The aftermath. There was official praise of this and that, but negative views and concerns were much more after the 1990 – and rapid, vast and, as it turned out, endless changes were going to be implemented in order of saving football from dying. On the positive side was the simple fact of increased quality of most teams – apart from USA and the United Arab Emirates, there were no outsiders at the 1990 World Cup. Anonymous teams like Costa Rica and Egypt were pretty much equal to star-studded teams. No outsiders, but hardly pleasant surprises either – only Colombia and Costa Rica.
Costa Rica against Scotland. Well… the unknowns proved capable of playing the same tough football as the big guys. Competent pressure and crowding, what else.
If the ‘smaller’ continents and countries climbed up, there was nothing optimistic at the top – rather, the traditional powers went down to lower level. Everybody was quite the same, no outsiders, but no favourites either and maybe Germany was ‘rightful’ champion, but it could be almost any other team – the final revealed unplesant truth: the ‘well oiled’ Germans in full strength managed to beat shapeless, badly trained Argentina, which had 4 regulars missing (Olarticoechea, Batista, Giusti, and Caniggia – all of them suspended for collecting cards) and finishing the match with 9 men. It took disputable – at least disputable – penalty to score the winning goal and without it… Argentina could have prevailed, who knows. And it was not that Argentina played any football. No wonder that practically one match in the whole championship pleased observers – Germany vs Holland. Football was seriously sick, going to die.
Nothing new was shown on the tactical field – that is, everybody used similar and familiar tactics, aimed mostly to destroy the opposition. Defense was the central idea. The World champions used 5-3-2 formation and the losing finalist entirely defensive and destructive ‘concept’, hoping that Maradona will eventually pull a trick or hand and that will win the match. Short of that – the penalty shootout gambling (which essentially voids any blame from the loser – Vicini defended himself that Italy finished the tournament with 6 wins and 1 tie, unbeaten). The difference between old hated catenaccio and the 1990 defensive football was largely in that: it was not just defensive play, but active hunt of the key players of the opposition anywhere on the field and destroying them. Physically destroying them. Any dirty trick was used – and defended as rightful: either kill the opponent star in the name of victory, or simulate theatrically, so the referee will expel the opposing player. Perhaps the biggest example of the state of the game was the new discoveries – practically none.
Dancing Roger Milla was the discovery of 1990 World Cup – back in 1958, the discovery was 17-years old Pele. Now it was 38-years old and retired for 2 two years former professional player, who was not exactly a great star in his earlier years.
The top scorer of the 1990 World Cup, Toto Schillaci, was of the same suspect mold: not exactly young striker, who shined largely because the ‘stars’ (Vialli and Mancini) utterly disappointed. Schilacci had his 15 minutes of fame and that was that… he never became a true star. In the grand leveling such moments were possible – the development of football in the 1980s made that exactly possible: no real difference between a star and competent ordinary player. As long as anybody can run 90 minutes and is not killed by the opposition, one can do better than Maradona in a given match – even 38-years old retiree or chancy reserve. The problem, however, is that no teenage magician could emerge in such environment.
So let concentrate on the negative side, a whole list of problems. Ugly brutality on and off the field.
The English fans distinguished themselves once again, but their habits of invading a city and destroy anything on their way was rapidly spreading already around the globe. Old problem by now, by fans violence would stubbornly stay with game no matter what measures were, are, and will be taken.
No better on the pitch. 176 yellow and red cards were given in the 1990 finals.
Argentina ‘won’ the championship with 3 red and 21 yellow cards. It was a World Cup which started and finished with expelled players. For the first time there was red card shown at the final – and Argentina took a big leap ‘forward’ in that with 2 players sent off. Hard to beat such lead.
Cameroon was second ‘best’ with 2 red and 14 yellow cards. Yes, the outsiders vastly improved… back in time, the outsiders collected cards largely because of incompetence and frustration. Now it was just like the leading teams: cold-blooded fearless calculated professional brutality. Deliberate, tactical, and no big deal that ‘we’ will play with fewer man – the point was to scare and destroy the ‘others’. It worked – the more you kick and spit, the farther you go… Followed by ‘mellow’ Czechoslovakia – 1 red and 13 yellow cards. The new world champions were very good too: they came 4th in registered brutality with 1 red and 8 yellow cards. Brazil had the same strong record.
Austria played only 3 games, but managed 1 red and 7 yellow cards in them. If they played more… sky was the limit. Uruguay, well remembered as the brutes in the 1986 World Cup, could not even compete with current leaders – they got only 9 yellow cards. The British teams were the gentlemen of the tournament – collectively, they got 13 cards, all yellow (England – 6, Ireland – 4, Scotland – 3). Poor Belgium was last on this honorable table with 1 card (however, it was red – as if trying to catch up with the rest by one big effort). Only 4 games ended with no cards distributed – 3 in the first round (Costa Rica – Scotland, Belgium – Spain, England – Scotland) and the meaningless 3rd place match Italy – England.
This picture is not even full, for the concerns with brutality already forced FIFA to make special statements and instructions to the referees to punish the offenders. But such instructions were quietly and no so quietly reversed as the championship progressed and neared its end: now there were too many cards, it was not good for the commercial image of the World Cup and there were too many complains, for key players missed key games. Argentina had 4 regulars suspended for the final, but the Germans were in full force – is that just? From what point of view? Fans want the best. Television and sponsors want the best. What kind of a final is the one where some obscure reserves play? A dark cast spreads over the champions – if Argentina was not depleted by suspensions, was it possible for the Germans to win? They barely managed – and with referee’s help! – to prevail against severely handicapped squad and against only 9 men of them. On the other hand… Argentina deserved more than two to be red-carded at the final and Germans deserved to see a player or two sent off too.
Brutal football, no fun at all, based on plethora of dirty tricks on one hand, bad refereeing on the other hand. Referees were under criticism for a long time, but in 1990 they were found inadequate. Of course, the Mexican Codesal was in the center of controversy: in short, he did not see a genuine penalty in German favour and later awarded non-existant one, thanks to which the Germans won the title. That was the culmination of complains against the refereeing in 1990. Earlier in the tournament there was special moment, which probably never happened before – a bit of a scandal between a referee and one of the linesmen during the match. The linesman had to be warned sternly that he is not the one making the decision, but this linesman was a referee with much higher status and authority than the one conducting the game – looked like a case of ego clash, but… FIFA was mostly to blame – politics played a huge role in assignments, beginning with the long established practice of ‘fair’ continental inclusion, which in fact put referees with little experience, even knowledge of, contemporary game. They made big mistakes, increasing the tensions on the pitch. Backroom maneuvering brought Codesal to the final and his performance was terrible. There were much better referees than him, but politics prevailed. In the same time FIFA looked for two opposite things at the same time: to clean the ugly game, thus instructing referees to punish many offenses severely. But money were another key aim to FIFA and television and sponsors wanted the big names to be present – there was more than bit of truth in Maradona’s accusation that everybody was against Argentina, because FIFA and sponsors wanted profitable Italy-Germany final. The ‘bright’ image of football was big stars, the strongest teams possible, festive atmosphere – no yellow and red cards shown left and right and teams appearing with reserve players because the regulars were suspended. So, the earlier instructions changed as the championship progressed and the number of yellow and red cards became massive: now, suddenly, it was to be other way around – try not to show cards. No wonder the referees were confused and lost their way – they were criticized for showing cards and not showing cards in the same time and frustration only increased their mistakes.
The combination of problems had only one solution: changing of rules and a process started after the World Cup and continues to this very day and certainly in the future too. More or less, the only helpful and meaningful change was the ban on goal-keepers playing with hands when the ball came to them from a teammate. Time-wasting was killed at last – the end of endless passing between a defender and a goalkeeper. No other rule change really benefited the game – rather, artificially made it speedier and a bit more attractive, but not because it was played better. Anyhow, changes were still in the future in 1990 – presently, it was concluded that the game was practically dying and needed big and massive changes. And that was finally shown by the best eleven of the finals.
Of course, there were various ‘best eleven’, but El Grafico version represents the general tendency. Goycoechea (Argentina) became unlikely hero – thanks to heavy injury of Pumpido he appeared and since so many games ended with penalty shoot-out, he was lucky to save a few penalties and thus the propel Argentina to the final. He did not play badly during the games either, but it was the penalties he saved making him number one – for he was not extraordinary goalkeeper… and there were at least a few better than him at the World Cup, but they played fewer games for early eliminated teams. Bergomi and Baresi… well, Italy did not win the championship, did not even reach the final, so… big names, steady players, but not exactly shining this year. Yet, Augenthaler with them was disturbing – the fact that such a player could be a key figure mostly showed how impoverished on talent football became: a player like Schwarzenbeck, not like Beckenbauer was the best. Brehme deserved his place – at least because there was no other so dependable and versatile left fullback at the finals. Wright… the same as Augenthaler – one can be only sorry for the past when there were impressive players. Same with Matthaus and Gascoigne. To a point, same with Maradona – the only artist among the ‘best eleven’, but he was not particularly great at this championship. Klinsmann deserved his place. Schillaci – yes, a pleasant surprise and the goal-scorer of the championship, but… a great star he was not. For whatever reasons many real stars disappointed: Gullit, van Basten, Rijkard, Vialli, Butragueno, Francescoli, Burruchaga, etc. Only a tiny trickle of young talent and that mostly showing promise: Caniggia, Gascoigne, Baggio, Raducioiu, Popescu, Ingesson, Brolin, Reuter, Richard Witschge. Of them only Reuter made it to the final, yet, as a substitute – seemingly, the days of youngsters like Pele were gone forever…
A picture like this one symbolized best the 1990 state of the game: controversial artist, mixing cocaine with handballs, still ahead of gritty workaholic with limited skills and imagination, who may be behind in talent, but ahead on winning precisely because of his grit.