West Germany was may be the second favourite. Of course, everybody lists the Germans as favourites ever, but there were serious doubts this time too. To a point, the actual strength of the team was a bit unknown, for West Germany had the easiest qualifying group and few paid close attention. The 1978 fiasco was well remembered, though – fueling doubts. It was not the exciting German team of the first half of the 1970s, decline was noticed since 1974, the great stars aged and retired, and there were no equal to them youngsters emerging. But Germans are never dismissed, for it is also well remembered that they always rise to the occasion. Well, except in 1978… well, they lost the European final in 1976 too… well, Beckenbauer warned about coming crisis right after the 1974 triumph. And the the team sunk at the 1978 World Cup… Schon was sacked. Or resigned. The press was very vocal about it – only to change its view after the fact.
The German Federation appointed Jupp Derwall and there were plenty of critics: he never coached seriously, he was too liberal with the players, he lacked the intellectual capacity of Schon, he was Schon’s assistant after all, so what kind of new thinking one cane expect? Now it was felt that Schon should have stayed for few more years. The national team was under close scrutiny – and merciless criticism. On the other hand Derwall was natural choice – thus, the right choice. So far, West Germany was coached by only two men: Sep Hepberger was replaced by his assistant Schon. Following the established tradition, it was natural he to be replaced by his own long-time assistant. Derwall knew the workings of the national team in and out, he had enormous experience. Smooth replacement worked wonderfully before – that was the way. Nothing dramatic happened with the change: Derwall continued using players Schon included in the national team. Changes were natural – retirements – and new players were gradually and carefully introduced. But the first steps were rocky – West Germany started badly in the qualification group, hitting rock bottom in Malta. As time moved on, the real problems became clearer: careful, step-by-step reshaping of the team was unsatisfactory – Derwall appeared gutless by depending on well known players, who did not make the great teams of Schon and failed miserably in Argentina. In the same time youngsters lacked more than experience: they were not as good as the previous generation. If Derwall risked entirely new team, criticism would have been murderous. No-win situation, in which the coach steered in strange, but admirable way – a mixture of continuing Schon’s legacy with slow introduction of young players. Non-confrontational way, it appeared to be: the reason of someone becoming a starter was the retirement of a great veteran. Nobody can really protest… circumstances. And it was circumstances helping Derwall at the end – injuries of key players, or at least players Derwall, fearing risk, considered essential. Yet, the team strong, there were plenty of candidates for a place in it, there were first-rate European stars of the time, there was new talent already impressing keen observers and specialists. West Germany was a favourite, many a specialist considered it playing the final, if not a winner. The German Federation lifted the stupid ban on foreign-based players, which handicapped the team at the 1978 World Cup. On the surface, it was laughable matter – back in 1978 it was only Stielike playing abroad. In 1980 there were 2 players – Stielike and Bonhof. The picture was revealing the real problem of West German football: there was no great play-maker. The absence of Stielike immediately reduced West Germany to toothless team. Bonhof was the other option, but he was not exactly a play-maker – he was similar to Neeskens: great player, but only when having someone greater than him. Not a leader in terms of conducting and shaping the game. Stielike was universal player – the dream of the original total football: a player equally at home at any position. It was Derwall who moved him back as a libero – it was a copy of the original: Schon moving Beckenbauer back in defense to give him bigger creative freedom. But it was not the same… for ahead of Beckenbauer were Overatt or Netzer. Now… Derwall lamented that he needs two Stielikes and there is only one. Bonhof was perhaps the closest approximation of much needed creative midfielder. So it looked like… Stielike was back and Bonhof was also at hand. Until he suffered injury and was out – it was so late in the season, the squad lists for the finals were already deposited and changes were impossible. West Germany arrived in Italy with 21 players. Two more injuries happened earlier – Norbert Nigbur and Klaus Fischer. Sep Mayer retired in 1979 and Nigbur was his replacement. Already 31 years old, he was in and out of the national team for years, playing very little, because. Nigbur was reserve in 1974. Fischer had similar fate – because of Gerd Muller in his case – but eventually became the regular center-forward of West Germany around 1978. These two were the very heart of the German problem: second-stringers during the days of the great generation. They replaced the stars not that much on merit, but because they retired. By now the former second-stringers were quite old… experience was on their side. They were also the current top players. But with them the team struggled – and now it was clear why they were not starters before, but Mayer, Muller, Beckenbauer, etc. Something was missing… a bit of leadership, a bit of skill, a bit of consistency, a bit of nerve… and as a result, the team was not winning, was not exciting, and looked without future. But it was also impossible to dismiss them, for they were the top current stars. Nigbur and Fischer were good example: they were key players of the team under normal circumstances – behind them were either known veterans, tried and dismissed for those two were slightly better, if nothing else. The other options were… dangerous. The three goalkeepers Derwall brought to Italy had a grand total of 3 matches for the national team, which belonged to Toni Schumacher. Only one of them was full match… No coach will deliberately play such players at finals. Derwall was not thinking either – it was just because Nigbur and Fischer were injured Schumacher and Hrubesch became starters. It was because Culmann was in shaky form and Bonhof out Bernd Schuster got a chance. It was not Derwall, but circumstances making the stars of 1980s – one can make support such a claim quite easily. That was why West Germany was not seen as a overwhelming favourite and considered weaker then Holland.
1
1GK
Harald Schumacher
(1954-03-06)6 March 1954 (aged 26)
Köln
2
2DF
Hans-Peter Briegel
(1955-10-11)11 October 1955 (aged 24)
Kaiserslautern
3
2DF
Bernhard Cullmann
(1949-11-01)1 November 1949 (aged 30)
Köln
4
2DF
Karlheinz Förster
(1958-07-25)25 July 1958 (aged 21)
Stuttgart
5
2DF
Bernard Dietz (c)
(1948-03-22)22 March 1948 (aged 32)
Duisburg
6
3MF
Bernd Schuster
(1959-12-22)22 December 1959 (aged 20)
Köln
7
2DF
Bernd Förster
(1956-05-03)3 May 1956 (aged 24)
Stuttgart
8
4FW
Karl-Heinz Rummenigge
(1955-09-25)25 September 1955 (aged 24)
Bayern Munich
9
4FW
Horst Hrubesch
(1951-04-17)17 April 1951 (aged 29)
Hamburg
10
3MF
Hansi Müller
(1957-07-27)27 July 1957 (aged 22)
Stuttgart
11
4FW
Klaus Allofs
(1956-12-05)5 December 1956 (aged 23)
Fortuna Düsseldorf
12
3MF
Caspar Memering
(1953-06-01)1 June 1953 (aged 27)
Hamburg
13
3MF
Rainer Bonhof
(1952-03-29)29 March 1952 (aged 28)
Valencia
14
3MF
Felix Magath
(1953-07-26)26 July 1953 (aged 26)
Hamburg
15
3MF
Uli Stielike
(1954-11-15)15 November 1954 (aged 25)
Real Madrid
16
2DF
Herbert Zimmermann
(1954-07-01)1 July 1954 (aged 25)
Köln
17
3MF
Karl Del’Haye
(1955-08-18)18 August 1955 (aged 24)
Borussia Mönchengladbach
18
3MF
Lothar Matthäus
(1961-03-21)21 March 1961 (aged 19)
Borussia Mönchengladbach
19
3MF
Miroslav Votava
(1956-04-24)24 April 1956 (aged 24)
Borussia Dortmund
20
2DF
Manfred Kaltz
(1953-01-06)6 January 1953 (aged 27)
Hamburg
21
1GK
Walter Junghans
(1958-10-26)26 October 1958 (aged 21)
Bayern Munich
22
1GK
Eike Immel
(1960-11-27)27 November 1960 (aged 19)
Borussia Dortmund
The squad made people skeptical and critical – this is one of youngest German selections, averaging a bit over 24 years. Two players were barely 19 years old. Most names were little known outside Germany. Some appeared even wild – Caspar Memmering for sure. Many had played only a handful matches for the national team. For those lamenting the lost purity of the German team nowadays: Miroslav (Mirko) Votava was born in Czechoslovakia and arrived in West Germany after some years in Australia – his parents left their native country in 1968, thanks to the Soviet-led invasion. At a glance, one may think Derwall was a radical, introducing entirely new team. But it was circumstance again – by now only two 1974 World Champions remained: Bonhof and Culmann. Nigbur was out because of injury. Eventually, Bonhof was also out. It was not Derwall’s wish… and he persevered and played Culmann. Retirement and injuries ‘revolutionized’ the squad. Before the finals it was very sucpicious squad… During the finals it was not a happy squad both on and off the field. It was not a squad without problem after the championship either. There was promise, but so far it was very difficult to see in these names the big stars of the 1980s. What was quite visible at first was dulness… Culmann again, the ever-present ultra-reliable dull player, usually a reserve, but year after year in the team. A prime example of the ugly change of free, creative total football into physical battle of the fittest, in which those who run the most win.