and early: during the qualifications. Otto Baric was replaced with Josef Hickersberger in 1988 and at first nobody saw evil. But slowly… the team captain Tony Polster, playing in Spain for Sevilla, was increasingly disliked by the fans and criticized in the media. The reason was egoistic play, which eventually transformed into question of patriotism: why some foreign-based player, thinking only of money and himself? Indirectly, the problem escalated when the national team played in other cities than Vienna and local fans insisted local players to be included in the squad. And who was promoting Polster? The coach… Polster was met with boos whenever Austria played a home game, never mind he was the only real star of the national team and his goals practically qualified Austria to the finals. Hickersberger increasingly was seen as dictatorial and disliked by the players, until a scandal burst between him and the 34-years old veteran defender and team captain Heribert Weber. The scandal was triggered by coach’s decision to leave Weber out of the starters because of sickness for the important match against DDR. Weber wanted to play and left out, said that he will never play for Hickersberger. And sent ultimatum to the Federation – ‘either he, or I’. The Federation ruled ‘wisely’ after the game was finished and Austria won: Hickersberger stays, Weber out. Practically, that left the national team, short on talent at that time, without a key player. Also, without the only player with World Cup experience – goalkeeper Lindenberger was also part of the 1982 World Cup team, but only as unused substitute. Such ‘tremors’ affected the whole team – now the players were quite against the coach, saying that behind every Austrian coach lurks Ernst Happel, a great coach universally disliked for his dictatorial methods. Looking ahead, during the finals everybody lamented ‘if only Otto Baric was coaching’. Poisoned atmosphere, especially aggravated by the fact that Austria did not have enough talent at the time and leaving somebody out of the team for whatever reason only meant weakening – oh, the days of Prohaska, Krankl, Pezzey, Concilia… there were no such players now, simple as that.
Belgium. Walter Meeuws successfully qualified the national team to yet another World Cup, but beginning with the last and unimportant qualifying match and following with preparatory friendlies the team seriously underperformed. Meeuws was no longer safe – many felt that he was reached his limit already. He also managed to alienate the players accusing them openly that they were not serious and do not put much work, thinking more of their clubs than of playing for their country. Eventually, the poisoned atmosphere made Meeuws quit 3 months before the finals and the suddenly the national team was without coach. Retired Guy Thys was asked to coach the team in a rush and he accepted. Thys had huge authority and all stars played under him in the past – he quickly restored order.
Costa Rica. The team qualified for the first time to World Cup finals and whatever lurked in the back was invisible – as soon as the national team lost 3 games at the Marlboro Cup in USA, the problem came up in front: the new President of the Federation, just elected, immediately sacked the national team coach Rodriguez. The results were just a pretext – it was known than both men disliked each other greatly and Rodriguez acted against the new President. Who retaliated with vengeance. Great Menotti was asked to take the team – he flatly refused – and the next man to be asked was Bora Milutinovic, who accepted. But the players were angry and wrote an open letter, signed by 7 of the best players, insisting the old coach to be restored. Some thought of quitting the national team if Rodriguez was not back at the helm. However, the significant point was ‘We are not against Milutinovic, we only want Rodriguez’ – thus, there was no hostility towards the new coach. The Federation President stayed firm on his decision, rightly thinking that the chance to play at the World Cup will be stronger motivation than supporting Rodriguez. Milutinovic made the best diplomatic move under the circumstances – he brought the team early to Europe to acclimatize it, which practically meant the team was far away from domestic turbulence.
The crisis in the United Arab Emirates was rather trivial: great Mario Zagallo qualified the team to the finals for the first time and seemed untouchable national hero. On the strength of the successful campaign, he asked for more money and was fired instead. Hard to tell why, since money were not a problem for the Sheikhs. In his place another Brazilian was quickly hired – Carlos Alberto Parreira, who coached Kuwait at the 1982 World Cup. Already well known and respected coach, so it was not exactly hiring somebody in a panic, but still it was a change and disruption.
Italy, as a host, had the ambition to win the World Cup and noting less would suffice. Azeglio Vicini was to coach the team with this objective and for awhile everything was fine. But when the finals came close and the team stop winning criticism piled up and both coach and team were under terrible pressure, constantly scrutinized and criticized. The atmosphere was poisoned and the only way for Viccini to silence his critics was to win the championship.
If in Italy style was not an issue and the way only important thing was winning, Brazil was more complicated – from the 1960s on the battle was between those wanting traditional artistic football and the pragmatics wanted ‘European’ disciplined kind, which translated always as defensive football. Sebastiao Lazaroni represented the ‘Europeans’, not the first and not the last of this breed, but now the focus was on him. Brazilians, in general, wanted to win, but playing beautiful football. With Tele Santana they pleased the eye and lost two World Cup. Naturally, the new coach had to introduce the opposite approach… and it was fine until seen and Lazaroni emphasized strong defense – and nobody liked it. Then the team won Copa America for the first time in quarter of a century at least and everything was fine, Lazaroni was the man. Then the euphoria ended and it was recalled that the boys won Copa America, but did not please the eye. Lazaroni fought back in a way more alienating than soothing: ‘You (the Federation) hired me, now you have to suffer me.’ Like Viccini in Italy, Lazaroni was not fired, but quickly the situation developed reached the point of ‘win or die’.
Cameroon brought the fantastic into usual scuffles between displeased public and national team. By 1990 the coach was Soviet citizen – Valery Nepomniachi. He qualified Cameroon to second World Cup and the unknown name naturally created interest – the Cameroonians introduced him as a pupil of Valery Lobanovsky. If someone asked the Soviets about him, he would learn only that nobody knew this guy, this making his name rings particularly true – it is roughly translated as ‘not remembered’. And there was nothing to remember – he was obscure coach in what soon was going to be independent Turkmenistan, mostly coaching juniors. Pupil of Lobanovsky? Nepomniachi recalled seeing Lobanovsky about three times in the corridors of the Federation, may be saying ‘hi’. At one point Cameroon asked for some Soviet coach and the Soviet Federation gave them Nepomniachi to work again with juniors. But when the national team coach suddenly left, Nepomniachi was remembered. Not immediately… at first the Minister of Sport in Cameroon declared that he was taking charge of the national team and bellow him a coaching trio was to do the bothersome practical work – Nepomniachi was offered to become part of the trio and accepted. Eventually, he was climbed to head coach, leading a successful qualification campaign – the whole process of his transformation was ‘smooth’: with every new win he ‘naturally’ climbed higher mostly by praise. One win and he was wonderful coach, second win – leading coach, third win – a great coach. And that way the initial trio disappeared and Nepomniachi was the great head coach of Cameroon – but not the only one… for it was Africa and there more than anywhere else politicians interfered with the running of the national team. Often Nepomniachi was told who to select, who to play, how many players of this club to take and how many of the other club to take or not to take. Yet, it was not just happy sailing – in early 1990 Cameroon lost the African championship and the mood was to sack Nepomniachi at once. He managed to survive somehow, perhaps by making compromises suitable to the politicians – at least, the case of Roger Milla strongly suggest that: Milla not only was out of the national team, but out of football. He had retired and occasionally played for fun, but his name was so big in Cameroon that the media constantly called for his return. Nepomniachi heard the call most likely from the politicians and decided to try Milla in the last training camp before the World Cup in Yugoslavia. True, including Milla was not advised by all – the player had his enemies as well, who pointed out to Nepomniachi the difficult character of the veteran, which was only to add to various other frictions in and outside the team, the biggest of which was the long lasting poisonous rivalry between the star goalkeeper N’Kono and Bell. Nepomniachi tried Milla in a game, without really expecting anything good, but the veteran surprised him not only with excellent form, but with fitting perfectly and taking the leading role in the team. This more or less settled the tensions and the future of the coach. At least for the moment.
Argentina was also rocked – the team did not a game since July 1989. They finished 3rd in Copa America. Carlos Billardo was under pressure, but the focus of attention was somewhat taken away from him because of various problems of star players: Maradona, his lack of form, and drug use: the shaky form and pretenses of Brown, Clausen, Batista: various demands of Valdano and constant complains of Diaz. Of course, everybody in Argentina knew what is best and gave advise – or rather demands – to Billardo, including the country’s President Menem. Nothing new… and hardly helped by Billardo’s attitude and combative answers. To a point, settling camp in Europe well before the start of the finals was wise decision to take away the team from poisonous scrutiny at home, but… it was a squad of 9 players, for the rest were playing in Europe and still involved with unfinished championships – part of the preparation, for instance, was going to Naples to watch Maradona’s Napoli play. Billardo said that he was satisfied with the form of the star and therefore everything will be fine.
Still, the jewel of the scandals before the World Cup belonged to the Dutch. It was a tradition… and went the same way as in 1974, 1978… it was like Holland could not go to finals without major scandal and ‘temporary’ measures. After winning the European championship in 1988 Rinus Michels stepped down and was replaced by Tijs Libreghts, who qualified the team easily. Yet, he was fired in April 1990 because of weak performance of the team and bad relations with the players. The same as in 1974 and 1978… a new coach was hired in the last minute and only for the final round. The problems were also the same – the players wanted bigger bonuses, the Federation was unwilling to pay more. This battle was crucial for Libreghts: he tried to take middle position and to mediate between players and Federation with the result of alienating both sides, neither wanting him anymore. The players – at least the big number coming from Ajax – wanted Cruijff, but the Federation did not want to deal with him. Cruijff did not want to deal with the Federation either, making his usual biting critical and ironic comments. Leo Beenhakker was temporary hired – just like Michels in 1974 and Happel in 1978, only for the finals. Somewhere in the shadows Rinus Michels lurk in advisory position. Libreghts meantime went to the courts to sue the Federation for breach of contract. In another country… but it was Holland, so the scandals was actually seen as optimistic sign: the Dutch seemingly performed best when in the midst of scandal – such was the tradition: 1974, 1978… this time they also had all the stars at hand, unlike 1974 and 1978.
And the finals were coming in all that, so scandals were scandals, but much more important was becoming the ranking, the predictions, the expectations.
Perhaps it will be best to recall a betting agency rather than more ‘professional’ views: this is how Germans ranked the teams in betting terms. Hardly more different that ‘official’ ranking and ‘professional’ predictions/expectations. It will be good to see how close the betting ranking came to actual results. This quotation did not differ much from what was expected by specialists and pundits… Perhaps the most important thing was how England and Spain was seen: no matter what was hoped at home, objectively nobody thought these two teams capable of winning the World Cup. Strong – yes, winners – no. Also run. That was the reality in 1990.
The all-time World Cup table was going to change. What else?

1990

1990

Football hit rock bottom. The World Cup showed exactly that and it was the logical conclusion of decade plunging into the abyss.
Even the official poster of the finals was reminding a coffin. During the 1980s problems piled up, most of them voiced out, but not addressed – the sport was into fundamental crisis. From aging and increasingly dangerous stadiums to fan violence, which spread like the plague from country to country. By now a football match was really like a war – an invasion of merciless army of fans destroying everything they met on the road to the stadium. Win or lose, the carnage was always present. It was not better on the pitch, where tactical fouls, hunting of the best players of the opposition, vicious tackles, physical battle, time wasting, simulations, and constant complaining of every call of the referees were not just elements of the game, but became the game itself. Referees were no better – their too many mistakes were no longer viewed as mistakes, but deliberately done ‘against us’ and the referee, never really liked, now was considered entirely incompetent, but ill-minded devil. Coaches behaved in a way, which only fueled the fire: jumping, gesticulation, screaming, protesting and abusing the referees every time they blew the whistle. Their ’emotions’ were calculated to increase the tensions and succeeded. A football match was no longer fun and joy, but mean and dangerous event, in which only victory counted, no matter how achieved. Violence ruled the game and everything surrounding it. And by the end of the 1980s something else was evident: a leveling of players and teams. Yes, it was great to see many lowly teams, particularly those from Africa and Asia, improve and coming close to the traditional football leaders, but the traditional powers were not getting better – they were getting worse. Everybody was playing the same kind of football, with the same tactics, it was difficult to distinguish one team from another . The players were also becoming generally the same, similar robots just from the assembly line of mass production. The 1990 World Cup just illuminated all the ills of the game – it was the dullest World Cup finals ever, the final match was simply a shame, leaving the bitter taste in viewers of three hours entirely wasted. Football was dying and the only way to bring it back to some kind of life was by radical surgery. Thus, rules had to be changed and an era of constant changing of rules started. Yet, one key element, perhaps the most important one for the ills of the game, was increased in importance: money. Big money. In 1990 ‘classic’ football expired. Something different was born. Something artificial. Something like a sick patient kept alive only by constant medical intervention, plugged in machines and mechanisms – unplug them and the patient will collapse dead immediately. What started in 1990 was the road on which a player with fantastic salary is terribly injured before even the season started and is constantly complaining of ‘unhappiness’. 1990 was the dead end.