Category: 1988

The Olympic final USSR and Brazil. Clearly, the best teams at the Olympics. If the Soviets always prepared a team for a long time, Olympic teams in the West were traditionally a secondary matter – but this time Brazil did it ‘Soviet style’, if you like. Seven players of the squad participated in the European tour of the A team in 1987 – this was hardly impressive tour, but in fact the Olympians got good early preparation for the 1988 Games. Team USSR had some problems, though – the concept of separate Olympic team was still new for them and hard to swallow. Without the best national team players it looks not very serious to Soviet eyes. All that changed during the Olympics, but at the final two equal teams met, both well prepared and ambitious.
Ketashvili clears the ball. It was fairly equal match with Brzilians the more dangerous at first.
Of course, the Brazilians were more technical and the Soviets – rougher, but well organized. The world was getting used to someone called Romario.
1-0 Brazil in the 30th minute. Who scored it? Well, the new guy… what’s his name? The Soviet journalists were unable to get his name right even in their articles on the final – he was called in one and in the same piece Funes, Romario, and Romario Funes. A whole Brazilian line of strikers, three in one. Well, Romario was already the top scorer of the Olympics, but new boys are rarely called right.
The Soviets were far from beaten – in fact, they gradually got the upper hand, but still had to do defensive work and fret. Left to right – Viktor Lossev, Evgeny Kuznetzov, Vladimir Lyuty, Aleksey Mikhailichenko, Arminas Narbekovas, Gela Ketashvili.
Brazil tried to slow down the flow of the game, but the Soviets were pushing forward and eventually equalized. In the 61st minute Mikhailichenko scored the awarded penalty – it was not only the mysterious Funes-RomarioFunes-Romario making strong impression: between the goalposts was another new discovery, Taffarel. Perhaps the best player at the final. He saved a lot, but could not save the penalty. It was 1-1 at the 90th minute.
In the extra time younger Brazilians got tired and physically stronger Soviets eventually scored a second goal – Vladmir Lyuty here is just about to pass a header to Yury Savychev, who scored 2-1 in the 105th minute. The result stayed unchanged to the end, except both teams were left with 10 players after Tatarchuk was redcarded in the 110th minute and Ademir was expelled in the 118th minute. Another 5 players got only yellow cards during the final – the Soviets eventually complained from brutal Brazilian play, but they got more yellow cards.
Soviet Union 2 – 1 Brazil (aet, FT 1-1)
Soviet Union: Kharin – Ketashvili, Yarovenko, Gorlukovich, Losev – Kuznetsov, Dobrovolsky, Mikhailichenko, Tatarchuk – Lyuty (Sklyarov), Narbekovas (Savichev).
Brazil: Taffarel – Luis Carlos, Aloisio, Andre Cruz, Jorginho – Andrade, Milton, Neto (Edmar) – Careca II, Bebeto (Joao Paulo), Romario.
Referee: Gerard Bignet (France) Attendance: 75 000
Scorers: 30′ Romario 0-1; 61′ Dobrovolski (pen) 1-1; 103′ Savichev 2-1.
Brazil finished with silver medals, once again unable to win the gold, but the team was more than promising – few players was seen as future big stars, Taffarel and Romario in particular. More importantly, this Brazil squad was a solid and well prepared team, something which was never the case with their Olympic selection.
USSR was more experienced and may be a bit better playing team than Brazil and they won the Olympic title. It was well deserved victory – USSR and Brazil were the best teams at the finals, it was not simply a matter of chance.
So, USSR won its 2nd Olympic title after a very long and sometimes frustrating wait. Sitting from left: G. Ketsahvilil, O. Cherednik, I. Sklyarov, A. Janonis, I. Dobrovolsky, Z. Ordzhonikidze – doctor, A. Narbekovas, V. Tatarchuk, Yu. Savichev, O. Prudnikov, V. Lossev. Top row: V. Miklyeav – press officer, D. Kharin, V. Tishtenko, E. Kuznetzov, I. Ponomarev, O. Borodyuk, O. Tukmanov – team chief, V. Salkov – assistant coach, V.Lyuty, A. Byshovetz – coach, S. Yarovenko, G. Gadzhiev – assistant coach, S. Fokin, O. Mikhailichenko, S. Gorlukovich.

The group round ended with these finals tables, top two teams qualified to the ¼ fianls:
Group A
1. Sweden 2 1 0 6-3 5
2. West Germany 2 0 1 8-3 4
3. Tunisia 0 2 1 3-6 2
4. China 0 1 2 0-5 1
Group B
1. Zambia 2 1 0 10-2 5
2. Italy 2 0 1 7-6 4
3. Iraq 1 1 1 5-4 3
4. Guatemala 0 0 3 2-12 0
Group C
1. USSR 2 1 0 6-3 5
2. Argentina 1 1 1 4-4 3
3. South Korea 0 2 1 1-2 2
4. USA 0 2 1 3-5 2
Group D
1. Brazil 3 0 0 9-1 6
2. Australia 2 0 1 2-3 4
3. Yugoslavia 1 0 3 4-4 2
4. Nigeria 0 0 3 1-8 0
The only surprise was the elimination of Yugoslvaia. Standing from left: Prosinecki, Lekovic, Asanovic, Lesjak, Vasilijevic, Jaksic. First row: Stevanovic, Mitrovic, Bogdanovic, Suker, Petric.
The ¼ finals.
Sweden – Italy 1-2
USSR – Australia 3-0
Zambia – West Germany 0-4
Zambia was the pleasant surprise in the group phase, but the road was blocked by Germans. This is the squad beating Italy 4-0.
Brazil – Argentina 1-0
½ finals.
USSR – Italy 3-2
Brazil – West Germany 1-1 3-2 penalty shoot-out
Match for bronze medals
West Germany – Italy 3-0

Italy finished 4th – no big deal, for Olympics did not count much, but this team lost 0-4 to Zambia and 0-3 to West Germany. Somewhat, too much.

West Germany took the bronze medals and perhaps that was a bit of consolation for Jurgen Klinsmann and Frank Mill after the European fiasco.

The Olympics. The second big tournament in 1988, which never attracted great interest – but times were changing. What used to be a domain of the Communist Eastern Europe was no more that – professional players were permitted to play since 1984, with some restrictions, including age restrictions, so the Olympics got new importance – it was the place to see and may be snatch young talent.
The new rules forced even the Eastern Europeans to change their ways – not able to field their first teams anymore, now they organized true Olympic teams, entirely different from their first selections. The new rules were still either unclear or left some gaps for beating them, for the Soviets listed a squad with plenty of players older than 23: originally, 12 of total 20. Only one of the team played at the European finals – Mikhailichenko. Two players apparently were added later and played as regulars – Losev and Gorlukovich. The Olympic team was coached by a rival of Lobanovsky – Byshovetz, a fellow Ukrainian, but hardly a great fan of Lobanovsky, so there may have been some frictions between the two regarding players – may be some were ignored for ‘belonging’ to the rival. This working both ways, for the Olympics were late this time – starting in September, when the qualifications for the 1990 World Cup started as well. In any case apart from Mikhailichenko nobody else was much needed by Lobanovsky at the moment, so it was a true Olympic team. The other finalists acted according to their own vision – Europeans and South Americans more or less made made young squads with an eye to the future: promising players who may make the national team in time, reinforced by some old guys. The West Germans, for example, included Frank Mill, who made the national team for years, but played rarely for it. Klinsmann was in the team too. Brazil included Bebeto and Romario from the young prospects. Italy preferred dependable second stringers, having no chance to play for the first team – the goalkeeper of Juventus Tacconi, for instance. Argentina chose players who did not make the national team. Countries from other continents played with what they had at hand, which was more leaning towards their first teams for Asians and Africans and unknown young players for USA and Australia. Yugoslavia was closer to the West European approach – second stringers, a star or two, hopeful youngsters.

The aftermath. Analyzes, ‘lessons’, innovations – the usual thoughtful writings after a big championship, but somewhat toned down this time. The ideal team if the finals was formed right away:
Hans van Breukelen (Holland)
Giuseppe Bergomi (Italy) Frank Rijkaard (Holland) Ronald Koeman (Holland) Paolo Maldini (Italy)
Jan Wouters (Holland) Lothar Matthaus (BRD) Giuseppe Giannini (Italy)
Ruud Gullit (Holland)
Gianluca Vialli (Italy) Marco van Basten (Holland)
Not even one Soviet player! That looks weird – USSR eliminated Italy and beat Holland in their group match. Italy, not all that exciting, had 4 players among the best 11. The reason for that perhaps was that collective performance was most important at that time – the Soviets played as a great collective, but individually – other players were seemingly more impressive when compared one by one. One can also fail to see why Matthaus was selected. Again, it was collective play vs individuality and it was hard to point at anybody as greatly better than other players at the same position. Only Gullit, Rijkaard, and van Basten were obvious choices beyond doubt. From such viewpoint, Euro’88 did not bring anything new in terms of tactics or new way of playing the game – it was rather return to classic total football, which was great because the game was again entertaining, but still it was a step back. A close and vigorous look shows a repetition of 15-years old approach: back in 1974 Haan was moved back to play center defender – now Rijkaard. Gullit played a center-forward and playmaker at the same time, like Cruijff. Van Basten had to move often to the wing because of Gullit – in 1974 Rep had to play this way because of Cruijff. Arnold Muhren was old, but useful – van Hanegem had this role in 1974. Van Aerle did not play in PSV Eindhoven at the position he played for the national team – back in 1974 this was the case of Wim Rijsbergen. And just like in 1974 the teams playing best total football reached the final – except this time it was not teams playing innovation, but those who actually managed to return best to total football and copy the artistry of it.
And from this perspective the judgment of the finalists: the Danes were down, their time ended and no surprise there, it was already noted, a generation got old. England failed terribly – once again, it was a pattern. West Germany failed and many were happy with that – enough with the dull physical football not pleasing the eye. Spain was back to its traditional awful ways. Italy was not ready, still in the process of rebuilding and shaping, with good potential for the future.
The Irish were praised.
Jackie Charlton made a lot out of seemingly nothing, but his style was considered primitive – it was mostly the big hearts of the underdogs praised. In terms of tactics… it was a giant step back to the very outdated kick and run. However, this approach worked and Eire had a good chance even to reach the semi-finals.
Lobanovsky left mixed feelings – a great and well known coach, certainly, but may be blinded by his stubborn mentality. Placing Alleynikov in the center of his defense was a mistake – which Lobanovsky repeated a month after the European final in friendly at home against Finland. The match ended 0-0 – a friendly and also Olympics were coming, so it was hard to experiment, but why playing the same team in a mere friendly? Why not trying other players, why trying again Alleynikov in unfamiliar position? Stubborn…
Michels was out, as it was known before the Euro finals, and the question was who will replace him was important – the Dutch Federation once again made a strange decision, which may put the great team in jeopardy.
The rest was transfers – the usual excitement of the market after a big tournament. The news here was that Soviet players were now available. Not everybody, but they were hot property to pursue. The immediate future was Dutch and Soviet.

The final: Holland vs USSR. They already played once and it was very entertaining match, so a new delight was expected. 50-50 chances, although the memory of the Soviet victory was still fresh and vivid. Rinus Michels said before the final that team USSR was a great puzzle to him, for they were so unpredictable and who knows what surprise they will take out of their sleeves. After all, out of the blue they played defensive football against Eire, but great attacking football against Italy. What could be now? Ruud Gullit concurred, saying he would prefer Italy, USSR was the most difficult opponent. The Soviets were not so vocal, but they had problems – Bessonov was injured and out, Oleg Kuznetzov suspended. Lobanovsky had to make changes and probably his decision was mistaken: his defensive line was changed constantly due to unfortunate circumstances – against Italy it was Bessonov, Khidiatullin, O. Kuznetzov, Ratz. Bessonov had to be replaced with Sulakvelidze, for he suffered injury , but Sulakvelidze was too old by now to face the speedy Dutch. Demianenko, who suffered both injury and shaky play earlier in the tournament, was placed back in the team, but this time as right full back instead of his usual left-side position. Alleynikov was moved back to take the place of Kuznetzov – why he and not Sergey Baltacha? Perhaps because Bessonov was universal player, capable of playing any position and his versatility was very beneficial – he was strong in defense, but had great attacking ability too. Good play-maker, good striker, he could move around depending on flow of a game. Alleynikov was similar, although he never played defense before – a lesser version of Bessonov, but still similar, so most likely Lobanovsky felt that he will be a good weapon. Baltacha did not play at all so far and he lost his place largely because of injury suffered a few months earlier – it was not sure he was fit to play yet on one hand, and on the other – Khidiatullin and Kuznetzov made just the pair Lobanovsky needed: strong, physical, rugged, with a taste for going in attack. Putting Alleynikov in defense was a great risk, but also affected the other lines – so far, he played generally in midfield and once as a striker. Gotzmanov was fielded in the place of Alleynikov and Belanov was back in the attack. Again, it was partly because Lobanovsky could not use Alleynikov as a striker and partly because fast Belanov was perhaps the best to play against the Dutch – despite earlier disappointments, which led to his complete exclusion for the semi-final with Italy. But who else? He was the only one faster than the Dutch and perhaps his punishment awakened his ambitions. Fast forward to the game – the big mistake was Alleynikov in defense (so, Baltacha came out after all, substituting Gotzmanov in the 69th minute. Even that was too late.) Holland had no problems with injuries, suspended players, or lack of form and fielded their regular and best eleven with Gullit more like second striker than pure midfielder. Nominally, the team schemes were 4-4-1-1 – Holland – and 1-3-4-2 – USSR.
Holland: van Breukelen, van Aerle, Rijkard, Ronald Koeman, van Tiggelen, Wouters, Erwin Koeman, Banenburg, Arnold Muhren, Gullit, van Basten.
USSR: Dassaev, Demianenko, Khidiatullin, Alleynikov, Ratz, Litovchenko, Mikhailichenko, Zavarov, Gotzmanov (Baltacha, 69), Protassov (Pasulko, 72), Belanov.
The Soviet squad would tell Michels that defensive approach was out, for there were not enough defensive players on the field (no Bessonov, no Sulakvelidze – both able to switch from midfield to defense and back), but it was not a great concern anyway – the Dutch team was flying and there was no need to change tactics or players. It was entertaining clash from start, both teams attacking and also pressing hard, with the Dutch slightly getting the upper hand.
Erwin Koeman watching Zavarov building an attack – fairly equal match, both teams dangerous and creative.
Alleynikov blocks Gullit’s attack – that was the tiny difference… Alleynikov tried hard, but Gullit was too much for him and with time – able to get away from Alleynikov.
And in the 34th minute Gullit scored with a header, which the Soviets thought came after offside. But there was no offside… Alleynikov was the last man, not van Basten. Tiny mistake, but fatal.
And then in the second half van Basten scored his incredible and instantly famous goal and made it 2-0 in the 54th minute. And 10 minutes after that Lovanovsky substituted Gotzmanov with Baltacha, stabilizing his defense. It was too late by then, it was over by then…
For the Soviets got a penalty in the 59th minute and Belanov missed. Or van Breukelen saved… In any case Belanov did not have a great tournament and even the way he took the penalty confirmed the critics were right: he kicked it differently than his usual approach and thus helped van Breukelen. It is easy to analyze penalties and blame players after the fact – the main point is that USSR lost its chance for come back and then even Lobanovsky lost his cool by fielding another defender. True, Holland was incredibly dangerous, but the result was 0-2 and there were 20 minutes to play – why not enforcing the attack? In the last ten minutes physical condition became crucially important and the Dutch appeared to be fresher and stronger than the Soviets. Holland won, USSR was worthy opponent, the final was great show, that was real football pleasing everyone. Even Lobanovsky, in his peculiar manner, acknowledged that – ‘I think the viewers were pleased with the final. We had more chances and entirely controlled the game in the second half, but in football who defends better and manage to use his scoring chances wins. I wanted my players to be very active and press the opponents from start in order to dominate with other kind of football, I think we managed to do that.’ Such words from Lobanovsky’s mouth were a major complement, even sounding like he was not going to put his team to the usual hell – he praised it after a lost match! Michels, however, differed – he claimed his team achieved dominance, enforcing his style with great focus and skill. The most important thing, according to him, was not to give even a minute to play free to a team like USSR, it would be lethal. Frankly, Michels gave more accurate explanation than Lobanovsky – Holland was slightly stronger. But the match was highly entertaining and that was perhaps most important: two great teams clashed and played their best.
USSR finished second. Strangely, a photo of the team playing the final is very difficult to find – even Soviet publications at the time printed another formation of earlier game. So did many other magazines in Europe. Thus, a picture of the squad from the final is a rarity. Standing from left: Dassaev, Khidiatullin, Alleynikov, Demianenko, Mikhailichenko. Crouching: Ratz, Belanov, Zavarov, Gotzmanov, Protassov, Litovchenko.
USSR played great finals and achieved its best success since 1972, when they were finalists too. But the difference was enormous – the team in 1972 looked outdated and was entirely outplayed by West Germany at its peak. In 1988 the Soviets could have been winners and played vanguard football. One can say they were unfortunate, suffering injuries of key players, and unable to field their best team at the final, but may be Lobanovsky could be blamed to a point: not only for the risky decision to move Alleynikov to the defence for the most important match, but rather for his whole selection, where were some players who were not to play under any circumstances (Sukristov, Dmitriev, Vyshnevsky), thus limiting the team’s options in defence and attack. Still, the core of the team delivered, perhaps further motivated by prospects of playing abroad – at last Soviet players had real chances to move to European professional clubs and good performance would only increase their value. Soviet teams at the 1982 and 1986 World Cups made good impressions – and many of this squad played at those finals – but somewhat failed to advance: at last the team competed for the title, at last it delivered and was not only a nice promising team. The Soviets played so well that this time even at home they were not criticized. Even Lobanovsky appeared to be happy and satisfied.
Holland was the new European champion and perhaps this team deserved most to win, but it was euphoric victory for many reasons. First of all, they eliminated West Germany which was a revenge for the lost final in 1974. Second, Holland finally washed away the stigma of losing finals. Third, they had again a great generation and team, after years of decline, and once again were leading the continental football. The days of the great total football were revamped. There was a direct link with the glorious past too: Rinus Michels and Arnold Muhren. There was also some irony in that – the legendary Ajax, built by Michels, achieved more success without him and in that team Arnold Muhren was mere reserve, rarely playing – now he was European champion, something none of his famous teammates achieved. There were some more elements speaking in favour of Holland’88 when compared to Holland’74 and ’88: a strong goalkeeper, first of all, and no problems in defense. Back in 1974 Michels had to improvise, but now he had good players at hand. There was more than enough talent, even spilling over the basic eleven – Wim Kift and John Bosman saw little action, for Marco van Basten was fantastic. Aron Winter had to wait for his hour in the future too. Versatility was also very helpful – both Rijkard and Ronald Koeman started as midfielders, but had no problem moving back to central defense . Or back to midfield, particularly Rijkard. Similarly, Gullit played midfield or striker, depending on the needs of the moment. It was a dream team and even the peculiarities of the Dutch Federation could not prevent it from winning – the old tradition with quickly replaced coaches was still intact: back in 1974 Michels was hired just for the World Cup finals, then it was the same in 1978 with Ernst Happel, and now was almost the same as before – Michels officially came to coach the team a few years earlier, but Leo Beenhacker coached the team most of the time until the finals came. And with the end of Euro’88 Michels was gone, just like in 1974 and 1978. And Johan Cruijff was nearby… as the likeliest replacement of Michels and once again he was not in the team. One rumor said that Michels himself blocked Cruijff’s appointment, fearing that his favourit pupil will outshine him. Anyhow, all that was in the backyard and what was in front was triumph and joy – and rightly so.
The Dutch won a big trophy at last.
And posed for the last photo as if to rub more salt to West German wounds – their photo with the European Cup is suspiciously similar to the photo of West Germany with the World Cup in 1974.

Semifinals. It was unanimous: the four best teams reached the semis. Group phase now only a reference point, everybody concentrated on the next games. USSR proved Holland was beatable, the Germans were playing at home – they were expected to win. Italy was doing well, but the Soviets had lethal strikers and played exciting football… here looked like 50-50. Somewhat, a repeat of the 1972 European final seems likelier.
West Germany – Holland 1-2. 1974 was evoked. Back than the Germans outfoxed the flying Dutch. It was clear that Rinus Michels would go for attacking approach. Beckenbauer seemingly tried to copy his former coach Helmuth Schon – in 1975 Vogts was attached personally to Cruijff to shadow him everywhere and it worked. Now Kohler and Borowka had the same duty, attached to Gullit and van Basten. In the last moment Beckenbauer replaced already listed in the starters Littbarski with Mill – Michels did not budge to what he thought was only a trick to confuse his team, but eventually the change was considered a big mistake. Was it or not… depends on time: true, Littbarski was creative, fast, and the better player, but he was unpredictable. And in general, by 1988, everybody was tired with his failures to deliver. With Mill, who spent many years at the bench, the plan of Beckenbauer was clearer – Holland was too strong to outplay, so, step back to what the team played most of the 1980s: a war, constant fighting for every inch of the pitch. Eventually, the Germans played just that most of the match. And it was 1974 again, but this time a mirror image of it.
A battle of giants, one may thinks from a photo like this one, but it was mostly Holland. Germans scored first, though – from a penalty in the 55th minute. After that they moved back defending the result and wasting time as much as they could.
But there was a second penalty – this time against them and Ronald Koeman coolly equalized. Back in 1975 it was the opposite. The Dutch did not stop attacking, of course, and two minutes before the end of regular time the inevitable happened.
Kohler made a tiny mistake and van Basten made it 2-1 Holland. The reverse of 1974 was completed. Note that at Euro 1988 for the first time the rule for extending the game to compensate for lost time during the game was enforced: it was up to the referee to add minutes, not many, but some, so about 3 minutes were added – they were not enough to change anything. The mighty Germans lost at home. After the game Beckenbauer hinted his displeasure with the referee, but the fact was simple – his team was outplayed. In the Dutch camp the mood was more than triumphal – starting with Michels, the general was taking a revenge for 1974.
USSR – Italy 2-0. Italy had no problems with injured players and was in full force. Not so the Soviets – Khidiatullin was in question, after suffering severe cut on his face in the previous match. But he was fielded with stitches and bruises. Belanov, however, was not even a reserve for this game – looked like that Lobanovsky gave up on him after his bland play in the previous games. Strange it may be, but USSR looked more defensive oriented than Italy on paper: 4-5-1 vs Italian 4-4-2. On the field it was different and by far. First of all, the ‘meak’ Soviets started with clear message that they will fight by all means and Oleg Kuznetzov was yellow-carded in the 20th second of the match. More yellow cards followed as the game progressed, but the Soviets went into relentless attacks and Italy had no answer.
Franco Baresi is in control here and Gennady Litovchenko painfully watching, but in fact it was the other way around.
Italy was on the receiving end in both ways – went it came to rough defending.
And when it was a matter of dangerous attacks. The inevitable happened in two minutes – Litovchenko scored in the 60th minute and in the 62nd Protassov made it 2-0. The last Italian chance was in extra time , but it was only a matter of mercy. Ferri tried to score from a free kick, but it was no trouble for Dassaev and in any case it was all over. Their was massive praise for the Soviets after the game – ‘Bild’ called them ‘the caviar of football’. Even Lobanovsky was happy for a change and said he had no pretenses to any of his players for the first time at this tournament. He also added that if the result was against his team he would have been satisfied with his team after such great play, but that certainly was a lie. Vicini made the usual excuses – his team was too young and could not survive such terrific pressing for 90 minutes. Apollogies to the fans, but better next time.
The winners were clearly the best teams so far, it was only just they reached the final. As for the losers – they were looking for the future, since there was no present.
Beckenbauer said that his players lost most one-on-one challenges, that was the biggest handicap, but he was sure he will correct that and will qualify the team to the 1990 World Cup finals.
Vicini said that his young players got important lesson and experience and will have great team for the 1990 World Cup, possibly greater than the World champions of 1982. As we know, it is easy to promise the future.

Group 2. A British derby first – England – Eire. The Irish were outsiders, but match against England is something else, so there was possibility of surprise. Still, England was favourite by far – Cruijff, for example, thought whoever lost in the other match, Holland vs USSR, will see the semifinals only on TV. Yet, it was a match between rivals playing the same style and for the Irish motivation was extremely high – it was matter of national pride.

And in the 6th minute Ray Houghton scored for Eire with a header – a classic English goal against England! The rest of the match the Irish dedicated to destroying English efforts, entirely succeeding in that.
 England 0, Republic of Ireland (misspelled!) 1. Jacky Charlton prevailed over his own countrymen at their own game, playing it better than they did, and became instant Irish hero. So far, there were hostile banners against him at Irish matches, but now it was all different.
Holland – USSR 0-1. Knowing the stakes, both teams went full throttle ahead – it was a matter of life and death.
Vagiz Khidiatullin tackles Marco van Basten, Anatoly Demyanenko close from behind to help. The first half team USSR survived the Dutch storm, Dassaev played one of his greatest games and the result was 0-0 – although it may have been 3-0 Holland. Perhaps that was crucial – the Dutch did not score.
In the second half the Soviets showed their own teeth and now the roles were slightly reversed – it was Ruud Gullit trying to clear away the ball from dangerous Oleg Protassov. The tired old wisdom ‘if you don’t score, the opponent will’ came true again: Ratz scored for USSR in the 54th minute. Now the Dutch were furious, but still unable to score – the ball bounced away from the goalpost once, Dassaev saved miraculously, the ball missed the net by a hair or was deflected just a tiny bit by a defender. However, the Soviets did not play only defense – they tried to attack at every opportunity and perhaps had a case for penalty not given to them. As a whole, they managed to keep the Dutch from scoring, but the game was highly entertaining and both teams played excellent football.
England – Holland 1-3. The Irish destroyed Cruijff’s prediction – England’s loss equalized the group situation, nothing was decided after the first round. Once again it a matter of life and death. After losing their first games both coaches made changes and in that more successful was Rinus Michels – he benched Bosman and van’t Schip and put Erwin Koeman among the starters – which changed his tactical scheme significantly: now van Basten was the sole striker with Gullit supporting him. Given the traditional Dutch respect to British football, it was rather cautious concept, but it worked fine. As usual, England went into attack and pressed Holland back, but… this was predictable and since England never had a plan B…
It was 1-0 Holland just before half time. In the 56th minute Robson equalized, but Marco van Basten kept scoring.
Van Basten celebrates a hattrick. England was out, once again failing at big finals.
Eire – USSR 1-1. USSR traditionally had troubles against tough British teams and the Irish were now especially spurred by having a chance to qualify to the next round. Of course, nobody relaxed and both coaches took the game seriously, but looks like Lobanovsky made a tactical mistake – he decided to play just like against Holland, that is looking for opportunities for counterattacks. But that presumes aggressively attacking opponent which Eire was not, just the opposite: they were deeply entrenched in defense, waiting for a rare opportunity to pass a long ball to their solitary striker when there was no defender around. The Soviets tried to bait the Irish by giving them the initiative, but it was not working – the Irish were perfectly happy to posses the ball and waste time. Team USSR was unable to change their tactics, so the Irish suddenly saw that the devil was not all that dangerous and controlling the game they slowly pushed ahead and tried to score.
Strangely, this photo somewhat shows the game best: modest Irish somewhat pushing forward and the Soviets backing up and keeping away from the ball.
To their own peril – in the 39th minute Ronnie Whelan scored beautiful goal and now looked like Eire was going to be the sensation of the finals, winning a second match. The Soviets played a rather formless and clueless game to the end, but since they had classy players managed to equalized in the 75th minute. The Irish controlled the match to the end, but there was old problem which a team with traditionally limited resources is never able to overcome: scoring troubles. Even scoring one goal was often a matter of good luck, but two… the match ended 1-1 and nobody was unhappy – both teams quite satisfied with the point.
Eire – Holland 0-1. It was again a matter of life and death – a tie automatically eliminated Holland (to hope on big English win over USSR was unrealistic). The Irish, however, aimed at a tie – Holland was too strong to hope for more.
The match just went as the picture shows – the Dutch domineered, but their great supremacy did not result in goals. Modest Irish mostly fought to prevent the Dutch from scoring, but used well their rare opportunities and came closer to scoring than their mighty opponent.
Then it was matter of resources… Michels increased the Dutch striking power in the second half by replacing Erwin Koeman and Muhren with Kift and Bosman. It worked – in the 82nd minute Kift kicked the ball and Bonner cracked – 1-0 Holland. After the game Michels said the goal was lucky. Jack Charlton shared the same opinion, but from the losing end.
England – USSR 1-3. England, already eliminated, had nothing to play for – except helping the Irish, or rather Jack Charlton, to reach the semifinals. Bobby Robson said that, but it was really a jest. The Soviets needed only a tie to qualify, but calculations were at work: finishing 2nd in the group meant playing against West Germany, a team Lobanovsky prefferred to avoid. Robson fielded some new players which somewaht confirmed the lack of motivation in the English camp. The Soviets played with pretty much their best: Dassaev and Bessonov were injured fatally, Litovchenko was back from serving suspencion. Shaky Demianenko was replaced by Ratz, who was familiar with the job. England, eliminated or not, never really gave up a game, but somewhat surprisingly team USSR played free and easy game.
Igor Belanov – here watching Kenny Samson getting the ball – was not the fast and dangerous torpedo, but it was attributed to a new role in midfield. Yet, the Soviets were very much together, perfectly organized and attack-oriented.
They got the upper hand and it was clear England was not going to win. At the end, it was 3-1 for USSR.
1. USSR 2 1 0 5-2 5
2. Holland 2 0 1 4-2 4
3. Eire 1 1 1 2-2 3
4. England 0 0 3 2-7 0

Group1. West Germany – Italy 1-1. The opening match and between the favourites. Not a memorable game…
More or less, defense prevailed and won. Hard battle and no fun. By now hardly anybody expected great show from opening games, yet in the same time everybody wished exactly a great show.
Italy eventually opened the scores – after enormous double mistake, starting with Matthaus and ending with Herget, Mancini scored. Beckenbauer was furious after the match, blaming mostly Herget, and was right: the defender was not some green youngster, but veteran both in age and national team experience. But not only those two were to blame – as a whole, rather mysterious Italian team (at the time) was the stronger and better on the field. However, the referee stood against them – and it was not just Italian opinion. At the time the rules stipulated that a goalkeeper could make no more than 4 steps with ball in his hand. Zenga made more than four and the referee blew his whistle, giving the well forgotten nowadays ‘indirect kick’ inside the penalty area. All by the rules, but for years referees put a blind eye to this rule, recognizing its stupidity. Not just the Italians saw the referee as a more than pedant, but rather as maliciously biased against Italy. ‘Scandalous’ refereeing – that was the opinion of the British press too. However, the referee was formally right. Since one cannot score directly from such a kick, traditionally defending teams built huge walls, sometimes behind their goalie, if there was not enough space in front of him, to prevent quick short pass to staying near by teammate who could now kick the ball directly in the net. Italy made exactly that, but for some reason the wall fell apart in the last moment, yet, preventing Zenga to see where the ball was going and Germany equalized. Both goals were scored early in the second half, nothing else happened to the end, and the match ended 1-1, only to create a mountain of critical articles the next day.
Denmark – Spain 2-3. The memories of the Spanish win at the 1986 World Cup were not just fresh, but indicative – Denmark by now was in clear descent, too old, too tired. Predictions were slightly in favour of the Spaniards and they proved right, except it was not 5-1, like in 1986. Spain was not particularly impressive, but Denmark was worse.
Spain was visibly stronger and with time – Denmark seemingly tired and not up to the task.
It was not exactly huge Spanish dominance, but when it came to scoring Butrageno was the man. Denmark trailed behind, but they were able to respond twice with equalizers. However, Butrageno’s goal was crucial – it was the second Spanish goal and there was strong feeling for offside. After the match the Danes complained and the Spanish did not exactly objected the protest. But no matter the result, no matter what was said by coaches, the writing was on the wall: Denmark was in decline. Sepp Piontek, who shortly before the finals extended his contract to 1990 now said he was going to resign at the end of the finals.
West Germany – Denmark 2-0. This time the Germans played better, but it was a bit of a kicking a dead dog.
Yet, killing the dead dog was not great – it was rather rough battle, the kind of football Germans usually win.
You fight, you win. But this time the Germans looked better. Beckenbauer made no bones about the victory – he was brief, saying that there was nos secret the whole idea was winning and the next game was more important. The he rushed to the waiting helicopter not to miss Italy-Spain. Morten Olsen, Soren Lerby and Preben Elkjaer-Larsen were resigned – they honestly said they were not the same players, it was not the same team as four years back, it was the end of their era. Almost nobody noticed that Peter Schmeichel played for Denmark in this game – and not because he was a flop, but because the team was dead.
Italy – Spain 1-0. To a point, the Spanish coach Munoz surprised everybody with his ultradefensive tactic. The idea was to bait the Italians into attacking and beat them with counterattacks. It did not work … Italy in attack? Almost contradiction of terms.
The result was particularly unattractive match, played largely in the middle of the field. For a long time it looked like anti-football would win and Spain would extract vital point.
It is enormously hard to beat the Italians by their own kind of football – it took just the minimal mistake and disorientation from the Spanish defense and Vialli scored. One can blame Zubizaretta, who could have reacted better, but it is fruitless – Italians are masters of taking advantage from practically nothing. Go and try scoring after Italy gets the lead… After the game Munoz made his second surprise, stating that his initial tactics were not defensive, but Italy pushed his team into that. A laughable statemen, unless he was kidding himself. Briegel pontificated that Italy is the best team at this finals. Beckenbauer, always the diplomat, said the match was on high level and Italy was world class. But he was not going to change his tactics and will play against Spain the same way his team played against Denmark, aiming at a win. In translation… Spain was beatable, but mostly by fighting.
West Germany – Spain 2-0. Calculation were in full swing: BRD and Italy needed nothing more than ties and that was perfectly easy for each of them, that simple. Denmark was out; Spain was hardly the team to attack relentlessly with imagination. Only big Italian loss would qualify Spain to the next – by calculations, but nobody really believed such thing possible. Before the match both Beckenbauer and Munoz said they were going for large scoring, which was unbelievable, but on the pitch the Germans played their best game so far.
Young Klinsmann was making his name, troubling Zubizarreta.
Rudi Voeller had wonderful match this time – or at last, for he was one of the most criticized German players so far. Finally he played as it was expected from him and scored both German goals. Matthaus also played strong game at last. Spain had no answer. This time the German press liked what they so – and the Kaiser was again the Kaiser: ‘Franz, this was your best match’, wrote a Frankfurt newspaper.
Italy – Denmark 2-0. Meaningless match for Denmark, already eliminated; Italy needed a tie just to be sure – not much at stake. Situation often spurring the outsider to perform better than before and this was one such match – Denmark played their best game at the finals. But Italy was deeply entrenched and eventually not only blunted the Danish efforts, but started looking ahead too. Especially in the second half. And scored 2 goals.
Altobelli scored the first in the 66th minute.
Vialli – or De Agostini? – made it 2-0 in the 87th minute. Schmeichel was not yet the superstar we know today.
After the game Vicini was happy and said the Italian program minimum was fulfilled better than anticipated. Piontek was also on somewhat positive mood: no tragedy happened and the future was not so bleak, there were talented young players and rebuilding could be successful.
1. West Germany 2 1 0 5-1 5
2. Italy 2 1 0 4-1 5
3. Spain 1 0 2 3-5 2
4. Denmark 0 0 3 2-7 0

Group 2. England, Holland, USSR, and Eire.
England.

Manager: Bobby Robson
No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club
1
1GK
Peter Shilton
(1949-09-18)18 September 1949 (aged 38)
98
Derby County
2
2DF
Gary Stevens
(1963-03-27)27 March 1963 (aged 25)
23
Everton
3
2DF
Kenny Sansom
(1958-09-26)26 September 1958 (aged 29)
83
Arsenal
4
3MF
Neil Webb
(1963-07-30)30 July 1963 (aged 24)
7
Nottingham Forest
5
2DF
Dave Watson
(1961-11-20)20 November 1961 (aged 26)
11
Everton
6
2DF
Tony Adams
(1966-10-10)10 October 1966 (aged 21)
11
Arsenal
7
3MF
Bryan Robson (captain)
(1957-01-11)11 January 1957 (aged 31)
66
Manchester United
8
3MF
Trevor Steven
(1963-09-21)21 September 1963 (aged 24)
23
Everton
9
4FW
Peter Beardsley
(1961-01-18)18 January 1961 (aged 27)
24
Liverpool
10
4FW
Gary Lineker
(1960-11-30)30 November 1960 (aged 27)
32
Barcelona
11
3MF
John Barnes
(1963-11-07)7 November 1963 (aged 24)
39
Liverpool
12
3MF
Chris Waddle
(1960-12-14)14 December 1960 (aged 27)
34
Tottenham Hotspur
13
1GK
Chris Woods
(1959-11-14)14 November 1959 (aged 28)
12
Rangers
14
2DF
Viv Anderson
(1956-07-29)29 July 1956 (aged 31)
30
Manchester United
15
3MF
Steve McMahon
(1961-08-20)20 August 1961 (aged 26)
3
Liverpool
16
3MF
Peter Reid
(1956-06-20)20 June 1956 (aged 31)
13
Everton
17
3MF
Glenn Hoddle
(1957-10-27)27 October 1957 (aged 30)
50
Monaco
18
4FW
Mark Hateley
(1961-11-07)7 November 1961 (aged 26)
28
Monaco
19
2DF
Mark Wright
(1963-08-01)1 August 1963 (aged 24)
20
Derby County
20
2DF
Tony Dorigo
(1965-12-31)31 December 1965 (aged 22)
0
Chelsea
Traditionally, a favourite. Although by now largely by inertia – England already built a tradition of disappointment. But it played well at the 1986 World Cup and the team looked serious, and the coach was great, and England had excellent qualifying campaign. Group 2 seemingly was tougher than Group 1, so England was not pronounced absolutely sure leader, but it was felt that they will go ahead – second, if not group winners. A lot depended on the current health of Bryan Robson, Hoddle, and Waddle – they had a long history of injuries.
Holland.

Manager: Rinus Michels
No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club
1
1GK
Hans van Breukelen
(1956-10-04)4 October 1956 (aged 31)
35
PSV
2
2DF
Adri van Tiggelen
(1957-06-16)16 June 1957 (aged 30)
24
Anderlecht
3
2DF
Sjaak Troost
(1959-08-28)28 August 1959 (aged 28)
3
Feyenoord
4
2DF
Ronald Koeman
(1963-03-21)21 March 1963 (aged 25)
23
PSV
5
3MF
Aron Winter
(1967-03-01)1 March 1967 (aged 21)
6
Ajax
6
2DF
Berry van Aerle
(1962-12-08)8 December 1962 (aged 25)
6
PSV
7
3MF
Gerald Vanenburg
(1964-03-05)5 March 1964 (aged 24)
22
PSV
8
3MF
Arnold Mühren
(1951-05-02)2 May 1951 (aged 37)
18
Ajax
9
4FW
John Bosman
(1965-02-01)1 February 1965 (aged 23)
12
Ajax
10
3MF
Ruud Gullit (captain)
(1962-09-01)1 September 1962 (aged 25)
34
Milan
11
3MF
John van ‘t Schip
(1963-12-30)30 December 1963 (aged 24)
16
Ajax
12
4FW
Marco van Basten
(1964-10-31)31 October 1964 (aged 23)
19
Milan
13
3MF
Erwin Koeman
(1961-09-20)20 September 1961 (aged 26)
10
KV Mechelen
14
4FW
Wim Kieft
(1962-11-12)12 November 1962 (aged 25)
15
PSV
15
2DF
Wim Koevermans
(1960-06-28)28 June 1960 (aged 27)
1
Fortuna Sittard
16
1GK
Joop Hiele
(1958-12-25)25 December 1958 (aged 29)
4
Feyenoord
17
3MF
Frank Rijkaard
(1962-09-30)30 September 1962 (aged 25)
26
Zaragoza
18
2DF
Wilbert Suvrijn
(1962-10-26)26 October 1962 (aged 25)
6
Roda JC
19
3MF
Hendrie Krüzen
(1964-11-24)24 November 1964 (aged 23)
3
Den Bosch
20
3MF
Jan Wouters
(1960-07-17)17 July 1960 (aged 27)
14
Ajax
A big revival, due to the great new generation led by Gullit, van Basten, and Rijkard. Rinus Michels was back at the helm – another asset. Yet, the long lasting decline and missing both the 1984 Euro and the 1986 World Cup kept observers cautious – Holland had good chances of going ahead, but not certainly. Memories of failures waited heavily against the team.
USSR.

Manager: Valeri Lobanovsky
No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club
1
1GK
Rinat Dasayev (captain)
(1957-06-13)13 June 1957 (aged 30)
77
Spartak Moscow
2
2DF
Volodymyr Bessonov
(1958-03-05)5 March 1958 (aged 30)
67
Dynamo Kyiv
3
2DF
Vagiz Khidiyatullin
(1959-03-03)3 March 1959 (aged 29)
42
Spartak Moscow
4
2DF
Oleg Kuznetsov
(1963-03-22)22 March 1963 (aged 25)
26
Dynamo Kyiv
5
2DF
Anatoliy Demyanenko
(1959-02-19)19 February 1959 (aged 29)
65
Dynamo Kyiv
6
3MF
Vasiliy Rats
(1961-04-25)25 April 1961 (aged 27)
23
Dynamo Kyiv
7
4FW
Sergei Aleinikov
(1961-11-07)7 November 1961 (aged 26)
41
Dinamo Minsk
8
3MF
Gennadiy Litovchenko
(1963-09-11)11 September 1963 (aged 24)
32
Dynamo Kyiv
9
3MF
Aleksandr Zavarov
(1961-04-26)26 April 1961 (aged 27)
23
Dynamo Kyiv
10
4FW
Oleg Protasov
(1964-02-04)4 February 1964 (aged 24)
35
Dynamo Kyiv
11
4FW
Igor Belanov
(1960-09-25)25 September 1960 (aged 27)
22
Dynamo Kyiv
12
2DF
Ivan Vyshnevskyi
(1957-02-21)21 February 1957 (aged 31)
6
Dnipro Dnipropetrovsk
13
2DF
Tengiz Sulakvelidze
(1956-07-23)23 July 1956 (aged 31)
47
Dinamo Tbilisi
14
2DF
Vyacheslav Sukristov
(1961-01-01)1 January 1961 (aged 27)
3
Žalgiris
15
3MF
Alexei Mikhailichenko
(1963-03-30)30 March 1963 (aged 25)
7
Dynamo Kyiv
16
1GK
Viktor Chanov
(1959-07-21)21 July 1959 (aged 28)
7
Dynamo Kyiv
17
4FW
Sergey Dmitriyev
(1964-03-19)19 March 1964 (aged 24)
6
Zenit Leningrad
18
3MF
Sergey Gotsmanov
(1959-03-27)27 March 1959 (aged 29)
25
Dinamo Minsk
19
2DF
Sergei Baltacha
(1958-02-17)17 February 1958 (aged 30)
44
Dynamo Kyiv
20
3MF
Viktor Pasulko
(1961-01-01)1 January 1961 (aged 27)
6
Spartak Moscow
The Soviets were considered perhaps a bit weaker than England and Holland, but not at all to be discarded. Their performnce at both 1982 and 1986 World Cups were fondly remembered, there was sense that such a team would finally be able to climb higher. On the other hand, a lot depended on the form of Dynamo Kiev, which was incosistent. And similar to England, there were a number of players often injured – Bessonov, Baltacha, Demyanenko. Some of the selected players looked strange to foreign eyes – Pasulko, Dmitriyev, Sukristov, Vishnievsky – but they were mere reserves. Oleg Blokhin was out of the team – expected, due to his age, yet, it was somewhat a handicap, since everybody was used to see him in the team and consequently measure the team by that. Since the group was without a clear leader, the chances of USSR were good, although largely for the second place.
Eire.

Manager: Jack Charlton
No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club
1
1GK
Packie Bonner
(1960-05-24)24 May 1960 (aged 28)
23
Celtic
2
2DF
Chris Morris
(1963-12-24)24 December 1963 (aged 24)
5
Celtic
3
2DF
Chris Hughton
(1958-12-11)11 December 1958 (aged 29)
36
Tottenham Hotspur
4
2DF
Mick McCarthy
(1959-02-07)7 February 1959 (aged 29)
27
Celtic
5
2DF
Kevin Moran
(1956-04-29)29 April 1956 (aged 32)
36
Manchester United
6
3MF
Ronnie Whelan
(1961-09-25)25 September 1961 (aged 26)
26
Liverpool
7
3MF
Paul McGrath
(1959-12-04)4 December 1959 (aged 28)
23
Manchester United
8
3MF
Ray Houghton
(1962-01-09)9 January 1962 (aged 26)
15
Liverpool
9
4FW
John Aldridge
(1958-09-18)18 September 1958 (aged 29)
15
Liverpool
10
4FW
Frank Stapleton (captain)
(1956-07-10)10 July 1956 (aged 31)
63
Derby County
11
3MF
Tony Galvin
(1956-07-12)12 July 1956 (aged 31)
24
Sheffield Wednesday
12
4FW
Tony Cascarino
(1962-09-01)1 September 1962 (aged 25)
5
Millwall
13
3MF
Liam O’Brien
(1964-09-05)5 September 1964 (aged 23)
6
Manchester United
14
4FW
David Kelly
(1965-11-25)25 November 1965 (aged 22)
3
Walsall
15
3MF
Kevin Sheedy
(1959-10-21)21 October 1959 (aged 28)
13
Everton
16
1GK
Gerry Peyton
(1956-05-20)20 May 1956 (aged 32)
24
AFC Bournemouth
17
4FW
John Byrne
(1961-02-01)1 February 1961 (aged 27)
14
Le Havre
18
4FW
John Sheridan
(1964-10-01)1 October 1964 (aged 23)
4
Leeds United
19
2DF
John Anderson
(1959-10-07)7 October 1959 (aged 28)
15
Newcastle United
20
4FW
Niall Quinn
(1966-10-06)6 October 1966 (aged 21)
9
Arsenal
The outsiders. Eire, so was felt, achieved more than they were worth by qualifying to the finals. Tough fighters, but without much class and even lucky to reach the finals. Jacky Charlton used ‘primitive tactics’ and had vocal opponents in Ireland, but another coach was unlikely to do better – Ireland never had enough strong players for a formidable team. They were going to play with great spirit, that was sure, but hardly compensating the lack of quality players. What they could do, though, was to frustrate and kill somebody else’s plans and that was the role expected from them – whoever underetsimated them was going to pay a high price.

Group 1. West Germany, Italy, Spain, and Denmark.

Manager: Franz Beckenbauer
No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club
1
1GK
Eike Immel
(1960-11-27)27 November 1960 (aged 27)
15
VfB Stuttgart
2
2DF
Guido Buchwald
(1961-01-24)24 January 1961 (aged 27)
18
VfB Stuttgart
3
2DF
Andreas Brehme
(1960-11-09)9 November 1960 (aged 27)
36
Bayern Munich
4
2DF
Jürgen Kohler
(1965-10-06)6 October 1965 (aged 22)
15
1. FC Köln
5
2DF
Matthias Herget
(1955-11-14)14 November 1955 (aged 32)
34
KFC Uerdingen
6
2DF
Uli Borowka
(1962-05-19)19 May 1962 (aged 26)
2
Werder Bremen
7
3MF
Pierre Littbarski
(1960-04-16)16 April 1960 (aged 28)
53
1. FC Köln
8
3MF
Lothar Matthäus (captain)
(1961-03-21)21 March 1961 (aged 27)
61
Bayern Munich
9
4FW
Rudi Völler
(1960-04-13)13 April 1960 (aged 28)
49
Roma
10
3MF
Olaf Thon
(1966-05-01)1 May 1966 (aged 22)
24
Schalke 04
11
4FW
Frank Mill
(1958-07-23)23 July 1958 (aged 29)
10
Borussia Dortmund
12
1GK
Bodo Illgner
(1967-04-07)7 April 1967 (aged 21)
3
1. FC Köln
13
3MF
Wolfram Wuttke
(1961-11-17)17 November 1961 (aged 26)
3
1. FC Kaiserslautern
14
2DF
Thomas Berthold
(1964-11-12)12 November 1964 (aged 23)
26
Hellas Verona
15
2DF
Hans Pflügler
(1960-03-27)27 March 1960 (aged 28)
6
Bayern Munich
16
4FW
Dieter Eckstein
(1964-03-12)12 March 1964 (aged 24)
5
1. FC Nürnberg
17
3MF
Hans Dorfner
(1965-07-03)3 July 1965 (aged 22)
5
Bayern Munich
18
4FW
Jürgen Klinsmann
(1964-07-30)30 July 1964 (aged 23)
5
VfB Stuttgart
19
2DF
Gunnar Sauer
(1964-06-11)11 June 1964 (aged 23)
0
Werder Bremen
20
3MF
Wolfgang Rolff
(1959-12-26)26 December 1959 (aged 28)
31
Bayer Leverkusen
Not just a favourite, but The favourite – the mighty Germans were playing at home.By now the lack of coaching diploma which was a problem with the acceptance of Beckenbauer was pretty much swallowed, but there were other problems. As noisy as they were, the scandals with the best goalkeepers were not the biggest problem – both Tony Schumacher and Uli Stein were expelled from the national team. The first for his ‘tell-it-all’ book; the second – because of various scandals and frictions, the final drop of whcih was his physical attack on Bayern’s player at the 1987 German Supercup final. But both keepers were already getting old and their replacement was somethink kept in mind – and there were good enough youngsters, who promptly stepped in – Eike Immel already had 15 games for BRD and Bodo Illgner, only 21 years old – 3 games. Yet, after the 1986 World Cup a bunch of players announced their retirement from the national team – K-H. Rummenigge, Briegel, Magath, D. Hoeness, Eder, Jacobs, Allofs. Karl-Heinz Forster was out due to health problems too. Beckenbauer tried 17 new players between the World Cup and the Euro finals, and some made it to his final selesction, but doubts remained – some players failed to deliver in important games. That concerned Matthaus and Littbarski mainly, but Olaf Thon,who was considered the prime replacement of Matthaus was somewhat similar and also failed to shine when it mattered most. The whole team played in allarming way – during preparation there were few brilliant games, but moct were just bland. Since German journalists traditionally were highly critical, perhaps their vitriol was not all that important – bogger concern, voiced by Beckenbauer, was the lack of offical games. Not a new concern in itsled – for years hosts of bit tournaments complained from that, although if they had to play in qualifying rounds most certainly they would have complained too, but this time was slightly different: Beckenbauer was trying to build new squad and badly needed games which actually mattered in order of shping and steeling his team. As a whole, the selection was somewhat short – there were more or less stange players in it, who seemingly just made the required numbers and the actual team was perhaps 15-16 players. Not enough talent in West Germany… that was the real problem, but still the Germans were prime favourite and expected to win.
Italy.

Manager: Azeglio Vicini
No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club
1
1GK
Walter Zenga
(1960-04-28)28 April 1960 (aged 28)
17
Internazionale
2
2DF
Franco Baresi
(1960-05-08)8 May 1960 (aged 28)
21
Milan
3
2DF
Giuseppe Bergomi
(1963-12-22)22 December 1963 (aged 24)
46
Internazionale
4
2DF
Roberto Cravero
(1964-01-03)3 January 1964 (aged 24)
0
Torino
5
2DF
Ciro Ferrara
(1967-02-11)11 February 1967 (aged 21)
4
Napoli
6
2DF
Riccardo Ferri
(1963-08-20)20 August 1963 (aged 24)
12
Internazionale
7
2DF
Giovanni Francini
(1963-08-03)3 August 1963 (aged 24)
7
Napoli
8
2DF
Paolo Maldini
(1968-06-26)26 June 1968 (aged 19)
3
Milan
9
3MF
Carlo Ancelotti
(1959-06-10)10 June 1959 (aged 29)
17
Milan
10
3MF
Luigi De Agostini
(1963-04-07)7 April 1963 (aged 25)
10
Juventus
11
3MF
Fernando De Napoli
(1964-03-15)15 March 1964 (aged 24)
21
Napoli
12
1GK
Stefano Tacconi
(1957-05-13)13 May 1957 (aged 31)
1
Juventus
13
3MF
Luca Fusi
(1963-06-07)7 June 1963 (aged 25)
1
Sampdoria
14
3MF
Giuseppe Giannini
(1964-08-20)20 August 1964 (aged 23)
15
Roma
15
3MF
Francesco Romano
(1960-04-25)25 April 1960 (aged 28)
0
Napoli
16
4FW
Alessandro Altobelli (captain)
(1955-11-28)28 November 1955 (aged 32)
57
Internazionale
17
3MF
Roberto Donadoni
(1963-09-09)9 September 1963 (aged 24)
16
Milan
18
4FW
Roberto Mancini
(1964-11-27)27 November 1964 (aged 23)
13
Sampdoria
19
4FW
Ruggiero Rizzitelli
(1967-09-02)2 September 1967 (aged 20)
2
Cesena
20
4FW
Gianluca Vialli
(1964-07-09)9 July 1964 (aged 23)
25
Sampdoria
Well, Italy, like Wst Germany, is always a favourite. It was those two teams immediately thought of the winners of this group and who was to be first and who second was not important. True, Italy missed the 1984 Euroepan finals and played rather poorly at the 1986 World Cup, but it was Italy. Reputation. The team was hardly great, there were problems, it was somewhat in the process of rebuilding – but it was Italy! However, it was quite a short team and also surprirsingly young squad for Italy. There was bright young talent – Vialli, Mancini, Donadoni, Giannini, Maldini. Bergomi, an old hand already, was only 24 years old. Altobelli and Franco Baresi provided experience. Zenga was very stable between the goalposts. But it was a team not fully balanced and having players who would not have been selected 7-8 years earlier – Ferrara, Ferri, Tacconi, Fusi, Romano. If the squad was compared to some teams from the 1970s, it was rather impoverished, but compared to contemporary teams from elsewhere – it was not only stronger, but having raising stars – it was a team on ascent. And it was Italy – so, big favorit on paper.
Spain.

Manager: Miguel Muñoz
No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club
1
1GK
Andoni Zubizarreta
(1961-10-23)23 October 1961 (aged 26)
15
Barcelona
2
2DF
Tomás Reñones
(1960-08-09)9 August 1960 (aged 27)
31
Atlético Madrid
3
2DF
José Antonio Camacho (captain)
(1955-06-08)8 June 1955 (aged 33)
73
Real Madrid
4
2DF
Genar Andrinúa
(1964-05-09)9 May 1964 (aged 24)
6
Athletic Bilbáo
5
3MF
Víctor Muñoz
(1957-03-15)15 March 1957 (aged 31)
44
Barcelona
6
3MF
Ramón Calderé
(1959-01-16)16 January 1959 (aged 29)
21
Barcelona
7
4FW
Julio Salinas
(1962-09-11)11 September 1962 (aged 25)
30
Atlético Madrid
8
2DF
Manuel Sanchís
(1965-03-23)23 March 1965 (aged 23)
13
Real Madrid
9
4FW
Emilio Butragueño
(1963-07-22)22 July 1963 (aged 24)
19
Real Madrid
10
4FW
Eloy
(1964-07-10)10 July 1964 (aged 23)
32
Sporting Gijón
11
2DF
Rafael Gordillo
(1957-02-24)24 February 1957 (aged 31)
61
Real Madrid
12
2DF
Diego Rodríguez Fernández
(1960-04-20)20 April 1960 (aged 28)
1
Real Betis
13
1GK
Francisco Buyo
(1958-01-13)13 January 1958 (aged 30)
2
Real Madrid
14
3MF
Ricardo Gallego
(1959-02-08)8 February 1959 (aged 29)
44
Real Madrid
15
3MF
Eusebio
(1964-04-13)13 April 1964 (aged 24)
17
Atlético Madrid
16
3MF
José Mari Bakero
(1963-02-11)11 February 1963 (aged 25)
3
Real Sociedad
17
3MF
Txiki Begiristain
(1964-08-12)12 August 1964 (aged 23)
12
Real Sociedad
18
2DF
Miquel Soler
(1965-03-13)13 March 1965 (aged 23)
23
Espanyol
19
3MF
Rafael Martín Vázquez
(1965-09-25)25 September 1965 (aged 22)
3
Real Madrid
20
3MF
Míchel
(1963-03-23)23 March 1963 (aged 25)
1
Real Madrid
Can’t call Spain an outsider, but certainly they were not considered a favourite. And not seen as going ahead – may be third in the group, no more. The reason was obvious: after bright and highly promising 1984 European finals Spain went back to its old ways – tough, rough, but rather shapeless team with significant deficiancies. The bigger problem was the attack – except ‘the Vulture’ Butrageno, nobody. It was quite an young squad, making the situation even worse in a sense – there was significant lack of quality players not just right now, but also in the years to come.
Denmark.

Manager: Sepp Piontek
No.
Pos.
Player
Date of birth (age)
Caps
Club
1
1GK
Troels Rasmussen
(1961-04-07)7 April 1961 (aged 27)
27
AGF
2
2DF
John Sivebæk
(1961-10-25)25 October 1961 (aged 26)
49
Saint-Étienne
3
2DF
Søren Busk
(1953-04-10)10 April 1953 (aged 35)
59
Wiener SC
4
2DF
Morten Olsen (captain)
(1949-08-14)14 August 1949 (aged 38)
95
1. FC Köln
5
2DF
Ivan Nielsen
(1956-10-09)9 October 1956 (aged 31)
42
PSV
6
3MF
Søren Lerby
(1958-02-01)1 February 1958 (aged 30)
64
PSV
7
3MF
John Helt
(1959-12-29)29 December 1959 (aged 28)
15
Lyngby
8
3MF
Per Frimann
(1962-06-04)4 June 1962 (aged 26)
14
AGF
9
2DF
Jan Heintze
(1963-08-17)17 August 1963 (aged 24)
5
PSV
10
4FW
Preben Elkjær
(1957-09-11)11 September 1957 (aged 30)
67
Hellas Verona
11
3MF
Michael Laudrup
(1964-06-15)15 June 1964 (aged 23)
43
Juventus
12
2DF
Lars Olsen
(1961-02-02)2 February 1961 (aged 27)
11
Brøndby
13
3MF
John Jensen
(1965-05-03)3 May 1965 (aged 23)
12
Brøndby
14
3MF
Jesper Olsen
(1961-03-20)20 March 1961 (aged 27)
40
Manchester United
15
4FW
Flemming Povlsen
(1966-12-03)3 December 1966 (aged 21)
11
1. FC Köln
16
1GK
Peter Schmeichel
(1963-11-18)18 November 1963 (aged 24)
6
Brøndby
17
3MF
Klaus Berggreen
(1958-02-03)3 February 1958 (aged 30)
43
Torino
18
4FW
John Eriksen
(1957-11-20)20 November 1957 (aged 30)
14
Servette
19
2DF
Bjørn Kristensen
(1963-10-10)10 October 1963 (aged 24)
7
AGF
20
3MF
Kim Vilfort
(1962-11-15)15 November 1962 (aged 25)
9
Brøndby
By now the ‘Danish dynamite’ was a thing of the past for most specialists – they reached their peak, aged, and inevitably were desecending. After their great 1986 World Cup fiasc0 – 1-5 against Spain – they were practically written off. What can you, Denmark had a small pool of players and a great generation was something isolated, happening only once. Traditionally, the Danes were modest and now they were seen modest again. Peter Schmeichel, already 24, was unknown back-up goalkeeper, for instance. Yes, Michael Laudrup was young and recognized already as great ney star, but… the wait of years was heavier: Morten Olsen was 38, Busk – 35, Lerby – 30, Elkjaer-Larsen – 30, Ivan Nielsen – 31, Bergreen – 31. So… aging and not the same as before, a finished team. No way they could go ahead, most likely to finish last in the group.