Football Journey

The Olympic tournament attracted little attention – Russians went to see the games, of course, but internationally and especially in terms of discoveries and innovations, nobody expected anything and rightly so. There were only 4 serious teams, who are not to meet each other before the semifinals. Every group had a strong favourite and the rest were too weak for any surprise or upset. The groups were: Group A – USSR, Cuba, Venezuela, Zambia. Group B – Czechoslovakia, Kuwait, Colombia, Nigeria. Group C – DDR, Algeria, Spain, Syria. Group D – Yugoslavia, Iraq, Finland, Costa Rica. No need to points out the obvious favourites. The rest, including Spain, were nobodies by all accounts – in every group the battle was going to be for the 2nd place and it was unpredictable. Momentary form would decide half of the teams proceeding to the ¼ finals. There were no famous players, so it was no wonder coaches attracted most attention, for they were the most famous members of the finalists: Ivan Toplak was at the helm of Yugoslavia – one of the well respected Yugoslav coaches in the 1970s, his task obviously was to test and prepare players for the A team, going through rebuilding. Jose Santamaria lead Spain – the Uruguayan star of the great years of Real Madrid had not similar role to Toplak’s, only not so urgent. Spain was very young team, clearly testing promising youngsters, who may become leading players after 4-5 years. Otto Gloria was at the helm of Nigeria. The man who made Benfica top team in the early 1960s had a different role now: to bring some professionalism into talented, but ill-trained Africans. Kuwait had Brazilian coach for the same purpose – one Carlos Parreira. At the time, he was not famous yet, but at 37 years of age, he had vast experienced – the African championship, beating Algeria at the final. More or less, that was all, so really only team USSR needs closer scrutiny.

USSR was the biggest favourite – hosting the Olympics put special expectations on Soviet sportsmen in every sport, including football. The political aim was to show the world the supremacy of the Communist way of life via sporting victories. Under the general aim there was a more specific one: USSR badly needed victory – the whole decade was full of frustrations and disappointments. By 1980 USSR was at very low point, not even able to qualify to major international tournaments. They missed 2 World Cups, they missed 2 European finals, they lost 2 Olympic tournaments. Olympics were frustrating for separate reasons as well – they belonged to Eastern Europe, therefore to USSR as a flagman of the Communist world. Yet, team USSR not only did not win Olympics since 1956, but did not reached even the final since this same year. Mere ‘vassals’ eliminated the ‘masters’ in 1972 and 1976. Now, on home turf, it was time to win at last – and hardly anybody doubted Soviet victory, for they were the only team which was pretty much the A national team of the country. It was also expected that orders not to play hard against USSR will be given to at least Czechoslovakia and DDR. Yet, the mood in USSR was strange – there was little criticism after lowly Greece eliminated USSR and went to the 1980 Euro finals. Beskov was not sacked for the failure. Instead, the page was closed and new goal was elevated in 1979 – preparation for the Olympics was the most important and to hell with secondary distractions like European finals. May be reasonable approach, if it was followed to the letter – Beskov’s A team was a bit rag-tag during the European qualifications and remained so for the Olympics. Dynamo Kiev players were not in favour – the team was based on Spartak Moscow, which Beskov also coached. There were only 2 players from Kiev – Baltacha and Bessonov. In itself, it was not the most important thing – the really important thing was that it was still shapeless team. The aim was clearly building a new national team and the base of it was already in place – most of the Olympic players were soon to become world famous and the stars of the exciting Soviet team of the 1980s – but they were still inexperienced and clearly the whole team was still in the stage of searching the right combination before even tuning a regular squad. Since this team came under the name of Olympic team, no particular attention was paid to its shortcomings: it was supposed to be ‘different’ team than the A national team. So, there were players, who were considered as national team material at the time, but clearly part of ‘trying’ stage: Prokopenko (Dynamo Minsk), Gazzaev (Dynamo Moscow), Nikulin (Dynamo Moscow). The back-up goalkeeper on the other hand showed fear: Vladimir Pilguy (Dynamo Moscow) was good, but at 32 he was also on his way out of the national team, where he never established himself anyway. In and out for years, he played only 12 matches for USSR to this moment , most of them friendlies. Seemingly, Beskov wanted insurance… he was uncertain of his own discovery Rinat Dassaev. Dassaev, although with 7 caps for USSR already, was still unknown even in USSR – everybody knows his name today: Rinat Dassaev. Right? Well, in 1980 he was listed Renat – even officials in USSR were not yet aware of the correct spelling of his name. Since only 17 players per team were permitted at the 1980 Olympics, team USSR was suddenly suspect – 4 players were not exactly promising great future, the rest had little experience and there was no certainty that they will became regulars and make a strong national team, and in the same time various promising youngsters were out. So were established stars – the biggest absentee was Oleg Blokhin. It was curious approach – it did not look serious enough. It did not look like Beskov was the right man to ensure victory. It was a team neither here, nor there – not the A team in full force, yet not entirely different Olympic team. It was not entirely team for the future, but not a team based on former respectable players getting last chance to succeed internationally either. One really expected the Soviets to put their very best for a home victory, which politics demanded. But even with such misgivings, team USSR looked much stronger than any other – DDR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia had clearly weaker teams than their A national teams. Team USSR deserves to be given in full not that much because of its strangeness, but because most names will ring a bell – most players will become very familiar soon after 1980.

1. Rinat Dassaev (Spartak Moscow) 2. Tengiz Sulakvelidze (Dinamo Tbillisi) 3. Aleksander Chivadze (Dinamo Tbillisi) 4. Vagiz Khidiatulin (Spartak Moscow) 5. Oleg Romantzev (Spartak Moscow) 6. Sergey Shavlo (Spartak Moscow) 7. Sergey Andreev (SKA Rostov) 8. Vladimir Bessonov (Dinamo Kiev) 9. Yury Gavrilov (Spartak Moscow) 10. Fyodor Cherenkov (Spartak Moscow) 11. Valery Gazzaev (Dinamo Moscow) 12. Vladimir Pilguy (Dinamo Moscow) 13. Sergey Baltacha (Dinamo Kiev) 14. Sergey Nikulin (Dinamo Moscow) 15. Khoren Oganesyan (Ararat) 16. Aleksander Prokopenko (Dinamo Minsk) 17. Revaz Chelebadze (Dinamo Tbillisi).

Genady Radchuk, one of the best Soviet football commentators, casually mentioned that the rules for European and South American teams forbade using players who played at World Cup matches. Who exactly made the rule is unclear and was it really followed is also unclear, but in the Soviet case it was easy to follow it: the last qualification match for the World Cup USSR played in the first half of 1977. Almost all of the participants in it were not called to the national team for a long time already. The Olympic team was the new national team, which did not start the next World Cup campaign yet.

USSR opened their Olympic campaign against Venezuela – captains Romantzev and Sanchez shaking hands with mutual puzzlement, for neither team knew much about the opposition. The Soviets played pretty much the same team which appeared as the A team less then a month before against Denmark. It was an easy sailing – 4-0. Zambia was no more difficult either – 3-1. Cuba was even weaker than the previous opponents – 8-0. There was no much to comment… so vast was the difference between USSR and the anonymous teams. In the second half against Cuba Beskov replaced Dassaev with Pilguy, giving a chance to the back-up goalie to play a little.

Cuba won the other two matches and finished 2nd in the group, thus going to the ¼ finals.

1. USSR 3 0 0 15-1 6

2. Cuba 2 0 1 3-9 4

3. Venezuela 1 0 2 3-7 2

4. Zambia 0 0 3 2-6 0

Nothing worth mentioning… Cuba got a bit of praise, for ‘overachieving’, but if another team finished second, it would have been the same.

A moment from the match between Cuba and Zambia – the players are quite surprised by… the ball.

 

The second big international tournament of the year was the Olympic Games. The Olympics always attract big interest, but in the 1980 even more so. First, because Moscow hosted them and the Soviet political ambition to outdo everything done to this moment immediately brought critical comparison to Hitler’s Olympics in 1934. It was to be more than sports – it was to be a showcase of Communist supremacy, aiming to win ideological battle. Politics affected badly the games – the West was not happy to participate in something designed to humiliate democracy. USSR provided a way out, but also politicized the games for the West too. The second point was the Soviet invasion of Afganistan – now now the West had a reason to protest and eventually refuse to participate in the games. The issue became entirely political, accusation flew both ways and no side was satisfied – USA called for boycott , but not every country followed, so to a point the boycott failed. USSR tried to emphasize sporting spirit and accused USA of sabotaging purely friendly event – but few were convinced.

At the end sportsmen from participating countries marched to the opening as ever.

Mummy-like Brezhnev announced the Olympics officially starting.

And the mascot Misha wished success to everybody. All of these were interpreted depending on political standpoint – perhaps the first Olympics burdened with so heavy double meaning.

Football was hardly affected by the confrontation – actually, it was, but 4 years later when the Communist countries retaliated by boycotting the Los Angeles Olympics. In 1980 it was perhaps the sport least suffering by the political stand off: Olympic football lost its importance long time ago, it was considered a domain of Eastern Europe, and the interest in it was small. There were problems with participation, the status of players and whole teams, statistics, and the whole formula for years – they diminished both the importance of Olympic football and public interest in it. Tensions were largely European, for South Americans were not very interested in Olympic football and played by the rules. The rest of the world played by the rules too and easily so, for there was no professional football in Asia and Africa, and very little in North America. Europe was the only battlefield – first of all, not every country bothered with Olympic football. This created problems with qualifications – amateur football was secondary matter at best for most federations. Money were short. This lead to qualification groups based on geography – the Eastern Europe grumbled, because now the Communist countries were grouped together. Teams, better than their Western counterparts were eliminated. ‘Not fair’, cried the East. The West responded by old accusation: that Easterners used their national teams and their players were hardly ‘amateurs’ – unfair advantage over purely amateur Western teams. With time, the whole amateur issue became muddy, because rules differed from one country to the next in the West and it was not the real situation of a given player, but rather what was written on paper making him professional or amateur. Sometimes violations were not even objected by either side of the dispute, because objection would trigger even bigger digging in the backyard of the protester. The main result was fantastic statistical mess – as a rule of thumb, Eastern European countries counted their Olympic matches as matches played by their national team. Western European countries did not do that. But, with time, the Eastern Europeans also started making separate Olympic teams – and this brought even bigger statistical mess, for there were players never appearing for the A team, but still got matches because the Olympic team appeared in official statistics. In 1980 the mess caught the Easterners as well – during the Olympics Soviet journalists complained about the statistic numbers of Czechoslovakian and East German players: they looked fake and it was impossible to figure out on what those numbers were based. Coaches were puzzled and unable to really evaluate the strength of the opposition, journalists had no idea who some players were – the names were unknown, but their records showed otherwise. As for statisticians and historians… the puzzle was unsolvable. What was the legitimate criteria was growing mystery: the official registration showed the number of ‘international matches played’. And here is a sample of East German players: Kuhn – 75 matches, Schnuphase – 69, Liebers – 53, Hause – 51, Terletzki – 50, Trieloff – 46. At the bottom of the list was the 30-years old Netz with 6 matches. Fairly well known player, but with so few caps, unlike his teammates. Those with most matches were national team players, but nobody had so many matches for the A team. Journalists considered that the records showed a grand total of matches played for the A national team, B team, the Olympic team, and all junior formations. And… still the numbers did not tally.

The biggest mystery of all was Rostislav Vaclavicek – 34-years defender of Zbrojovka (Brno), whose registry showed 48 ‘international matches’. But he never played a single game for Czechoslovakia – that is, for the A team. The only conclusion the Soviet journalists came to was that may be Czechoslovakian Federation counted all international matches a player participated in during his career – including unofficial friendlies of the club a player played for. Still, there was no solution… with all his ‘impressive’ international record Vaclavicek was only a reserve. A new suspicion loomed from that: it looked like some teams decided on race for records – and suddenly team USSR appeared inexperienced, for compared to Vaclavicek the Soviet players had nothing to show… their most capped player was Vagiz Khidiatulin with 17 caps. Bessonov followed with 16. But even the Soviet numbers were a mystery… both Khidiatulin and Bessonov were still new to the national team. There numbers showed what? Matches for the A team? The Olympic team? Or combined record? There was no distinction between teams – on July 12, less than a month before the Olympics started, USSR played a friendly against Denmark. The accounts show a match of the A team. Denmark certainly played with their national team. ‘Olympics’ were not even mentioned ones in the articles on the match – just an ordinary friendly of the A national team. Which consisted of the very same squad playing 20 days at the Olympics. Under the same coach too – the other ‘suspect’ finalists at least had different coaches for their A and Olympic teams, a clear sign of separation, of different teams. At least USSR, DDR, and Czechoslovakia officially had ‘amateur’ football – Yugoslavia did not exactly claim that. Players there had ‘contracts’ with their clubs, it was openly spoken of and written about. Who was amateur and who was professional in Yugoslavia then? If Zlatko and Zoran Vujovic, Milos Hrstic, Ivan Gudelj, Dragan Pantelic, Tomislav Ivkovic were still young players and may be without professional contracts, it was unlikely that established for years players like Boro Primorac, Milan Jovin, Milos Sestic were ‘amateurs’ training after work by 1980. Like the entire team USSR, half of the Czechoslovaks, and at least a third of team DDR, the Yugoslavs were current national team players or up and coming youngsters destined to play for the national team. Of course, the role of the Olympic teams was more or less trying future national team players, but there were so many current ones on one hand, and so many not merely promising youngsters, but ready to play for the A team as soon as the Olympic games end. It was a mockery of the whole distinction between national and Olympic teams – and this was not lost on Western countries either, which during the 1970s gradually started using not part-timers, but players already included in professional teams. Lines were blurred, problems increased not only of what was a legitimate amateur, but what is a match of the A national team and what not. To sum the problems: if one looks records today, the already mentioned Rostislav Vaclavicek has 0 matches for Czechoslovakia. Vladimir Bessonov has 79 matches for the national team of USSR and 6 for the Olympic team – separate records, although the Olympic one includes only the matches played at the 1980 Olympic finals, suggesting that the USSR Olympic team played no other games at the time – just the finals. Frank Terletzki has a grand total of 4 matches for DDR – and nothing else, which means that A and Olympic teams were separate entities in DDR even when using the same players. Boro Primorac – 14 for Yugoslavia, started in 1976. Francisco Buyo, the future goalkeeper of Real Madrid, playing for Deportivo La Coruna in 1980, has 11 matches for the amateur national team of Spain – despite the fact that he was ‘loaned’ from La Coruna by Huesca in 1978-79 and played for professional clubs since 1975. And Frantisek Stambachr won Olympic gold less then two months after winning European bronze with the Czechoslovakian A team – yet his record shows only matches played for the A team: 31 between 1977 and 1983. No wonder Western countries called for changing rules and permitting professionals to participate in the Olympic games – by 1980 even the Communist countries had trouble figuring out their own teams and who and what was legitimate amateur. After all, one cannot really oppose the status of, say, Buyo, if counting the preparatory games of his ‘Olympic’ teams as A-national team friendlies. Other factors piled up – just after the Olympics the African Federation officially permitted professional football on the continent: given the resources there, hardly a single African country would have been able to finance two different national teams. The same was true for Asia at that time and most of Central America as well – the International Olympic Committee wanted vast participation in the games, so it was clear that unless rules were changed, fake and corrupted records would flood Olympic football and tensions, scandals, and never ending mutual accusations, followed by boycotts may even kill the Olympic games.

 

The new European champions were different matter – they had established and new stars, very able team, which was also young and not quite at its peak, and most importantly West Germany returned to the right track. The changes after the 1978 fiasco seemingly brought back the Germans to exciting total football and they had a team playing like the fantastic team of the first half of the 1970s. And this team was most certainly to stay on top for many years. There were similarities with the the great team of the early 70s and tradition was seemingly at work. Of course, the coach was credited for that.

Lothar Matthaus, Calle Del’Haye, and Jup Derwall – a picture of optimism.

German tradition was the key to success – Derwall, after years as an assistant to Schon, replaced him in 1978, just like Schon replaced Sepp Heberger in 1964, after working as Herberger’s assistant for years. Stability was obviously the key – Derwall was only the 4th manager of the German national team in history. Helmut Schon was assistant coach for 8 years and Derwall was his assistant 8 years too. Like Schon, he experienced success first as an assistant. He knew very well the ins and outs of working with the national team. Continuation of the line was fruitful – if Herberger waited almost 20 years for his success, Schon achieved it in less then 10. Derwall won a title after only 2 years at the helm. It was the first major tournament West Germany played under his guidance – another optimistic sign. Herberger made West Germany world champions, Schon doubled the success if his teacher, winning the European and the world titles – Derwall, like Schon, won the European championship first, and since he was expected to stay as long as those before him, he was expected to outdo them after such a start. Tradition certainly was bringing results. Tradition is conservative, however. Derwall was no innovator, he made no radical change of a team which obviously needed that in 1978 – instead, he lamely continued the approach of Helmut Schon. The picture above is a bit misleading: Derwall had the guts to include young players – Matthaus was only 19 years old – but his exciting new team was also a result of circumstances. In West Germany Derwall was observed critically and rightly so: facing the need to start from scratch, he chose to continue Schon’s approach, which obviously reached a dead end. Nigbur, Fischer, Bonhof, and Cullmann were key players for Derwall – the survivors of Schon’s team. Three 1974 world champions… but what kind? Only Bonhof was a starter and not right away back in 1974. Cullmann was the eternal back up player. Nigbur hardly ever played for the national team – a total of 6 matches during the 6 years he was included in the national team. Fischer was not a stable first choice either. Bonhof was the prime star and also the youngest of the quartet, but he was also part of the team which lost the 1976 European final and crushed so badly in 1978. There is little doubt that Derwall insisted on these players – injuries of Nigbur and Fischer made him look for other options. Bonhof and Cullmann were in the 1980 squad… Bonhof was out because of late injury, Cullmann was obviously insufficient, yet, Derwall played him as much as possible. The new team happened because Derwall did not have his chosen stars… and he had to give up on Cullmann. Reluctantly at that. Derwall clearly had no guts to get rid of Schon’s reserves, of second-rate players, stigmatized by staying in the shadows of great players for many years – he was intending to continue the line of Schon going down. It is no wonder that the big discoveries in 1980 were exactly of players replacing the injured ‘stars’. Even the only innovation Derwall made was a copy of Schon’s and it was made out of desperation. Doubts about Derwall’s qualities can be summed like this: the new German team looked like a copy of the great West Germany of early 1970s, the team was finally shaped at the end of Euro 1980 – a copy of the 1974 World Cup team, and Derwall made it only because he had no other option. On the positive side – he had the guts to select young players, his team returned to the kind of football the Germans abandoned after 1974 – both successful and exciting to watch, and it was team for the future, given the age of the players. After all, the new European champions were the only really balanced team at the finals, with plenty of strong replacements, and the new stars – most of them defining the 1980s – came from it. Thus, unlike Belgium, the whole German team needs closer scrutiny.

Tony Schumacher. 26 years old rival of the other discovery that year – Pfaff. Five years ago he was almost without future, but perseverance and character elevated him to first choice at 1. FC Koln. He won the Bundesliga first and eventually was invited to the national team. Becoming a starter was a bit chancy – if Nigbur was healthy, Schumacher was to warm the bench – but he really jumped on his chance and was one of the big discoveries at the European finals. One big plus was that he was not stigmatized like the unfortunate keepers, who spent most of their careers in the shadow of Sepp Maier – Nigbur, Kleff, Kargus, Franke grew old playing rarely for the national team and always found deficient, for they were compared to Maier. Schumacher came in view after Mayer retired and was much younger than the already mentioned, who were pushing 30. The future was clearly his, he arrived – like Pfaff – at age, when goalkeepers usually start to mature. He filled the gap left by Maier for many years to come – it was easy to envision West Germany with a great goalkeeper for the next 10 years. Problem solved.

Manfred Kaltz. Already a star, considered one of the top full backs in the world. At 27, he was at his peak. A modern full back, reminding a bit of Breitner between 1972 and 1974. Energetic, covering large space, instrumental in attacks, scoring, and not exactly pinned to the right side of field. He was part of rapidly rising Hamburger SV, which was very helpful too, for other HSV players were included in the national team and teammates knew each other in and out. Versatile defender – he was used as a stopper by Schon in 1978. Of course, he was a copy of Breitner – his creativity was limited, he was not great in his essential job – strikers often outwitted him, and he was space-limited – unlike Breitner, roving everywhere, Kaltz largely occupied the right side of the field. He was also more defensive player – unlike Breitner, who rapidly evolved into playmaker.

Uli Stielike. Derwall moved him back to be a libero – a great move, even when commanded by necessity. The skills of Stielike were well known and he was the mover and shaker of Real Madrid. He was also exactly what the prophets of total football preached – versatile player, comfortable at any position: so far, Stielike played at almost every post in attack and midfield. Moving him back as a libero repeated the great move of Beckenbauer years before – space was opened for Stielike to conduct the team’s play. Essentially, Derwall did what Schon did years earlier and it was the right move. Stielike was not as ellegant as Beckenbauer, not he was so imaginative, but he was reliable and creative. Perhaps a bit poorer version of Beckenbauer, but only a bit – with Stielike, German defense remained iron strong, increasing the attacking strength in the same time. 25 years old – coming to his peak and having many years ahead of him.

Karl-Heinz Forster. 21 years old, coming from rising VfB Stuttgart. May be he needed some time to build chemistry with Stielike to the point Schwarzenbeck had with Beckenbauer, but Forster seemed better player than Schwarzenbeck already. He was more versatile, capable of playing not only as a sweeper and stopper, but as a left full back too. He also went into attacks more frequently than Schwarzenbeck and, most importantly, he was not just addition to a great and particular libero, but stand on his own. With him, the German team had not to worry for central defender for the next ten years. At least.

Bernard Dietz. The oldest and most experienced player in the squad. At 32, he was not yet showing decline. Spirited and modest left full back and captain of the team. A modest player, never considered a big star and playing for modest MSV Duisburg for years, Dietz was something between his predecessors Hottges and Vogts: very stable and spirited full back. He was less given to attack than Vogts, but more than Hottges. Disciplined player, willing to follow coach’s demands, but more conservative than both Hottges and Vogts, who on occasion played at different side of the pitch, and Vogts even in midfield. The age was the only problem – he was not going to last for long and seemingly there was no other strong enough left full back in West Germany, but either one of the Forster brothers or Briegel were capable of playing at the left side of defense, so the problem was not big.

Hans-Peter Briegel. 24 years old player of 1. FC Kaiserslautern, listed as defender. He played as full-back and at the end of the tournament he was voted in the top eleven as a left full-back, but his proper place was more like defensive midfielder. Difficult to pin down to particular post really. Briegel was especially strong even for a German and players of this kind tend to be brutes on pitch, but he was not. Of course, he intimidated the opposition, too powerfully build to push down, too fit to outrun him, too determined to brake him down emotionally, but he was good player, not just a tower of muscle without skills. Briegel solved the problem with defensive midfielder – a long lasting one, which always called for improvisation (Wimmer, Bonhof, Flohe, Cullmann – none of them played at this position in his club, or, if he did, eventually moved to another role). Briegel was particularly important discovery because he would cover either full-back, if needed – as he did, when Dietz was injured.

Bernd Schuster. Only 20 years old talent, playing for 1. FC Koln. Some specialists knew him already, but Ron Greenwood was lone and even eccentric voice when he named him one of the best before the finals started – Schuster was not a starter: he seemed to be back-up of Bonhof. That is, essentially defensive midfielder with play-making abilities, who, like Bonhof, would conduct the game from deeper back, and may be even restricted to more traditional role in the presence of Stielike. But the team had to be reshaped during the finals and Schuster not only became a starter, but was moved to a central paly-making role. Thus, the big problem existing since Overath and Netzer retired was finally solved – West Germany found at last great playmaker. Skillful, imaginative, with great leadership qualities. With Schuster the Germans seized to be boring marathon runners – the team suddenly had a flair. His age brought great confidence – this guy was almost a teenager yet. His best days were still in the future, he was surely to be the key player of the team for the next 10 years.

Hansi Muller. 22 years old and already a star – a young star, but a star. With Forster brothers, part of the rising VfB Stuttgart. An attacking midfielder with strong play-making inclination, he took the place of Uli Hoeness from the great old West Germany. However, Muller was heavily criticized and never fully accepted by German media: he was too technical for a German and tended to keep the ball too long. Like Hoeness before, Muller was a bit moody and unpredictable – often he underperformed or at least media thought so. The last negative side, also copying the situation of the early 1970s, was the rivalry with Felix Magath. Helmut Schon had a problem with Overath and Netzer – there was no way to play them both. Same was with Muller and Magath – which lead to tensions immediately: Magath was left on the bench and he complained to the media. Although Derwall did not give up on Muller, he was leaning towards plainer, but more reliable Magath – just like Schon preferred Overath over Netzer. Yet, for the moment the midfield was completed and given the age of the regulars – it was fantastic middle line not just for the moment, but for a long, long time.

Compared to the other lines, attack was shaky and unfinished – a promising, but momentary solution. The positive outweighted the negative, though: the line needed improvement, but it worked and given a little time will improve and settle.

Karl-Heinz Rummenigge. At 24 already an European star, one of the very best continental strikers at the moment. And for the future too. Starting professional football at the time when great Gerd Muller was still the king, relegated Rummenigge to the right wing – to a point, it was unfortunate and may be crippled a bit his development, but on the other hand, this development solved problems of the national team – back in 1974 Grabowski was placed as right winger as an emergency measure. In 1980 there was no great right winger in West Germany and Rummenigge was covering the gap. So far, so good – because of the nature of the center-forwards at the time. The question was how long such arrangement would work, because a player of Rummenigge’s caliber would hardly keep supportive or secondary role for long. Partly, the answer to the question depended on the construction of the whole team and on available strikers. Partly, it depended on personal ego and willingness to sacrifice stardom for team success. Partly, it depended on the authority of the coach. In real terms, the question was simplified to decision to base a team on Hamburger SV or Bayern. Eventually Rummenigge won – and West Germany lost – but in 1980 things looked fine. And there were options for variety precisely because Rummenigge was not a typical winger, but a center-forward capable of playing at the wing too.

Horst Hrubesch. The picture is symbolic one – Keegan needed a leather to get above Hrubesch. The top European player was a pale shadow of himself and England – a mediocrity at the European finals, when his ugly teammate became a star and won the title. A Cindarella story really – Hrubesch was included in the national team lately and reluctantly. He was not originally a starter. If Fischer was healthy, Hrubesch may not have been even in the squad. He was 29, he spent years playing second division football, and although he scored a lot, he was not a star, but rather one among similar big centers at the time, lacking great skills and even individuality – a tank. Of course, the problem was the shadow of Gerd Muller… since nobody could be Gerd Muller, his replacements were always found insufficient. Dieter Muller was the best promise, but he faded quickly. A string of heavy ‘tanks’ were used – Seel, Fischer… They were good, but on club level – in the national team they scored little and were blocked quite easily, for their game was predictable for modern defenders. The search continued. In itself, Hrubesch was not the solution – he was not better or different than Fischer. The solution was in the shaping of the new team – more creative wingers and midfielders. Defenses were busy preventing attacks form Hansi Muller, Rummenigge, Stielike, and were not able to read the creative directions of Schuster. Thus, attention was not focused on Hrubesch all the time, he had more freedom, and also he was not expected to be the sole finisher of attacks. The other great thing was that Kaltz – and eventually Magath – were accustomed to play with Hrubesch in front and to create opportunities for him. Better utilization. Hrubesch scored both German goals at the final and instantly became a hero – he delivered when it was most important. His rapport with the wingers was good, particularly with Rummenigge – the big forward served as a cover for sneaking from the back Rummenigge, keeping defenders busy with himself. At the moment, Hrubesch was the needed center-forward and since Hamburger SV was reaching its peak, it looked like he was a solution for the national team too – at least for the near future. Like the other new stars, he was not stigmatized player – Fischer was, for he was second or even third fiddle during the days of Gerd Muller.

Klaus Allofs. The 23-years old left winger of Fortuna Dusseldorf ended as the top scorer of European finals, but he was also the most criticized striker of the champions. Coming from a club which reached its peak at this time, Allofs was considered very promising, high scoring, somewhat typical winger. To a point, repeating Erwin Kremers of the 1972 team – limited to the left wing, he was practically unmovable to another post. Like Kremers, he was not always up to great performance, so looking for another option had to continue. But he was young and there were big hopes that he will mature in not so distant future. Scoring goals was expected of him and he scored when it mattered – a hat-trick against Holland. But that was all… leaving mixed feelings. In favour of him was the realization that modern football provided few opportunities for strikers – regular scoring was unlikely, but scoring at particular important match was most important. Allofs scored all goals in the difficult match with Holland – Hrubesch was dry until the final, when he scored all German goals. Allofs did not satisfy everybody, but was expected to develop further and as a whole – to stay in the national team for years to come, getting better. His moody play also helped, as strange as it may be – because Allofs was not entirely reliable yet, other tactical options had to be tried: using only 2 strikers, for instance. By default, West Germany had to use different tactical variety.

Exciting European champions – West Germany did not only come back, but had a team promising great future. The decline was over, new stars emerged, and Derwall seemingly had the mind and the skill to shape great team. And it was not a team limited to handful of players either – Bernd Forster, Felix Magath, Karl Del’Haye were eager to get a regular place. Lothar Matthaus, only 19-years old, made his debut. Eike Immel, also 19-years old, was in the team. Not included, but expected to be were other young talents, like Thomas Allofs. The new West Germany did not make revolution, but returned to the abandoned track of total football – and this was very optimistic sign, for already there was the strong feeling that total football was perverted into physical battle before its great possibilities were explored. West Germany killed total football, but now West Germany restored it – there was light again.

Only two teams were outstanding and talked about in positive terms: the finalists. On a larger scale, it was a testimony of impoverished football. On the other hand, both teams represented optimistic direction. Belgium was perhaps more discussed because they were a pleasant surprise. Unlike West Germany, the ‘Red Devils’ had few impressive personalities, but were more interesting in tactical terms. Of course, credit goes to their coach.

Guy Thys was little known before the European finals and hardly had the presence of a great coach – he talked modestly and never promised much. Yet, there was confidence in his words. He trusted his team and was not heavy-handed disciplinarian. Thys was right – his team delivered on the pitch and followed the requirements. Thys was master of tactical surprises – he knew the opponent’s style very well and adapted to it, using the weaknesses. On the surface and following the standard the norms of the time, Belgium looked like that:

Slightly modified 4-3-3, close to 4-4-2. At a glance, the scheme appeared deficient: classic right winger and typical center-forward. No left winger, which normally was interpreted as a limitation – the team depended heavily on the right, which was easy to read and block. But it was only on paper – Ceulemans was versatile and unpredictable. Not at all English type center-forward bolted in front of the net and waiting for crosses from the wings. Van der Elst was not always sticking to the right side either. Mommens had enormous operating field, helping the defense, playing as a midfielder when needed, and attacking as a left winger. Flexible player, contributing to specific tactical needs. The big figure of the team was a midfielder – van Moer, the only survivor of the 1970 Belgian team, which played at the World Cup. The surprising thing about van Moer was that he was 35 and looked his age – thus, nobody expected him to run endlessly from one of the pitch to the other and always to be in the midst of action. Van Moer had the energy, fitness, and stamina of 20-years old. He was the motor and the conductor of the team, but he was not the typical play-maker of the 1970s. He never shied away from dirty work, he constantly helped the defense, and started attacks from deep back. He also pressured the opposition in midfield like defensive midfielders did. But his passes were precise and lethal, he was able to keep the ball and to change the tempo of the game. Slightly behind him operated a pair of defensive midfielders – Cools and van der Eycken, securing the midfield and helping the defense. If Cools was typical defensive midfielder, van der Eycken was universal – he often rushed ahead, acting almost as a winger.

The defense was what became typical in the late 70s – two very active and attacking minded full backs – Gerets on the right side and Renquin on the left, and a pair of libero and stopper in the middle. Gerets was particularly dangerous, for he was creative passer and also a scorer. Renquin was part of elastic and flexible left side, which had no typical midfielder and winger – the roles were interchanged. The center-defenders were less modern at a glance – neither Meeuws, nor Millecamps were typical libero and stopper – they acted as the needs of the moment required, staying conservatively back. Meeuws was something between sweeper and libero – he conducted the line, yet, he was not behind everybody else, for the great weapon of the Red Devils was the off-side trap, which required all players to be in a straight line. But straight line was easy to penetrate too, so it was a matter of good reading of the game. Meeuws moved back and forth as needed – unlike the English defense, which played outdated line formation and thus fell victim of speedy strikers coming from midfield. As for the role of libero – creative conductor of attacks Meeuws was not: van Moer did that. Meeuws and Millecamps were deliberately staying back in case Gerets and Renquin were caught far ahead of their positions. As a whole, Belgian scheme was defensive – players were deeper back positioned, minding numerical superiority in their own half of the pitch, killing the attacking efforts of the opposition and ready for speedy counter-attacks. The players were up to the requirements of total football – they were versatile, able to change positions and cover for each other, physically fit, unselfish, smart. The whole approach was collective, there were no stars around whom the game was built. Like the Germans, the Red Devils pressured and crowded the opposition. Like the Dutch they were constantly looking for attacking opportunities. Like the Italians they saturated their own half with tough defenders. Like the English they never gave up. Like the Czechoslovakians they had no outstanding stars, but acted as a collective. It looked like Belgium combined the best of different schools, but it was not just a mix of different ellements – Belgium was unpredictable, for it was very intelligent team – they changed tactics in a second: one minute they played rugged Italian defense, but as soon as they got possession of the ball, they started attack as the Dutch. Or the English. Or the Germans. One never knew what they will do. And behind the field players was a great goalkeeper – Pfaff. With him, the defense was relaxed and never panicked.

It was not only the approach of the team, but the novelty of the players: Belgium came as an underdog to the finals. Most players were practically unknown and were ‘discovered’ during the finals. The renaissance of Belgium was noticed, of course – Anderlecht and FC Brugge were already successful and talked about. But the success, particularly of Anderlecht, was due to foreign players – the stars were Dutch. Belgians played secondary role. Those, who came to the European finals did not play for the top teams – that was why nobody knew them. Pfaff played for semi-professional Beveren. Van Moer and Gerets – for Standard Liege, which experienced a crisis in the first half of the 1970s and lost its leading position in Belgian football. Perhaps the best ranked internationally was Francois van der Elst, the striker of Anderlecht. Individually, the Belgians were less impressive than as a collective. The European finals established 5 players – four new stars. One name was neither new, nor young, though.

Wilfried van Moer, here getting ready to tackle an Italian, was the most surprising discovery. Or rather rediscovery. The sole survivor of the old ‘Red Devils’ of the 1960s and the only player appearing at World Cup finals in the now very distant 1970. He was already forgotten – heavy injury kept him not only out of sight for a long time, but he was past retirement age already. At 35, he was playing for small Beringen. Guy Thys was clearly building younger squad and well veterans were not included. Originally, van Moer was not in the coach’s plans either – it was the insistence of the Belgian journalists putting van Moer back in the team. The journalists were right – the fiery midfielder was a revelation. He run like 20-years old, covering the whole field. A dynamo of a player, he was everywhere, energetically fighting for possession of the ball and then starting immediately dangerous attack. Not a typical playmaker at all – he was humble workaholic, not shying away from defensive tasks and not acting as a star veteran at all. He lead the team by example. Usually a veteran so old, even having a great tournament, is only mentioned – because of age, such a player practically has no future – but it was different with van Moer. His fitness, energy, skills gave impression that he has at least 3-4 years ahead of him.

Jean-Marie Pfaff clears the ball before Keegan reaches it. Pfaff was a discovery of the finals. Although he debuted for Belgium in 1976, he had few matches for the national team so far. Christian Piot was the big name for years and when he retired in 1977 it seemed that Belgium had no replacement. The ascent of Belgian football after 1975 somehow lacked promising goalkeeper – Anderlecht and FC Brugge depended on foreigners. Pfaff played for small club and although Beveren enjoyed perhaps its best years at the end of the 1970s, no stars came out of it. Since first choice goalkeepers usually are listed with number 1 at major tournaments, Pfaff seemingly was a reserve for the European finals to Royal Antwerpen’s keeper Theo Custers, also unknown player. But not only Pfaff was chosen to play, but he made huge impression and perhaps was the best goalkeeper at the finals. At 26, he was at the right age – since goalkeepers as a rule mature later than field players, he was precisely at the age when great keepers make their mark. Plenty of experience already and many years ahead of him, for keepers players longer than field players as well. Pfaff was here to stay – he was expected to be one of the best keepers in the 1980s, a player for the future. His impact was so great, nobody noticed – and rightly so, for third choice keepers hardly ever play – another name in the Belgian squad: Michel Preud’homme. As it happened, Belgium had two great keepers at hand instead of acute crisis, but 1980 was Pfaff’s year. He arrived – and he stayed on top for years.

Eric Gerets exits the pitch, listening to the team captain Cool (6) along with Vandereycken (7).One of the rugged bearded Belgians at first, he became famous quickly. Arguably, the biggest discovery among the Belgians. Not exactly young, but at his prime – 26 years old right full back of Standard Liege. Standard declined in the first half of the 1970s and lost its leading position in Belgian football to FC Brugge – perhaps the reason Standard’s players were still unknown: everybody was focused on Anderlecht and FC Brugge. The club was in the process of rebuilding, but the new team was not ready for success yet – Gerets was key part of the new team, he was noticed at home, Thys made him his first choice. Gerets debuted for the Red Devils in 1975, but 1980 brought him international fame. He was exactly what a modern full back was dreamed to be: excellent tough defender, who constantly participated in organizing – and finishing – attacks. Gerets was constantly moving similarly to Paul Breitner: although he was more conservative than Breitner, he did not restrict himself to the right side of the field, as full backs usually did. He was capable organizer, very fit, and a leader. Compared to Manfred Kaltz, Gerets was perhaps better, for Kaltz was a bit deficient in his strictly defensive role. Gerets was instantly seen as one of the stars of the coming 80s – and he fulfilled the expectations.

Michel Renquin, 24-years teammate of Gerets, covering the other side of defense. The left full-back debuted for Belgium in 1976, but like Gerets he got international recognition in 1980. Another modern full-back, equally comfortable defending and attacking, although more conservative than Gerets. Renquin was a particularly pleasant discovery, for there were few really strong full-backs at the time – some, like Dietz, were getting old, others, like Krol, moved to the center of defense, and Breitner to midfield. Renquin stepped in to close the gap.

Since the Belgian approach was defensive, no surprise the newly discovered stars were from the back lines. Yet, the last discovery was a striker.

Jan Ceulemans was the younger of the Belgian stars, but also the only one with European reputation – not a great star, but emerging one. At 23, the tall and strong striker already had 6 seasons in the Belgian championship. His scoring abilities were noticed quickly and FC Brugge bought him from Lierse in 1978. Ceulemans was quick to deliver – he ended 1979-80 season as one of the top European goalscorers with 29 goals. For Belgium he debuted in 1977. For a tall and physical striker, he was surprisingly mobile and versatile: he did not play as an English-type center-forward pinned in front of the net waiting for high balls, but operated on a wide field, often coming from deep back – and with time he moved even further back, becoming an attacking midfielder. He was unpredictable, difficult to block, and scored a lot, yet, he was not a selfish player. Like van Moer and Gerets, courageous, inspirational, and highly spirited player – a true leader. And of course one of the players for the future.

The new stars made Guy Thys move believable – he said that his team is not at its peak yet, that it was still unfinished team, to reach its potential in about 2 years. Apart from van Moer, the other discoveries were at the right age for exactly that. And more than that: they had great leadership potential, so clearly Belgium had the backbone already and with a bit more refining, the Red Devils were to be great team in the coming 1980s. The assets of Belgium were tactical richness and collective approach.

 

The aftermath. Euro 1980 was expected with big hopes. New formula, more teams – it was expected to be exciting tournament. After the end the tone was minor. Menotti was highly critical during the championship, accusing Europeans of boring defensive play. After the last match the European opinion was very similar: the finals produced very few exciting matches. The final was highly entertaining, but hardly any other. Compared to the 1976 finals, 1980 was dismal tournament – back in 1976 all matches of the final stage were enjoyable to watch. Now, with more teams, the number of memorable games shrunk to almost nothing. Tactically, nothing new was discovered. In 1972 there was huge difference between the new total football played by West Germany and the rest of the finalists. The new football was superior to the old and this was the way for the future – in 1980 nothing similar emerged. No innovations. Even commercially the new formula felt short – bigger tournament was much more expensive and required full gates. It was hoped that longer and bigger tournament will bring crowds to the stadiums, but it did not. In fact, only the matches with Italy brought high attendance – the biggest was not the final, but Italy-England – almost 60 000. The final was attended by less than 50 000. Nine of the matches were attended by less than 25 000 – a good 50% of the total! On the lowest side was Czechoslovakia – Greece, attended by less than 5000. Numbers were too small for grand event. And the numbers went along with mediocre football: the public somewhat guessed right – there was no point watching most of the matches. This was recognized by unlikely place: Artemio Franchi and the head of the West German Federation Neuberger both criticized the new formula as entirely ineffective and called for return to the old one of direct elimination with a country hosting only the last stage of semi-finals and finals. Both official said they were against the new formula because it lowered the quality of the game. Teams were putting everything they were capable of because of calculations. Some matches were not even important and at least one side did not care, saving strength for the next stage. That was the general view of the game. This championship had no shine and nothing new. ‘France Press’ evaluated all teams and the conclusion was that:

1. West Germany – might, speed, skill, spirit, two new leaders – Schuster and Briegel.

2. Belgium – fantastic ability to adapt to the style of the opponent and organize its game to a specific opponent. Excellent collective play, great goalkeeper, excellent reader of the game – van Moer, masters of the off-side trap.

3. Czechoslovakia – masters of killing the tempo, very serious approach, needing to change the squad with younger players, masters of penalty shots.

4. Italy – 2 goals in 4 home games was a verdict in itself, old-fashioned attacks, a coach speaking unrealistically – looked like Italy was stuck and nothing new happened and was possible to happen.

5. England – major disappointment. All except Wilkins looked too tired, amazingly old English ‘kick and run’ tactical approach, unfortunately the same for 15 years already.

6. Holland – under the shadow of Cruijff and seemingly unable to get out of there. Speed was lost. Kist did not deliver.

7. Spain – pleasant to watch, but lacking experience and not in good physical condition. Too much individualism, but with some bright promising moments. May be will be different in 1982.

8. Greece – not bad debut at such level, good impression from Mavros and Ardizoglou.

The summary was devastatingly right… Euro 1980 gave very little positive. As for the negative, there was plenty of it and the biggest negative aspect was outside the pitch. Even the best 11 of the finals were not entirely unquestionable:

1. Zoff (Italy) – 2. Gentile (Italy) 3. K-H. Forster (West Germany) 5. Scirea (Italy) 4. Briegel (West Germany) – 6. Tardelli (Italy) 8. Schuster (West Germany) 10. Muller (West Germany) – 7. Rummenigge (West Germany) 9. Hrubesch (West Germany) 11. Ceulemans (Belgium). Understandably, half of the selected players are Germans – champions always are preferred – but the rest are Italians and Italy finished 4th. Only one Belgian player. Somewhat limited selection, but few players shined and many disappointed. If one is looking for alternatives and omitted players, there was little to find: Pfaff instead of Zoff, Gerets instead of Gentile, van Moer instead of Tardelli. May be Antognoni instead of Muller and Krol instead of K-H. Forster. A good number of established stars were either not outstanding (Stielike, Kaltz, Francois van der Elst, Bettega, Wilkins) or bellow average (Keegan, Brooking, van de Kerkhof twins, Rep, Haan). None of the Czechoslovakian players, half of whom were champions in 1976 made strong impression – rather the opposite. Holland and England utterly disappointed. Only two teams impressed and they will be treated separately. Scoring was low and there were almost no memorable matches apart from the final. What was memorable was entirely negative.

Hooliganism. It was not new and was entirely British phenomena. The ugly and dangerous side football culture was getting bigger and more troublesome, but so far was also limited to domestic English games. Europe saw little of it and of short duration too – only when English club played European final. Trouble was limited o a day, even less, by the fact that the final is only one match. The English invaders had little time for massive destruction – a few hours before and after the match, and they were gone home. But long tournament concentrated them in another country for at least a week and damage was not done to a single city, for the English fans moved to where their team was scheduled to play. For the first time championship of national teams was tarnished by outrageous behavior of the English fans and it was a big warning for the future.

One of the most memorable moments of the 1980 European finals was the huge fight started by the English fans in the match against Belgium. It spilled beyond the stadium and was not limited just to day of the match. One man died. Many were wounded. Instead of festive, the new atmosphere at the stadiums was becoming hostile. The image of the 1980s was taking shape: drunk, half naked brutes fighting with heavily armed Police. A picture of war.

The question of security loomed large: nothing new about mounted Police patrolling near stadiums before and after games, but this was changing – now Police had to cover practically the whole city and patrol constantly. And not only patrol, but act, for drunk fans rioted constantly, thrashing everything in their way, looting, attacking bystanders, disrupting the normal life. Bars and restaurants quickly learned to simply close down and refuse to serve the English, if they were in town. Which only infuriated the invaders. Euro 1980 was almost halted when Milan’s Mayor threatened to close down the city stadium because of the violence: it was again a new problem difficult to deal with, for the venue was property of the city and no federation – national or international – had the power to operate it. The possibility of interrupted and even stopped and abandoned championship came as a result of increasing fans violence. And the Mayor had a strong point too: why his city should suffer damage and pay for it? The question of the English fans became huge and urgent. It was debated by UEFA, by English Federation, by the English clubs, by the media, by the Police, by politicians. It concerned larger issues as freedom of movement and individual liberties – it was simply impossible to refuse people their rights. On purely sporting scale the problem was aggravated by the sharp contrast between English on the pitch and English on the streets. English teams were liked for their spirit and behavior – they were gentlemen. Fair and entertaining players. For that, English teams attracted large crowds. Unfortunately, English teams had the largest traveling supporters and they were the problem. Since the problem was still new and in its infant stage, continental Europeans were not very happy with the attitude of English clubs and officials: the clubs almost dismissed the problem with the argument that they cannot be responsible for some fans. Officials and players, even when condemning the hooligans, were quick to add that it is a matter of only few ‘rotten apples’. Often a finger was pointed at the ‘foreign’ Police, which treated English fans harshly and thus provoked them. From the English side, it looked like as self-defense after unjust treatment: after all, what is one to do when a restaurant blankly refuses to serve him a glass of beer? ‘Foreigners’ raised the issue of costs – and here the English were quite stubborn: they were not to be involved with crowd control beyond English borders, but the fans were not to be subjected to ‘foreign’ rules either. The debate was at impasse, for England wanted to host the 1984 European finals and the English argument was that they know how to deal with their fans, so there will be no problem. It sounded as not very well veiled accusation of the ‘continentals’ for the problems – they don’t know how to treat English, thus creating problems. In reality, nobody knew what to do yet – the 1980s were coming with their ugly face and huge, spreading across Europe problems with the new violent fan culture. It needed the tragedy of Heysel Stadium to start really dealing with the problem – which generally lead to massive increase of restrictions and Police presence. As for fans violence… it is very much alive today everywhere. 1980 was the clear mark of huge change – going to football match was never to be simple Saturday peaceful entertainment. It became a dangerous adventure.

The final. It had all needed for a final – one team was obvious and expected favourite, which did not disappoint so far. The other was surprising team, which came as an outsider, but impressed by getting stronger and stronger. Weather added to the tensions: it was very hot in Rome – the temperature was above 30 degrees Celsius. News from team-camps increased the heat. Tensions in the German team surfaced. Magath was not happy at all – he said that he is better than those chosen to play and he will no longer be available for the national team because of that. Sounded like open rebellion just before the most important game. And also the ugly specter of the aftermath of 1974 raised its head: back then

Netzer and Breitner refused to play for the national team. Magath’s club team-mate Hrubesch added fire too: ‘Good we have to play against Belgium with their tall and physical defense. Derwall will not be a fool to leave me on the bench.’ Did not sound very flattering opinion of the coach. Del’Haye, not a starter anyway, sounded strangely happy to stay out of the final: ‘Today’s football is getting more and more brutal. It becomes just a matter of stronger bones.’ It sounded as if he is happy to save his for his new club, Bayern. It also sounded as a veiled criticism of Derwall chosing Allofs and not Del’Haye. The players were not alone and not entirely out of the mark: ever since Gerd Muller stopped played for West Germany center-forwards were under close scrutiny and found deficient. Hansi Muller was often criticized for his play too. But it was one thing outsiders to be critical and quite another insiders to voice their unhappiness: it meant trouble. Just hours before the final it looked like a big trouble.

Trouble in the Belgian camp was different. Once again the ‘unprofessional’ conduct of the Belgians was made public – the West German magazine ‘Bild’ run a new batch of scandalous photos of the Belgians lazily smoking and drinking along with their coach. Their reaction to the photos was even more scandalous: Walter Meeuws just laughed and dismissed the whole thing. “’Bild’ came here to take a look at us, saw our camp is no military barracks and felt offended. In one word – Germans.” Guy Thys preferred to address different critical points: ‘Against England we used zonal defense and the off-side trap. Against Italy we used Italian tactics. There is no problem at all – if we have to attack, we will attack.’ It was not a mere hint – it was already observed that Belgium used specific tactic for every opponent. West Germany was open team, so apparently Belgium was going to fight them in midfield in the same manner. The only question was was Belgium capable of attacking football – many were skeptical and thought Thys was talking nonsense.

The match started fulfilling bits of what was said before it: Magath was not a starter again. Hrubesch was. The West Germans were tense and careful. Belgium – a bit sluggish, perhaps because of the beer in their stomachs. West Germany pressed and pushed ahead – and what Thys feared most happened: an early goal. Schuster started dangerous attack and Hrubesch finished it. 1-0. Belgium responded in perhaps unexpected way – it neither moved blindly in attacks, nor stayed back defensively waiting for counter-attacking opportunity. Instead, van Moer took full reigns of the team and slowly, almost unnoticed, started to increase the tempo, taking possession of the central zone and build attacks. At first it did not work – Stielike, Kaltz, and Briegel became the players most involved, that is, the defensive players of Germany, not the creative Schuster and Muller. But those involved were versatile and capable of conducting attacks. The Belgian effort to press Germany back almost backfired – twice Rummenigge and once Schuster missed chances to score in the first half. On the other hand, Belgium had no scoring opportunity in the first half.

Jan Ceulemans seems formidable, but very alert Dietz is ready to tackle, determined to take possession of the ball. Hrubesh comes from behind, ready to help or to get a pass from Dietz and rush toward the Belgian net again. The picture of the first half – Germany was slightly stronger and more dangerous. If not for excellent save by Pfaff, the result would have been 2-0 – Allofs had a good chance and his shot was deadly on target.

In the second half Belgium increased the tempo, took the initiative at last, and dominated for good 20 minutes. The Germans were also unlucky – Briegel injured himself and was replaced by Cullmann. This change looked like fulfillment of the dark thoughts of every enemy of Derwall: back to the ugly pragmatic game. Back to the struglle, to the tackling, to the relentless pressing of the opponent, back to killing creativity and keeping minimal advantage by crushing under Prussian boot. It looked like Derwall had no answer to Belgian domination and desperately tries to keep the result with defensive play. And it did not work! Belgium pushed forward and got a penalty. There was no doubt hat Stielike fouled Rene Vandereycken. And it was crystal clear that it was a professional foul – the ugly pragmatic German invention, which spread as a plague in the 1980s: when in trouble, just bring down the opponent. The very reason rules were changed in the 1990s – today Stielike will be send off automatically. Back in 1980 there was no even yellow card. The only punishment was a penalty – which was not a penalty at all: a slow replay after the match showed that Stielike fouled Vandereycken outside the penalty area, but it was very close and the referee was hardly to be blamed for his mistake. Vandereycken stepped in and scored. 1-1 in the 72nd minute. It looked like West Germany was going to lose. Belgium missed chances in 74th and 80th minutes.

Although it looks like Germany was in desperate defense on paper, it was not so: both teams attacked, only Belgium slightly dominated the game in the second half. But the effort was too much for physically weaker Belgians and they started to look tired. As ever, the Germans were fresher and stronger in the last minutes than their opponents. That was perhaps the decisive factor. A minute before the end of the match Rummenigge placed the ball in front of the Belgian net from a corner-kick. Millekamps and Meeuws were slow to react. Hrubesch was not. He was no Gerd Muller – he was big, strong, English type center-forward, deadly in the air. His header was unstoppable.

Hrubesch just fired the ball towards the net. 2-1. German journalists roared in the Press-center ‘Das Ungeheuer schlug zu!’ There was no time for Belgian response. The match was more than entertaining and there was no grief that the Germans won it by their not always loved specialty – goal at the very end of the game.

Dietz and Hrubesch happy with European Cup. Deserving champions, no doubt. Just picture too – two of the ‘unflashy’ players. To a point, a warning for the future… Not stars, but ‘workers’ win trophies. But who can blame them? Dietz captained the new European champions and monster-looking Hrubesch made them champions.

Coaches were good-natured, polite, and generous after the game. Thys said he cannot blame his team for losing at the very end and is happy with the achievement. Derwall acknowledged that the opponent was dangerous and he feared for the outcome. He was glad the final was entertaining. This was more than after-match politeness. Thys considered – and said so earlier – his team still in building phase. To be ripe in the next two years or so. Derwall was aware of criticism, tensions, and problems. He found the right blend slowly and it was not even complete – there was quite a lot to be done in the future.

Apart from feeling sorry for the underdog, Belgium was rightly second. They were a bit weaker than the champions. But it was well-deserved silver – the ‘Red Devils’ came as outsiders. They had excellent tournament and became the most talked about team. They very little to be champions, but it was objective limitation of which coach and players were well aware of . They lost the final, but without blemish and were the most successful Belgian national squad in history. More than silver medals would have been a matter of sheer luck, not ability.

Triumphal European champions. West Germany was the team most deserving to win. Character was never lacking, but this team showed similarity with the great team of the early 1970s – they were able to play, not just to run. As a whole, West Germany was bit stronger than Belgium – their victory left no bitter taste in the mouth.

The ‘small final’ for the bronze medals. Good old days – third place still mattered. It mattered for Czechoslovakia – Venglos stated it a few times, it was the maximum this team was able of, even above maximum. It mattered for Italy as well – Bearzot wanted to end the tournament positively, in part because Italy was unlucky and missed playing the final. In part, positive ending was needed to neutralize the negativity of the Tottonero scandal – as a point that Italian football, or at least the national team, was not all about corruption. Both teams were interested in ‘the meaningless’ match, but it was not so with the man on the street. Fans were disappointed, for they wanted Italy to win the title and only less than 25 000 attended the stadium in Naples. It was entirely Italian crowd – in 1980 Czechoslovakian citizens were not free to travel to the West. Both teams started with their best lines. Only injured Antognoni was missing – a problem for Bearzot, for he had no other playmaker of similar class. Bettega was moved slightly back again, but still Italy was playing 4-3-3. Czechoslovakia once again was defensively minded – 4-4-2, but really with 5 defenders, for Vojacek – like in the previous matches – was listed as midfielder, but was and played a central defender. Jurkemik was assigned to cover Bettega. The beginning of the match was no surprise – Italy attacked, Czechoslovakia moved back into sturdy defense, looking for counter-attacks. And their scheme worked better. Czechoslovakia was not entertaining to the eye, but, unlike Italy, had a chance to score to score in the first half. And they scored first anyway – it was this very Jurkemik, whose role was to shadow Bettega.

In the 53rd minute Czechoslovakia was leading 1-0. No, it was not a penalty – Jurkemik powerfully kicked deflected ball from 20 meters.

Italy managed to equalize in the 77th minute, thanks to Graziani’s header.

Happy Italians… for the moment.

It was not attractive and memorable match. Jozef Barmos with ball was highly praised by Czechoslovakian press and this may be the best description of the ‘small final’ – watchful, careful Czechoslovakians, staying back and preventing danger. A triumph of the defenders. 1-1 in regular time and nothing different in extra time. Penalty shoot-out. Also nothing new… that was how Czechoslovakia won the European title in 1976. Venglos apparently was ready for such outcome: his team trained penalty kicks for a long time. Vaclav Jezek, who coached Czechoslovakia to victory in 1976 concurred: “It was not the best match today. If our boys win, it could be only in the shoot-out’.

And the shoot-out was the only trill this day. Both teams did not miss at all after the regular 5 shots. Twice the Italians were lucky, for the ball deflected from the bar to the net. Nobody missed the gate; no keeper managed to block a shot. 8-8. Collovati stepped in then. He kicked the ball. Netolicka guessed the direction and blocked the ball. On the goal-line.

Or behind? Looks like a goal… Collovati triumphal and Netolicka – unhappy.

The critical moment – where is the ball? The referees ruled it did not cross the goal-line.

Jaroslav Netolicka happy now… no goal. Netolicka became a hero and his saved penalty – quintessential moment of victory. But it was not victory yet – still Czechoslovakia had to score. Barmos did not miss – 9-8. Yet, the image of Netolicka remained… The drama was over at last.

A rare result, worth showing. If only the match was as interesting as the information board…

 

 

Empty-handed Italy. Of course, the whole Italy was disappointed. Bearzot was diplomatic and trying to defend his team: ‘Both teams deserved bronze medals. Apart from West Germany, we were the most balanced team at the finals. Many speak against Graziani today, but,in my opinion, he did his job well. We had scoring opportunities, but we were without Giordano and Rossi to use them. And what is the matter anyway – a few months back England won over Argentina and everybody proclaimed them the best in the world. Where is England now?’ But Bearzot’s words did not change the obvious – Italy was not the impressive team of 1978. It was a worse team. It was also true that Italy did not lose a single match – but Brasil did not lose a match in 1978 and yet it was not impressive team.

May be a bit lucky, but with bronze medals. There were similarities between 1976 and 1980 – Czechoslovakia nobody counted, but the team came on top. Penalty shoot-outs brought them success both times. Both times the team delivered when it mattered after slow careful preparation. And there was continuity: Venglos was assistant coach of the 1976 champions. Five of the 1976 winners were starters in 1980. Stambachr was unused reserve in 1976 – in 1980 was a regular. The team changed slowly and carefully – there were practically no newcomers coming out of the blue: Vojacek and Gajdusek played often for the national team even before 1976. They were out of the winning team back then, but regulars in 1980. Czechoslovakia did not shine and came with no expectations to the finals in 1980. Their modest approach was thoroughly realistic – the team was aging, had plenty of experience, played as best as they could, relying on tactical discipline. The most they could reach was third place – and they got it. Nothing outstanding, nothing spectacular – just honest work. It was not memorable team, rather boring, defensive in approach. A team with problems too – goalkeeping was the most serious one and there was no solution to it. Many already reached their peak and getting old. Czechoslovak press came to the same conclusion and was not euphoric after the team got won bronze. There was one more point, which was not made public yet, but certainly was known to insiders: Czechoslovakia started exporting players. The stars new it and they were motivated to play well, so to make good impression on future employers. This also meant urgent and pressing changes in the national team. There was also one more important international tournament this summer – the Olympic games in Moscow. It mattered for Czechoslovakia – and the Olympics were also a good opportunity to start new team. Well done so far, but Czechoslovakia left no lasting memory. Even the penalty saved by Netolicka stirred no debates – Dino Zoff said that the ball did not cross the goal-line. He was just there, a reliable witness from the losing team.

 

Group B. England and Belgium met in the first match. The opponents took seriously each other. England was expected to win. It was interesting to see the new England, playing finally modern football, as British media, Greenwood, and his players repeated constantly. The first minutes were not surprising: England attacked, Belgium entrenched itself in defense. Soon it was crystal clear that there was no ‘new England’, but painfully old one – fast bypassing of midfield, long balls from defense to the strikers, high crosses in front of the net. No libero in defense, but the outdated line formation. The ‘Red Devils’ were not only familiar with the primitive English tactic, but had a very effective way to deal with it – and old tactic too, for Belgium was known for inventing it in the 1960s: the off-side trap. England fell victim of it 17 times this day. It was testimony of English tactical poverty and lack of imagination… every time the ball was crossed from the wings, Walter Meeuws gave the signal to his mates, they moved ahead in synchronicity and the English striker was offside. No English player seemingly even thought to try something different, since long passes and crosses benefited the opposition. In the same time Belgium was dangerous in counter-attack. The veteran van Moer was excellent conductor. The ‘Red Devils’ knew what to do very well: close, almost personal covering of Keegan, Wilkins, and Brooking, so they had no room to move and no time to think; and constantly on alert for an opportunity to counter-attack. Still England managed to open the result after Cools made a mistake – Wilkins intercepted a careless pass and scored. Happiness lasted exactly 4 minutes – after a corner kick Ceulemans equalized in the 30th minute. The goal immediately triggered the English… no, not the players, but the fans. They started a fight with Italian fans, supporting Belgium. One particularly enterprising Brit climbed up on scoreboard and tried to change the fate of his team by erasing the Belgian goal and the name of the scorer. And that was the the most memorable part of this match…

The Police interfered, casualties were brought down near he pitch, so to be transported to hospitals, and as a last resort the Police used tear gas. The fight was stopped, but clouds of tear gas covered the pitch. The referee had no choice but to stop the match in the 41st minute. Players needed medical help – the English keeper Ray Clemence had it worse than anybody else: he was completely blinded by the tear gas. When the match was continued, there was nothing new – England attacked as before, Belgians killed English attacks with the off-side trap. At the end, it was 1-1. One Italian fan died in hospital from knife wounds; one English fan had broken skull. Minor injuries and arrests didn’t count. This was the first sign of the arrival of the ugly 1980s – fans violence was nothing new and the British were well known for it, but so far the hooligans were club supporters thrashing a city after a game. Nothing like this happened before when the national team was playing and at the finals of major international tournament. Naturally, the fans continued to ‘express’ themselves after the match on the streets of Turin. UEFA fined the English Federation 13 000 Swiss Franks. Greenwood and Keegan condemned the hooligans. To a point, Greenwood sounded as if finding excuse for the stupid play of his team in the hooligans – ‘They destroyed our good match’ – but ultimately was disappointed from his players. Guy Thys solemnly shrugged his shouldrs: ‘We got a point, everything goes as planned. I was surprised to see how easily the English fell into the off-side trap.’

Italy – Spain followed. Both teams were cautious before the match, taking the opponent seriously. The focus – and the pressure – was on Italy. Bearzot feared that Milan fans may be hostile to the national team. Zoff promised attractive attacking football. Victory was a must. And victory of Italy was expected not only at home – memories of wonderful Italy at the 1978 World Cup made Italy a favourite instantly: it was the right time, the team matured. It did, but not in the expected way – rather, the fears of Italian media proved true. It was older squad – not as age, but ‘morally old’: same players, those from Juventus no longer hungry for success. Bettega was moved back to play more as midfielder – he was getting old. It was not that Italy played bad – it was just not as great as expected. Spain was difficult opponent to begin with and without much pressure on their heads, the Spaniards played surprisingly well. To many – even above themselves. Both teams had their chances, but goalkeepers excelled this day – Zoff and Arconada were outstanding.

Equal match, perhaps the Spaniards were a bit more vigorous. Saura reaches the ball first and goes away from Bettega, who looks… disappointed and late. At the end it was 0-0. Bearzot and Cuballa hugged each other in recognition of the good fight – the match was considered the best of the opening round – but friendly gestures did not mask disappointment in the Italian camp. The media was quick to observe that the Italian attack was a bit toothless and there was nothing to be done about it. Paolo Rossi was badly missed, but he was suspended because of the Tottonerro affair. After the first round all teams in the group were still in the same equal position – every one with a point. Now winning became really a must.

Belgium – Spain was played in front of less than 1200 in Turin. Before the match media gossiped about the relaxed camp of the Belgians sipping beer. The players talked about… Holland. As if they were to play against the neighbours. ‘We will teach them a lesson’, said Ceulemans, ‘They are arrogant and although they make money in our championship, they look down at us.’ The Spanish camp did not provide fodder for the press. The match started seemingly as a copy of England – Belgium: Spain attacked, Belgium answered with meticulous defense and the off-side trap worked just as well – 18 times. But gradually it became clear that Belgium is tactically rich. Lead by non-stopping van Moer, they conquered the midfield. The defenders added their skill and strength to attacking – particularly Gerets. Spain had no answer to that – gaps appeared between their lines, they lost the battle for midfield, and there was no one capable to direct their attacking efforts. Later Cuballa acknowledged that only Asensi was able to sustain the tempo and pressure of the Belgians and when he had to be substituted because of injury, the match was effectively lost.

Unstoppable Ceulemans – the ‘scandalous’ beer-drinking of the Red Devils was instantly forgotten during the match: they looked bigger, better, faster than Spain. In the 16th minute Gerets scored. Quini equalized in the 35th minute, but 2 minutes later Asensi left the field and from this moment Belgian victory was just a matter of time. Cools scored the second goal in the 65th minute and that was the end. Guy Thys even substituted van Moer after that – unlike Asensi, the absence of van Moer did not affect the game of Belgium. Belgium deservedly won, the players were praised – new stars were discovered among them, and the team considered the weakest in the group suddenly was a favourite. Guy Thys once again was low key – he said his team was perfect and pleased him very much, but thought that it will be at its peak after 2 years. As for Spain, they were brought down to earth – perhaps not the team, but the opinion of the media of it: it was the old, painful to watch Spain of the whole decade.

But this match was central – Italy vs England was the big focus of interest. It was more than the thrill of all-important match, which more or less was decisive – the loser was to be practically eliminated and the winner almost certainly was to play at the championship final. The fight started by the English fans in the match with Belgium, followed by despicable behaviour of the English after the game on the streets was bigger concern. The Mayor of Turin said that since the stadium is property of the city, he will close it altogether and there will be no match. The threat lead to emergency measures of security, increased Police presence, which had the right to conduct body searches and shut down sells of alcohol near the stadium. Yet, the atmosphere was poisonous – fighting on the streets continued, an English bus was put to fire, and Dennis Law was kicked out of a restaurant as soon as he said a word in English. Now it was the English complaining of bad treatment by Police, services refused, and general Italian provocations – it worked at home, but on the continent there was no sympathy for the rowdy English fans. The tensions affected the players too and the match started with both teams obviously nervous and making too many mistakes. The Italians even had to be cooled down with 2 yellow cards. Bearzot made one change – instead of Cabrini, Benetti was a starter. Greenwood fielded the same team which played against Belgium – only Shilton replaced Clemence. This was perhaps a mistake, but on the other hand – this was the best England had. Not that much in terms of players, but in terms of tactics and creativity – personal changes were unlikely to suddenly change the outdated English approach. Curiously, the yellow cards given to Benetti and Tardelli helped the Italian game – the players cooled down and concentrated more on playing and less on battling. England was hard to blame and equally hard to praise… they played as they ever played: fast, high-spirited, with their minds on attack. They were also predictable and increasingly boring. Italy started to look better creatively and more dangerous. In the second half Italy dominated the match and although both teams had their chances, the inevitable finally happened.

Tardelli was quicker than the English defenders after low cross from Graziani. In the 80th minute Italy got a lead – 1-0. And kept it to the final whistle. England, expected if not winning the championship, at least playing at the final was out. The administration of Turin was very happy – the brutal English fans were moving to Naples, if not going home right away. Greenwood suddenly lamented the absence of Trevor Francis, but apart from that he saw nothing wrong with his team. Tony Woodcock made a rather outlandish comment: in his opinion, England concentrated too much on playing instead on approaching the match as a battle. Well, ‘playing’ was the obvious deficiency of him and his teammates.

Spain and England had nothing to play for – the best either team could do would be to play for 3rd place. Already ‘the small final’ was not all that important. Besides, to reach it depended not only on winning the direct match: Italy vs Belgium had to end with a winner. A tie worked against England and Spain. Apparently, there were no hopes in both camps. The Spanish Federation was concerned with continuous international disappointments and the finger was pointed at the foreign players in Spanish clubs. Timing was not great… decision was reached in the day of the match against England: ‘the minimalist’ faction won – Spanish clubs were restricted to contracting only one foreigner, who had to be approved by the State Sports Committee. Since no Spanish club actually employed only one foreigner after the restrictive rule it has to be clarified: first, as ever before, the ‘oriundi’ were not affected. Second, the rule meant only new recruits – whoever already played in Spain did not count. The rule changed absolutely nothing, except enraging the big clubs. Not the best thing hours before the match against England started. For Kuballa this was the last match as a coach – neither he, nor his players, already thinking of the next coach, were highly motivated. The English camp was quiet – the motivational talk of Greenwood was rather lame: ‘If you don’t want to completely disappoint our fans, go and beat Spain.’ Apart from pride, neither team had anything to play for. Both coaches made changes, giving chance to those who did not play so far. More important were the English changes: Viv Anderson and Glen Hoddle were starters. They looked better than the players used in the previous matches… so, why Greenwood did not play them when it mattered? Greenwood also changed tactics – 4-4-2 was used this day and Keegan was moved firmly at the top of attack. In the earlier matches he was placed back – used a bit as playmaker. Changes or not, nothing really changed – the opponents played as they did before. England looked a bit better, Spain was tough and difficult. Brooking scored in the 19th minute for England. In the second half Dani equalized from a penalty. And a few minutes later Spain got a second penalty. Dani stepped in again and scored again. But the referee did not like his approach: Dani was slightly stopping just before kicking the ball, so the goalkeeper was already flying and Dani was able to shoot in the undefended corner. The referee warned Dani, but… he did it again. Except luck was not on his side anymore.

Clemence blocks the third penalty – he expected Dani to change the direction this time and was right.

This was the high moment of the match – both as entertainment and outcome. The result remained 1-1 and Woodcock scored for England in the 61st minute. With this goal England won 2-1. Greenwood credited Lady Luck for everything: ‘We were unlucky against Italy, today were lucky against Spain.’ England depended still on luck – had to wait the outcome of the last group match and if lucky – to play for 3rd place.

Italy vs Belgium was to decide the finalist. Italian expectations were rather cautious: the media gave 60-40 chances to Italy. Belgium was blamed for defensive tactics – a point not missed by Guy Thys, who pointed out that he plans to do what Italians did for so many years. Who invented catenaccio after all? It was interesting reversal of roles – Italian media crying against defensive football and championing attack. Bearzot thought his team was able to beat Belgian offside trap. And he had to, for only victory would move Italy to the final – any other result benefited Belgium. Italy attacked allright, but the Red Devils were devious. Third match and third tactical approach: yes, they depended on defense and counterattacks, but there were variations. This one was the most pronounced defensive game played by Belgium: they new that offside trap would not work against Italy, so they moved back in mass, killed time, cleared the ball, and did not leave space for Italian strikers.

That was the match: Belgium deep in defense, making sure they outnumber the Italians near Pfaff. Who was excellent again. In the 53rd minute Italy was robbed from a penalty – or at least they thought they were. The ball deflected from Meews’ hand – deliberately to Italian eye; accidentally to the referee, who gave only a free kick. Italy was unable to outplay Belgium, had almost no scoring opportunity and the match ended 0-0. Zoff was outraged – ‘We are the only team not allowing a single goal in our net. It is an absurd we are not playing the final.’ Not so absurd… Italy scored only one goal in three matches. Belgium scored 2 – which was the breaker in case of equal points and same goal-difference. With all the talk of attacking football, not only Italy scored only once, but the strikers scored plain zero – the goal scored the midfielder Tardelli.

1. Belgium 1 2 0 2-1 4

2. Italy 1 2 0 1-0 4

3. England 1 1 1 3-3 3

4. Spain 0 1 2 2-4 1

Belgium was surprising finalist, but hardly by mere chance – overall, they were the most impressive team in Group B. The only team showing diverse tactics, to change its game depending on opponent and particular needs. Italy, shaken by the Tottonero scandal, was not as good as at the 1978 World Cup. The team did not add to its game, as it was expected in 1978 – rather, they were weaker, a step back from the enjoyable attacking football they played in Argentina. May be a bit unlucky, but with so great difficulties scoring, bad luck was hardly the reason. England entirely disappointed – it was the same impoverished tactic ‘run and kick’ as ever. Did not work for years too – European football changed massively in the 1970s and England clearly missed the boat. Spain – nothing new with them either. No wonder Spanish Federation was concerned, but perhaps the problem of Spanish football was not addressed correctly: the whole philosophy of Spanish football had to change radically. On every level.

At the end, the final standings in the group were fair, according to what they showed. Frankly, only Belgium was a team for the future. The rest… belonged to the past.

 

Group A opened the championship – West Germany vs Czechoslovakia, a replay of the 1976 final. The reigning champions against one of the main favourites, hungry for revenge. The intrigue was mostly on paper… the fans had better sense. Only 11 000 attended. The Germans had only one player who played at the 1976 final – Dietz. Czechoslovakia started with 5 – Ondrus, Gogh, Jurkemik, Panenka, and Nehoda. The opening ceremony of the championship quickly proved more interesting than the game. It was easy to find excuses: the heat, the pressure on the players, the respect both teams had for foxy opponent. Excuses could not hide the obvious: the game was extremely dull. Menotti, who was unfortunate to attend, made the best comment after the match: the ugly football currently in vogue made him a chain-smoker. He smoked 34 cigarettes during the match. The strikers of both teams scored 1 goal. The reigning champions scored nil.

In the 55th minute Rummenigge scored after a cross from Hansi Muller. That was all and no wonder: West Germany had only 3 shots at the Czechoslovakian net. The Czechs – 6. The Germans won, but pleased no one. Czechoslovakia seemingly played on their current level, which was not much. Venglos blamed his goalkeeper Netolicka for the goal – it was not a big mistake, but the coach was right. A bit of hesitation, uncertainty, lateness and the match was lost. Goalkeeping was well known problem of the team, though. West Germany was heavily criticized: the team just looked as a continuation of the failed 1978 version. It seemed Derwall had no vision of his own, but only followed the approach of Schon. The tactical scheme was 4-4-2, with 6 defensive players. In the middle of defense was Culmann: the ever-present Culmann, who was elevated from a substitute to key player. But he was never more than reliable substitute – and now even less. Schon reduced West Germany to dull, physical team of fighters having no clue what to do when possessing the ball – Derwall’s team was the same. Saturated mid-field with solid runners. Schuster was not fielded at all, Magath came as a substitute, Hansi Muller once again was found shaky and not at all at the level of Overath and Netzer. Any thought of comparing Culmann to Beckenbauer was laughable: not only the man had nothing to do with conducting the game, but he was a dwarf compared to Schwarzenbeck. Derwall had no friends after this match, which was voted the dullest of the whole championship. But the Germans got 2 points.

Holand vs Greece had no intrigue: it was just a formality. Holland was still considered a leading football nation – perhaps one reason this match was better attended than West Germany – Czechoslovakia. The Greeks made funny sounding statements before the game, which nobody took seriously. The Dutch started with many little known players, but it was felt that that the new names are the bright up and coming great Dutch. If not so – Krol, Haan, Rep, and van de Kerkhof twins were enough to beat Greece. Alas, it not so. The Greeks were clearly bellow the top teams even when running on enthusiasm. Unfortunately, Holland did not look better. They looked like the terrible Germans. Clueless in attack – the main quality of the great Holland of earlier years was exactly the attack. After the game Zwartkruis blamed the Greeks for their ultra-defensive approach. Nobody believed him… Holland had no creativity and was terrible. They were just lucky: in the 65th minute the Greek goalkeeper Konstantinou made a stupid foul against Nanninga. The ball was already in possession of a Greek defender, no danger, no reason for committing the foul. The referee immediately gave a penalty.

Konstantinou guessed the direction of the ball, but was not able to reach it. Kist scored the only goal of the match. Near the end Kapsis missed a good opportunity. That was all… Holland was lucky to win. In fact, Holland was lucky not to lose from incredibly weak opponent. The whole difference between winning and losing was that: if Konstantinou did not touch Nanninga and if the header of Kapsis was just a bit lower so to touch the goalpost at the other side so to go into the net, the winner would have been Greece.

Holland vs West Germany – the derby of Group A. The stakes were high – the winner was practically going to the final. Expectations were also high – West Germany and Holland had old scores to settle. Both teams disappointed a few days earlier, but it was felt that the derby will be entirely different. To a point, West Germany was repeating 1974 – back then the team also started badly and had to be reshaped in the next games until the right formula was found. Derwall did the same – Cullmann and Bernd Foster were out, replaced by Schuster and Hrubesch. Two players is not much of a change, but only on the surface: the whole structure was changed. Stielike was moved back as a libero, Schuster got the role of playmaker – not a pure playmaker like Overath before, but more like Bonhof: having some defensive role as well. Hrubesch, of course, was the center-forward. West Germany had immediately attacking shape – 4-3-3, with 6 attacking players, whereas against Czechoslovakia there were 6 defensive players. Both Schuster and Hrubesch were unknown internationally, but what looked like a risk was well justified: Kaltz and Hrubesch were lethal combination in Hamburger SV – the burly center-forward scored many a goal after long cross from Kaltz. Stielike was just right as libero – able to conduct the game and go ahead. Schuster at first was thought defensive midfielder, but immediately proved he was much more than that. He was hungry for success too. Holland had no other option, but the same players who disappointed against Greece. Five players had injuries, including Schrijvers, who had to be substituted in the 20th minute of the previous match – the real Dutch concern was to put the injured back on their feet. It was done. The game started and soon it was clear that the German changes worked. Holland, however, struggled as against the Greeks. The tempo was fast, soon the Germans clearly controlled the game and started scoring. The hero was Thomas Allofs, who was very disappointing against Czechoslovakia. He scored a hat-trick and 10 minutes before the final whistle the winner was absolutely clear: West Germany 3 – Holland 0.

Great match for Thomas Allofs – here he scores again and the picture tells it all: Schrijvers is too heavy for really quick reaction, as he always was, and van de Korput too late. The Germans were quicker, lighter, brighter. But Derwall made two substitutes, which were a bit questionable – first, Hansi Muller was replaced by Magath and in 75th minute Dietz by 19-years old Lothar Matthaus. Hansi Muller perhaps unjustly was constantly under criticism: he was thought too individualistic and underperforming. It may have been so, but Magath was no ultimately better player on one hand, and probably not the right substitute on the other, for he was doubling Schuster in midfield and the 20-years old was great. As for Matthaus, he replaced the left full back. Holland was expected to go ‘all or nothing’ in the last minutes, so it was clear that Matthaus must play defensive role, entirely unfamiliar position. His lack of experience showed quickly – he committed a foul inside penalty area and Rep made it 1-3. In the 85th minute Willie van de Kerkhof scored a second goal and things no longer looked bright for West Germany. To a point, the substitutes were not right – in the lats part of the match West Germany slowed down and lost efficiency. But Holland was not capable of miracle – they were not the team of 1978, far less the great one of 1974. They attacked to the end, but 5 minutes were just too short a time for this team. As a whole, West Germany was far better team, showing at moments sparks of greatness – the Gremans were back, that was the impression after the game. Holland was gone as a team – that was the other judgement. They looked just like West Germany in 1978: tough, constantly running and tackling teams with no clue what to do when possessing the ball.

Czechoslovakia – Greece attracted no interest and left almost no trace. It was a match without mystery and intrigue. The winner was certain. Less than 5000 attended. Venglos had no illusions – he just said to his team if they wanted to have a chance to play for the bronze medals, they had to win today. The difference of class was obvious – Panenka scored in the 6th minute from a free-kick, his specialty. The Greeks fought back and equalized 10 minutes later, but it was clear that they were inferior team by far. Czechoslovakia scored 2 more goals. The team did not impressed anybody – they were much better than the Greeks, yet, nothing special. With one match left, only miracle would have placed the reigning European champions on top of the group. A very huge miracle… West Germany had to lose to Greece and Czechoslovakia – win over Holland.

Czechoslvakia – Holland. Before the match Zwartkruis made grumpy excuses to unfriendly Dutch media: “What do you expect? The clubs rule – they do not free players for the national team and as a result we hardly play any friendlies. Without, say 8 friendlies a year, it is impossible to build good team.” Venglos was philosopkically-realistic: “It is possible to not lose to Holland, they are not better than us. If we are lucky to reach the ‘small final’ for third place our goal will be accomplished.” He fielded his usual starters, bringing back Netolicka, who did not play against Greece. Goalkeeping was well known problem without solution – Netolicka was not great, Seman was similar, Netolicka was back. The rest were the best Czechoslovakia had at the moment. Berger was out – he was substituted in the 23rd minute against Greece, which was enough indication for his worth – and Vojacek was the only new starter. Masny was moved back to midfield – defense and caution was the order of the day: 4-4-3 scheme, with 5 defensive players, for Vojacek was nominal midfielder. Zwartkruis tried to shake his team, which was difficult, given the squad he had. Haan was out. Kist was out. Nanninga, the golden substitute in 1978, was a starter. The changes were pathetic… Nanninga was used so far like in 1978 – a substitute, coming in the second half in the hope of making a miracle. Did not work. Nanninga was not a star, but rather ordinary player. For more Zwartkruis had no guts: it was obvious that van de Kerkhof twins are counter-productive. But they are constant starters. Rep was obviously beyond his peak, yet a starter. The tactical scheme was clearly defensive: 4-4-2, with Rene van de Kerkhof in front. He was more of a midfielder than a striker. Both opponents were seemingly going for a tie. The match was ugly and brutal – 52 fouls were called. Both teams managed to score a goal. Zwartkruis decision to start without Haan, but to depend on van de Kerkhof twins was obvious mistake – when Haan replaced Nanninga, Holland became more creative and dangerous. And managed to equalize. The match ended 1-1 – the result both sides seemingly aimed at, but Czechoslovakia benefited by it.

Vojacek clears the ball addressed to Haan. Ondrus watches nearby – the original scheme, in which Vojacek was placed as midfielder, fooled no one: he was a central defender. His real position. Zwartkruis said “we did what we can” – which was not much. Venglos again was ‘realistic’: “The game was not a question of beauty, but getting a particular result. We got it, we are happy.” Menotti was disgusted and one again criticized defensive European football.

The last group match – West Germany vs Greece – was mere protocol. Both teams made changes, giving some playing time to unused reserves. Derwall clearly kept some players fresh for the final. Cullmann was back – this time in midfield. Memmering got completed the line. Schuster, Dietz, and Allofs were out. Like the opening match, the scheme was 4-4-2. The Germans were not even interested and they appeared as arbitrary bunch of players some of which don’t want to play, and some don’t know how to play. The only important thing was the weird insistence of Derwall to use Cullmann – this time combined with Stielike. Why woody Cullmann, who was not even at his usual form? The Greeks were even less than usual, for some of the key players were replaced by the unused reserves. The team played as best as they could. West Germans walked and aimlessly kicked the ball around. Nobody scored. And who would expect a miracle of this match? Under the old rules, the match was not played at the same time Czechoslovakia and Holland played, but after. Derwall was crystal clear: “Who will start depends on the result of the other match. If it is tied, then Dietz, Schuster, and Allofs will get a rest.”. This match did not matter at all – even if they lost it, the Germans were finalists. The Greeks had a chance to win the match in the last minutes, but the ball deflected from the cross bar out. Panagoulias was happy and boisterous: ‘We are the moral winners, we are proud. Europe will hear from us yet.’ It did… 24 years later. True, the Greek team showed spirit and managed a tie against mighty West Germany, but it was absolutely clear that they are inferior to any other finalist. During the finals their only noticeable player relatively equal to the leading Europeans was Anastopoulos.

A double-edged picture: Rummenigge high above Greek defender, who is unable even to challenge. That was the objective difference of class between the Greeks and the leading European football nations. In the same time, Rummenigge and his teammates were unable to beat Greece. Rummenigge himself was substituted in the 65th minute by Del’Haye.

The final table of Group A:

1. West Germany 2 1 0 4-2 5

2. Czechoslovakia 1 1 1 4-3 3

3. Holland 1 1 1 4-4 3

4. Greece 0 1 2 1-4 1

West Germany once again going to the final – third time consecutive European finalist. Czechoslovakia, a bit surprisingly, was going to play for bronze – a success in itself, and also brave performance, for the champions of 1976 were not at all at their previous level. Holland – major disappointment and an end of an era, recognized by their own coach. Greece – nothing special, except that they reached the final stage. Success for the country, but obviously Greek football was still far behind the leading nations.

 

In Group A Belgium would have been a favourite, next to West Germany. In Group B the team was the outsider. Not as toothless as Greece, but relatively weaker than the other teams. Belgium went through a crisis in the early 1970s, but after 1975 new talented generation emerged and Belgian football was steadily rising. Clubs was successful internationally – FC Brugge played two European finals and Anderlecht won the Cup Winners Cup twice. The ‘Red Devils’ failed to reach the finals of two World Cups, but did well at the two European championships in the 1970s. They were always a team rising to the occasion. Nobody expected them to be easily beaten in 1980 either, yet compared to the other teams in Group B Belgium seemingly had more negatives. FC Brugge and particularly Anderlecht depended on foreign stars, mostly Dutch. The lax Belgian rules for imported players made the number huge – Anderlecht was seen as a double of Ajax quite seriously. Compared to the foreigners, Belgian players were not so impressive, they were rather support players to their famous team-mates. None of the new Belgians was major European star, some were practically unknown. There was no new van Himst. And they did not look serious enough – some hippie-like bearded guys, too relaxed for the sober and tidy professionalism at the end of the 1970s.

Guy Thys was modest in his interviews, even a bit dismissive of his team, expressing modest expectation ‘if’ this or that happened. There was no fear, but no big hopes either, which was judged to be realistic view of the abilities of his team: able to give a fight, but not equal to the opponents. Thy run liberal and relaxed camp – something always loved by the media, because it provides horrified gossip. It was during the finals when the journalists rushed to the Belgian camp only to find ‘horror’: the doors were not heavily blocked, the team sipping beer, and Thys smoking his cigar nearby, benevolently looking at his boys and making jokes. The boys readily provided scary answers: ‘Why giving up good habits?’, mused the captain of the squad Cools when asked about the beer in his hand. ‘We don’t like discipline. We cherish individual space and the coach understands that. He trusts us and wea re not going to let him down.’, lectured Meeuws. The journalists remembered that some of the team played for semi-professional clubs, there was even a school teacher among them, and made skeptical conclusions: the team was not professional enough to go far. Neither Thys, nor the boys contradicted the media. Since few Belgian players were well known, it looked a team starting a vacation. Guy Thys was hardly taken seriously – he included Wilfried van Moer under pressure from the media. The veteran was the only player from the last Belgian team appearing at World Cup finals. It was in 1970 – in 1980 van Moer was 35 years old…

 

1

1GK

Theo Custers

(1950-08-10)10 August 1950 (aged 29)

 

Royal Antwerp

2

2DF

Eric Gerets

(1954-05-18)18 May 1954 (aged 26)

 

Standard Liège

3

2DF

Luc Millecamps

(1951-09-10)10 September 1951 (aged 28)

 

Waregem

4

2DF

Walter Meeuws

(1951-07-11)11 July 1951 (aged 28)

 

Club Brugge

5

2DF

Michel Renquin

(1955-11-03)3 November 1955 (aged 24)

 

Standard Liège

6

3MF

Julien Cools (c)

(1947-02-13)13 February 1947 (aged 33)

 

K. Beerschot

7

3MF

René Vandereycken

(1953-07-22)22 July 1953 (aged 26)

 

Club Brugge

8

3MF

Wilfried van Moer

(1945-03-01)1 March 1945 (aged 35)

 

Beringen

9

4FW

François van der Elst

(1954-12-01)1 December 1954 (aged 25)

 

Anderlecht

10

4FW

Erwin Vandenbergh

(1959-01-26)26 January 1959 (aged 21)

 

Lierse

11

4FW

Jan Ceulemans

(1957-02-28)28 February 1957 (aged 23)

 

Club Brugge

12

1GK

Jean-Marie Pfaff

(1953-12-04)4 December 1953 (aged 26)

 

Beveren

13

3MF

Maurice Martens

(1947-06-05)5 June 1947 (aged 33)

 

Molenbeek

14

2DF

Gerard Plessers

(1959-03-30)30 March 1959 (aged 21)

 

Standard Liège

15

3MF

René Verheyen

(1952-03-20)20 March 1952 (aged 28)

 

Lokeren

16

3MF

Marc Millecamps

(1950-10-09)9 October 1950 (aged 29)

 

Waregem

17

3MF

Raymond Mommens

(1958-12-27)27 December 1958 (aged 21)

 

Lokeren

18

3MF

Guy Dardenne

(1954-10-19)19 October 1954 (aged 25)

 

Lokeren

19

4FW

Willy Wellens

(1954-03-29)29 March 1954 (aged 26)

 

Standard Liège

20

1GK

Michel Preud’homme

(1959-01-24)24 January 1959 (aged 21)

 

Standard Liège

21

2DF

Jos Heyligen

(1947-06-30)30 June 1947 (aged 32)

 

Beringen

22

4FW

Ronny Martens

(1958-00-22)22 December 1958 (aged 22)

 

Anderlecht

Belgium was not impressive even on picture: some hillbillies. Little class – Francois van der Elst and Jan Ceulemans. Van Moer was seemingly of symbolic value – just a link between the last successful team and the current one. At his age seemingly he was not good for anything else and very likely would not even play. One recognizable name was missing – van Gool. And rightly so – after he moved from FC Brugge to 1.FC Koln, he no longer the same. The team list was almost a diagnosis: only 5 players of Anderlecht and FC Brugge. The success of the Belgian clubs was clearly not due to Belgian players. Nobody knew yet Pfaff and Preud’homme – burly Theo Custers was seemingly the number one goalkeeper and he was not much. Belgium was tough to beat, nobody was thinking playing against them a picnic, but the fear was mostly of possible disturbance the plans of others. The whole role of Belgium was perhaps to decide the group winner, not to win.