Month: May 2015

Group B. England and Belgium met in the first match. The opponents took seriously each other. England was expected to win. It was interesting to see the new England, playing finally modern football, as British media, Greenwood, and his players repeated constantly. The first minutes were not surprising: England attacked, Belgium entrenched itself in defense. Soon it was crystal clear that there was no ‘new England’, but painfully old one – fast bypassing of midfield, long balls from defense to the strikers, high crosses in front of the net. No libero in defense, but the outdated line formation. The ‘Red Devils’ were not only familiar with the primitive English tactic, but had a very effective way to deal with it – and old tactic too, for Belgium was known for inventing it in the 1960s: the off-side trap. England fell victim of it 17 times this day. It was testimony of English tactical poverty and lack of imagination… every time the ball was crossed from the wings, Walter Meeuws gave the signal to his mates, they moved ahead in synchronicity and the English striker was offside. No English player seemingly even thought to try something different, since long passes and crosses benefited the opposition. In the same time Belgium was dangerous in counter-attack. The veteran van Moer was excellent conductor. The ‘Red Devils’ knew what to do very well: close, almost personal covering of Keegan, Wilkins, and Brooking, so they had no room to move and no time to think; and constantly on alert for an opportunity to counter-attack. Still England managed to open the result after Cools made a mistake – Wilkins intercepted a careless pass and scored. Happiness lasted exactly 4 minutes – after a corner kick Ceulemans equalized in the 30th minute. The goal immediately triggered the English… no, not the players, but the fans. They started a fight with Italian fans, supporting Belgium. One particularly enterprising Brit climbed up on scoreboard and tried to change the fate of his team by erasing the Belgian goal and the name of the scorer. And that was the the most memorable part of this match…

The Police interfered, casualties were brought down near he pitch, so to be transported to hospitals, and as a last resort the Police used tear gas. The fight was stopped, but clouds of tear gas covered the pitch. The referee had no choice but to stop the match in the 41st minute. Players needed medical help – the English keeper Ray Clemence had it worse than anybody else: he was completely blinded by the tear gas. When the match was continued, there was nothing new – England attacked as before, Belgians killed English attacks with the off-side trap. At the end, it was 1-1. One Italian fan died in hospital from knife wounds; one English fan had broken skull. Minor injuries and arrests didn’t count. This was the first sign of the arrival of the ugly 1980s – fans violence was nothing new and the British were well known for it, but so far the hooligans were club supporters thrashing a city after a game. Nothing like this happened before when the national team was playing and at the finals of major international tournament. Naturally, the fans continued to ‘express’ themselves after the match on the streets of Turin. UEFA fined the English Federation 13 000 Swiss Franks. Greenwood and Keegan condemned the hooligans. To a point, Greenwood sounded as if finding excuse for the stupid play of his team in the hooligans – ‘They destroyed our good match’ – but ultimately was disappointed from his players. Guy Thys solemnly shrugged his shouldrs: ‘We got a point, everything goes as planned. I was surprised to see how easily the English fell into the off-side trap.’

Italy – Spain followed. Both teams were cautious before the match, taking the opponent seriously. The focus – and the pressure – was on Italy. Bearzot feared that Milan fans may be hostile to the national team. Zoff promised attractive attacking football. Victory was a must. And victory of Italy was expected not only at home – memories of wonderful Italy at the 1978 World Cup made Italy a favourite instantly: it was the right time, the team matured. It did, but not in the expected way – rather, the fears of Italian media proved true. It was older squad – not as age, but ‘morally old’: same players, those from Juventus no longer hungry for success. Bettega was moved back to play more as midfielder – he was getting old. It was not that Italy played bad – it was just not as great as expected. Spain was difficult opponent to begin with and without much pressure on their heads, the Spaniards played surprisingly well. To many – even above themselves. Both teams had their chances, but goalkeepers excelled this day – Zoff and Arconada were outstanding.

Equal match, perhaps the Spaniards were a bit more vigorous. Saura reaches the ball first and goes away from Bettega, who looks… disappointed and late. At the end it was 0-0. Bearzot and Cuballa hugged each other in recognition of the good fight – the match was considered the best of the opening round – but friendly gestures did not mask disappointment in the Italian camp. The media was quick to observe that the Italian attack was a bit toothless and there was nothing to be done about it. Paolo Rossi was badly missed, but he was suspended because of the Tottonerro affair. After the first round all teams in the group were still in the same equal position – every one with a point. Now winning became really a must.

Belgium – Spain was played in front of less than 1200 in Turin. Before the match media gossiped about the relaxed camp of the Belgians sipping beer. The players talked about… Holland. As if they were to play against the neighbours. ‘We will teach them a lesson’, said Ceulemans, ‘They are arrogant and although they make money in our championship, they look down at us.’ The Spanish camp did not provide fodder for the press. The match started seemingly as a copy of England – Belgium: Spain attacked, Belgium answered with meticulous defense and the off-side trap worked just as well – 18 times. But gradually it became clear that Belgium is tactically rich. Lead by non-stopping van Moer, they conquered the midfield. The defenders added their skill and strength to attacking – particularly Gerets. Spain had no answer to that – gaps appeared between their lines, they lost the battle for midfield, and there was no one capable to direct their attacking efforts. Later Cuballa acknowledged that only Asensi was able to sustain the tempo and pressure of the Belgians and when he had to be substituted because of injury, the match was effectively lost.

Unstoppable Ceulemans – the ‘scandalous’ beer-drinking of the Red Devils was instantly forgotten during the match: they looked bigger, better, faster than Spain. In the 16th minute Gerets scored. Quini equalized in the 35th minute, but 2 minutes later Asensi left the field and from this moment Belgian victory was just a matter of time. Cools scored the second goal in the 65th minute and that was the end. Guy Thys even substituted van Moer after that – unlike Asensi, the absence of van Moer did not affect the game of Belgium. Belgium deservedly won, the players were praised – new stars were discovered among them, and the team considered the weakest in the group suddenly was a favourite. Guy Thys once again was low key – he said his team was perfect and pleased him very much, but thought that it will be at its peak after 2 years. As for Spain, they were brought down to earth – perhaps not the team, but the opinion of the media of it: it was the old, painful to watch Spain of the whole decade.

But this match was central – Italy vs England was the big focus of interest. It was more than the thrill of all-important match, which more or less was decisive – the loser was to be practically eliminated and the winner almost certainly was to play at the championship final. The fight started by the English fans in the match with Belgium, followed by despicable behaviour of the English after the game on the streets was bigger concern. The Mayor of Turin said that since the stadium is property of the city, he will close it altogether and there will be no match. The threat lead to emergency measures of security, increased Police presence, which had the right to conduct body searches and shut down sells of alcohol near the stadium. Yet, the atmosphere was poisonous – fighting on the streets continued, an English bus was put to fire, and Dennis Law was kicked out of a restaurant as soon as he said a word in English. Now it was the English complaining of bad treatment by Police, services refused, and general Italian provocations – it worked at home, but on the continent there was no sympathy for the rowdy English fans. The tensions affected the players too and the match started with both teams obviously nervous and making too many mistakes. The Italians even had to be cooled down with 2 yellow cards. Bearzot made one change – instead of Cabrini, Benetti was a starter. Greenwood fielded the same team which played against Belgium – only Shilton replaced Clemence. This was perhaps a mistake, but on the other hand – this was the best England had. Not that much in terms of players, but in terms of tactics and creativity – personal changes were unlikely to suddenly change the outdated English approach. Curiously, the yellow cards given to Benetti and Tardelli helped the Italian game – the players cooled down and concentrated more on playing and less on battling. England was hard to blame and equally hard to praise… they played as they ever played: fast, high-spirited, with their minds on attack. They were also predictable and increasingly boring. Italy started to look better creatively and more dangerous. In the second half Italy dominated the match and although both teams had their chances, the inevitable finally happened.

Tardelli was quicker than the English defenders after low cross from Graziani. In the 80th minute Italy got a lead – 1-0. And kept it to the final whistle. England, expected if not winning the championship, at least playing at the final was out. The administration of Turin was very happy – the brutal English fans were moving to Naples, if not going home right away. Greenwood suddenly lamented the absence of Trevor Francis, but apart from that he saw nothing wrong with his team. Tony Woodcock made a rather outlandish comment: in his opinion, England concentrated too much on playing instead on approaching the match as a battle. Well, ‘playing’ was the obvious deficiency of him and his teammates.

Spain and England had nothing to play for – the best either team could do would be to play for 3rd place. Already ‘the small final’ was not all that important. Besides, to reach it depended not only on winning the direct match: Italy vs Belgium had to end with a winner. A tie worked against England and Spain. Apparently, there were no hopes in both camps. The Spanish Federation was concerned with continuous international disappointments and the finger was pointed at the foreign players in Spanish clubs. Timing was not great… decision was reached in the day of the match against England: ‘the minimalist’ faction won – Spanish clubs were restricted to contracting only one foreigner, who had to be approved by the State Sports Committee. Since no Spanish club actually employed only one foreigner after the restrictive rule it has to be clarified: first, as ever before, the ‘oriundi’ were not affected. Second, the rule meant only new recruits – whoever already played in Spain did not count. The rule changed absolutely nothing, except enraging the big clubs. Not the best thing hours before the match against England started. For Kuballa this was the last match as a coach – neither he, nor his players, already thinking of the next coach, were highly motivated. The English camp was quiet – the motivational talk of Greenwood was rather lame: ‘If you don’t want to completely disappoint our fans, go and beat Spain.’ Apart from pride, neither team had anything to play for. Both coaches made changes, giving chance to those who did not play so far. More important were the English changes: Viv Anderson and Glen Hoddle were starters. They looked better than the players used in the previous matches… so, why Greenwood did not play them when it mattered? Greenwood also changed tactics – 4-4-2 was used this day and Keegan was moved firmly at the top of attack. In the earlier matches he was placed back – used a bit as playmaker. Changes or not, nothing really changed – the opponents played as they did before. England looked a bit better, Spain was tough and difficult. Brooking scored in the 19th minute for England. In the second half Dani equalized from a penalty. And a few minutes later Spain got a second penalty. Dani stepped in again and scored again. But the referee did not like his approach: Dani was slightly stopping just before kicking the ball, so the goalkeeper was already flying and Dani was able to shoot in the undefended corner. The referee warned Dani, but… he did it again. Except luck was not on his side anymore.

Clemence blocks the third penalty – he expected Dani to change the direction this time and was right.

This was the high moment of the match – both as entertainment and outcome. The result remained 1-1 and Woodcock scored for England in the 61st minute. With this goal England won 2-1. Greenwood credited Lady Luck for everything: ‘We were unlucky against Italy, today were lucky against Spain.’ England depended still on luck – had to wait the outcome of the last group match and if lucky – to play for 3rd place.

Italy vs Belgium was to decide the finalist. Italian expectations were rather cautious: the media gave 60-40 chances to Italy. Belgium was blamed for defensive tactics – a point not missed by Guy Thys, who pointed out that he plans to do what Italians did for so many years. Who invented catenaccio after all? It was interesting reversal of roles – Italian media crying against defensive football and championing attack. Bearzot thought his team was able to beat Belgian offside trap. And he had to, for only victory would move Italy to the final – any other result benefited Belgium. Italy attacked allright, but the Red Devils were devious. Third match and third tactical approach: yes, they depended on defense and counterattacks, but there were variations. This one was the most pronounced defensive game played by Belgium: they new that offside trap would not work against Italy, so they moved back in mass, killed time, cleared the ball, and did not leave space for Italian strikers.

That was the match: Belgium deep in defense, making sure they outnumber the Italians near Pfaff. Who was excellent again. In the 53rd minute Italy was robbed from a penalty – or at least they thought they were. The ball deflected from Meews’ hand – deliberately to Italian eye; accidentally to the referee, who gave only a free kick. Italy was unable to outplay Belgium, had almost no scoring opportunity and the match ended 0-0. Zoff was outraged – ‘We are the only team not allowing a single goal in our net. It is an absurd we are not playing the final.’ Not so absurd… Italy scored only one goal in three matches. Belgium scored 2 – which was the breaker in case of equal points and same goal-difference. With all the talk of attacking football, not only Italy scored only once, but the strikers scored plain zero – the goal scored the midfielder Tardelli.

1. Belgium 1 2 0 2-1 4

2. Italy 1 2 0 1-0 4

3. England 1 1 1 3-3 3

4. Spain 0 1 2 2-4 1

Belgium was surprising finalist, but hardly by mere chance – overall, they were the most impressive team in Group B. The only team showing diverse tactics, to change its game depending on opponent and particular needs. Italy, shaken by the Tottonero scandal, was not as good as at the 1978 World Cup. The team did not add to its game, as it was expected in 1978 – rather, they were weaker, a step back from the enjoyable attacking football they played in Argentina. May be a bit unlucky, but with so great difficulties scoring, bad luck was hardly the reason. England entirely disappointed – it was the same impoverished tactic ‘run and kick’ as ever. Did not work for years too – European football changed massively in the 1970s and England clearly missed the boat. Spain – nothing new with them either. No wonder Spanish Federation was concerned, but perhaps the problem of Spanish football was not addressed correctly: the whole philosophy of Spanish football had to change radically. On every level.

At the end, the final standings in the group were fair, according to what they showed. Frankly, only Belgium was a team for the future. The rest… belonged to the past.

 

Group A opened the championship – West Germany vs Czechoslovakia, a replay of the 1976 final. The reigning champions against one of the main favourites, hungry for revenge. The intrigue was mostly on paper… the fans had better sense. Only 11 000 attended. The Germans had only one player who played at the 1976 final – Dietz. Czechoslovakia started with 5 – Ondrus, Gogh, Jurkemik, Panenka, and Nehoda. The opening ceremony of the championship quickly proved more interesting than the game. It was easy to find excuses: the heat, the pressure on the players, the respect both teams had for foxy opponent. Excuses could not hide the obvious: the game was extremely dull. Menotti, who was unfortunate to attend, made the best comment after the match: the ugly football currently in vogue made him a chain-smoker. He smoked 34 cigarettes during the match. The strikers of both teams scored 1 goal. The reigning champions scored nil.

In the 55th minute Rummenigge scored after a cross from Hansi Muller. That was all and no wonder: West Germany had only 3 shots at the Czechoslovakian net. The Czechs – 6. The Germans won, but pleased no one. Czechoslovakia seemingly played on their current level, which was not much. Venglos blamed his goalkeeper Netolicka for the goal – it was not a big mistake, but the coach was right. A bit of hesitation, uncertainty, lateness and the match was lost. Goalkeeping was well known problem of the team, though. West Germany was heavily criticized: the team just looked as a continuation of the failed 1978 version. It seemed Derwall had no vision of his own, but only followed the approach of Schon. The tactical scheme was 4-4-2, with 6 defensive players. In the middle of defense was Culmann: the ever-present Culmann, who was elevated from a substitute to key player. But he was never more than reliable substitute – and now even less. Schon reduced West Germany to dull, physical team of fighters having no clue what to do when possessing the ball – Derwall’s team was the same. Saturated mid-field with solid runners. Schuster was not fielded at all, Magath came as a substitute, Hansi Muller once again was found shaky and not at all at the level of Overath and Netzer. Any thought of comparing Culmann to Beckenbauer was laughable: not only the man had nothing to do with conducting the game, but he was a dwarf compared to Schwarzenbeck. Derwall had no friends after this match, which was voted the dullest of the whole championship. But the Germans got 2 points.

Holand vs Greece had no intrigue: it was just a formality. Holland was still considered a leading football nation – perhaps one reason this match was better attended than West Germany – Czechoslovakia. The Greeks made funny sounding statements before the game, which nobody took seriously. The Dutch started with many little known players, but it was felt that that the new names are the bright up and coming great Dutch. If not so – Krol, Haan, Rep, and van de Kerkhof twins were enough to beat Greece. Alas, it not so. The Greeks were clearly bellow the top teams even when running on enthusiasm. Unfortunately, Holland did not look better. They looked like the terrible Germans. Clueless in attack – the main quality of the great Holland of earlier years was exactly the attack. After the game Zwartkruis blamed the Greeks for their ultra-defensive approach. Nobody believed him… Holland had no creativity and was terrible. They were just lucky: in the 65th minute the Greek goalkeeper Konstantinou made a stupid foul against Nanninga. The ball was already in possession of a Greek defender, no danger, no reason for committing the foul. The referee immediately gave a penalty.

Konstantinou guessed the direction of the ball, but was not able to reach it. Kist scored the only goal of the match. Near the end Kapsis missed a good opportunity. That was all… Holland was lucky to win. In fact, Holland was lucky not to lose from incredibly weak opponent. The whole difference between winning and losing was that: if Konstantinou did not touch Nanninga and if the header of Kapsis was just a bit lower so to touch the goalpost at the other side so to go into the net, the winner would have been Greece.

Holland vs West Germany – the derby of Group A. The stakes were high – the winner was practically going to the final. Expectations were also high – West Germany and Holland had old scores to settle. Both teams disappointed a few days earlier, but it was felt that the derby will be entirely different. To a point, West Germany was repeating 1974 – back then the team also started badly and had to be reshaped in the next games until the right formula was found. Derwall did the same – Cullmann and Bernd Foster were out, replaced by Schuster and Hrubesch. Two players is not much of a change, but only on the surface: the whole structure was changed. Stielike was moved back as a libero, Schuster got the role of playmaker – not a pure playmaker like Overath before, but more like Bonhof: having some defensive role as well. Hrubesch, of course, was the center-forward. West Germany had immediately attacking shape – 4-3-3, with 6 attacking players, whereas against Czechoslovakia there were 6 defensive players. Both Schuster and Hrubesch were unknown internationally, but what looked like a risk was well justified: Kaltz and Hrubesch were lethal combination in Hamburger SV – the burly center-forward scored many a goal after long cross from Kaltz. Stielike was just right as libero – able to conduct the game and go ahead. Schuster at first was thought defensive midfielder, but immediately proved he was much more than that. He was hungry for success too. Holland had no other option, but the same players who disappointed against Greece. Five players had injuries, including Schrijvers, who had to be substituted in the 20th minute of the previous match – the real Dutch concern was to put the injured back on their feet. It was done. The game started and soon it was clear that the German changes worked. Holland, however, struggled as against the Greeks. The tempo was fast, soon the Germans clearly controlled the game and started scoring. The hero was Thomas Allofs, who was very disappointing against Czechoslovakia. He scored a hat-trick and 10 minutes before the final whistle the winner was absolutely clear: West Germany 3 – Holland 0.

Great match for Thomas Allofs – here he scores again and the picture tells it all: Schrijvers is too heavy for really quick reaction, as he always was, and van de Korput too late. The Germans were quicker, lighter, brighter. But Derwall made two substitutes, which were a bit questionable – first, Hansi Muller was replaced by Magath and in 75th minute Dietz by 19-years old Lothar Matthaus. Hansi Muller perhaps unjustly was constantly under criticism: he was thought too individualistic and underperforming. It may have been so, but Magath was no ultimately better player on one hand, and probably not the right substitute on the other, for he was doubling Schuster in midfield and the 20-years old was great. As for Matthaus, he replaced the left full back. Holland was expected to go ‘all or nothing’ in the last minutes, so it was clear that Matthaus must play defensive role, entirely unfamiliar position. His lack of experience showed quickly – he committed a foul inside penalty area and Rep made it 1-3. In the 85th minute Willie van de Kerkhof scored a second goal and things no longer looked bright for West Germany. To a point, the substitutes were not right – in the lats part of the match West Germany slowed down and lost efficiency. But Holland was not capable of miracle – they were not the team of 1978, far less the great one of 1974. They attacked to the end, but 5 minutes were just too short a time for this team. As a whole, West Germany was far better team, showing at moments sparks of greatness – the Gremans were back, that was the impression after the game. Holland was gone as a team – that was the other judgement. They looked just like West Germany in 1978: tough, constantly running and tackling teams with no clue what to do when possessing the ball.

Czechoslovakia – Greece attracted no interest and left almost no trace. It was a match without mystery and intrigue. The winner was certain. Less than 5000 attended. Venglos had no illusions – he just said to his team if they wanted to have a chance to play for the bronze medals, they had to win today. The difference of class was obvious – Panenka scored in the 6th minute from a free-kick, his specialty. The Greeks fought back and equalized 10 minutes later, but it was clear that they were inferior team by far. Czechoslovakia scored 2 more goals. The team did not impressed anybody – they were much better than the Greeks, yet, nothing special. With one match left, only miracle would have placed the reigning European champions on top of the group. A very huge miracle… West Germany had to lose to Greece and Czechoslovakia – win over Holland.

Czechoslvakia – Holland. Before the match Zwartkruis made grumpy excuses to unfriendly Dutch media: “What do you expect? The clubs rule – they do not free players for the national team and as a result we hardly play any friendlies. Without, say 8 friendlies a year, it is impossible to build good team.” Venglos was philosopkically-realistic: “It is possible to not lose to Holland, they are not better than us. If we are lucky to reach the ‘small final’ for third place our goal will be accomplished.” He fielded his usual starters, bringing back Netolicka, who did not play against Greece. Goalkeeping was well known problem without solution – Netolicka was not great, Seman was similar, Netolicka was back. The rest were the best Czechoslovakia had at the moment. Berger was out – he was substituted in the 23rd minute against Greece, which was enough indication for his worth – and Vojacek was the only new starter. Masny was moved back to midfield – defense and caution was the order of the day: 4-4-3 scheme, with 5 defensive players, for Vojacek was nominal midfielder. Zwartkruis tried to shake his team, which was difficult, given the squad he had. Haan was out. Kist was out. Nanninga, the golden substitute in 1978, was a starter. The changes were pathetic… Nanninga was used so far like in 1978 – a substitute, coming in the second half in the hope of making a miracle. Did not work. Nanninga was not a star, but rather ordinary player. For more Zwartkruis had no guts: it was obvious that van de Kerkhof twins are counter-productive. But they are constant starters. Rep was obviously beyond his peak, yet a starter. The tactical scheme was clearly defensive: 4-4-2, with Rene van de Kerkhof in front. He was more of a midfielder than a striker. Both opponents were seemingly going for a tie. The match was ugly and brutal – 52 fouls were called. Both teams managed to score a goal. Zwartkruis decision to start without Haan, but to depend on van de Kerkhof twins was obvious mistake – when Haan replaced Nanninga, Holland became more creative and dangerous. And managed to equalize. The match ended 1-1 – the result both sides seemingly aimed at, but Czechoslovakia benefited by it.

Vojacek clears the ball addressed to Haan. Ondrus watches nearby – the original scheme, in which Vojacek was placed as midfielder, fooled no one: he was a central defender. His real position. Zwartkruis said “we did what we can” – which was not much. Venglos again was ‘realistic’: “The game was not a question of beauty, but getting a particular result. We got it, we are happy.” Menotti was disgusted and one again criticized defensive European football.

The last group match – West Germany vs Greece – was mere protocol. Both teams made changes, giving some playing time to unused reserves. Derwall clearly kept some players fresh for the final. Cullmann was back – this time in midfield. Memmering got completed the line. Schuster, Dietz, and Allofs were out. Like the opening match, the scheme was 4-4-2. The Germans were not even interested and they appeared as arbitrary bunch of players some of which don’t want to play, and some don’t know how to play. The only important thing was the weird insistence of Derwall to use Cullmann – this time combined with Stielike. Why woody Cullmann, who was not even at his usual form? The Greeks were even less than usual, for some of the key players were replaced by the unused reserves. The team played as best as they could. West Germans walked and aimlessly kicked the ball around. Nobody scored. And who would expect a miracle of this match? Under the old rules, the match was not played at the same time Czechoslovakia and Holland played, but after. Derwall was crystal clear: “Who will start depends on the result of the other match. If it is tied, then Dietz, Schuster, and Allofs will get a rest.”. This match did not matter at all – even if they lost it, the Germans were finalists. The Greeks had a chance to win the match in the last minutes, but the ball deflected from the cross bar out. Panagoulias was happy and boisterous: ‘We are the moral winners, we are proud. Europe will hear from us yet.’ It did… 24 years later. True, the Greek team showed spirit and managed a tie against mighty West Germany, but it was absolutely clear that they are inferior to any other finalist. During the finals their only noticeable player relatively equal to the leading Europeans was Anastopoulos.

A double-edged picture: Rummenigge high above Greek defender, who is unable even to challenge. That was the objective difference of class between the Greeks and the leading European football nations. In the same time, Rummenigge and his teammates were unable to beat Greece. Rummenigge himself was substituted in the 65th minute by Del’Haye.

The final table of Group A:

1. West Germany 2 1 0 4-2 5

2. Czechoslovakia 1 1 1 4-3 3

3. Holland 1 1 1 4-4 3

4. Greece 0 1 2 1-4 1

West Germany once again going to the final – third time consecutive European finalist. Czechoslovakia, a bit surprisingly, was going to play for bronze – a success in itself, and also brave performance, for the champions of 1976 were not at all at their previous level. Holland – major disappointment and an end of an era, recognized by their own coach. Greece – nothing special, except that they reached the final stage. Success for the country, but obviously Greek football was still far behind the leading nations.

 

In Group A Belgium would have been a favourite, next to West Germany. In Group B the team was the outsider. Not as toothless as Greece, but relatively weaker than the other teams. Belgium went through a crisis in the early 1970s, but after 1975 new talented generation emerged and Belgian football was steadily rising. Clubs was successful internationally – FC Brugge played two European finals and Anderlecht won the Cup Winners Cup twice. The ‘Red Devils’ failed to reach the finals of two World Cups, but did well at the two European championships in the 1970s. They were always a team rising to the occasion. Nobody expected them to be easily beaten in 1980 either, yet compared to the other teams in Group B Belgium seemingly had more negatives. FC Brugge and particularly Anderlecht depended on foreign stars, mostly Dutch. The lax Belgian rules for imported players made the number huge – Anderlecht was seen as a double of Ajax quite seriously. Compared to the foreigners, Belgian players were not so impressive, they were rather support players to their famous team-mates. None of the new Belgians was major European star, some were practically unknown. There was no new van Himst. And they did not look serious enough – some hippie-like bearded guys, too relaxed for the sober and tidy professionalism at the end of the 1970s.

Guy Thys was modest in his interviews, even a bit dismissive of his team, expressing modest expectation ‘if’ this or that happened. There was no fear, but no big hopes either, which was judged to be realistic view of the abilities of his team: able to give a fight, but not equal to the opponents. Thy run liberal and relaxed camp – something always loved by the media, because it provides horrified gossip. It was during the finals when the journalists rushed to the Belgian camp only to find ‘horror’: the doors were not heavily blocked, the team sipping beer, and Thys smoking his cigar nearby, benevolently looking at his boys and making jokes. The boys readily provided scary answers: ‘Why giving up good habits?’, mused the captain of the squad Cools when asked about the beer in his hand. ‘We don’t like discipline. We cherish individual space and the coach understands that. He trusts us and wea re not going to let him down.’, lectured Meeuws. The journalists remembered that some of the team played for semi-professional clubs, there was even a school teacher among them, and made skeptical conclusions: the team was not professional enough to go far. Neither Thys, nor the boys contradicted the media. Since few Belgian players were well known, it looked a team starting a vacation. Guy Thys was hardly taken seriously – he included Wilfried van Moer under pressure from the media. The veteran was the only player from the last Belgian team appearing at World Cup finals. It was in 1970 – in 1980 van Moer was 35 years old…

 

1

1GK

Theo Custers

(1950-08-10)10 August 1950 (aged 29)

 

Royal Antwerp

2

2DF

Eric Gerets

(1954-05-18)18 May 1954 (aged 26)

 

Standard Liège

3

2DF

Luc Millecamps

(1951-09-10)10 September 1951 (aged 28)

 

Waregem

4

2DF

Walter Meeuws

(1951-07-11)11 July 1951 (aged 28)

 

Club Brugge

5

2DF

Michel Renquin

(1955-11-03)3 November 1955 (aged 24)

 

Standard Liège

6

3MF

Julien Cools (c)

(1947-02-13)13 February 1947 (aged 33)

 

K. Beerschot

7

3MF

René Vandereycken

(1953-07-22)22 July 1953 (aged 26)

 

Club Brugge

8

3MF

Wilfried van Moer

(1945-03-01)1 March 1945 (aged 35)

 

Beringen

9

4FW

François van der Elst

(1954-12-01)1 December 1954 (aged 25)

 

Anderlecht

10

4FW

Erwin Vandenbergh

(1959-01-26)26 January 1959 (aged 21)

 

Lierse

11

4FW

Jan Ceulemans

(1957-02-28)28 February 1957 (aged 23)

 

Club Brugge

12

1GK

Jean-Marie Pfaff

(1953-12-04)4 December 1953 (aged 26)

 

Beveren

13

3MF

Maurice Martens

(1947-06-05)5 June 1947 (aged 33)

 

Molenbeek

14

2DF

Gerard Plessers

(1959-03-30)30 March 1959 (aged 21)

 

Standard Liège

15

3MF

René Verheyen

(1952-03-20)20 March 1952 (aged 28)

 

Lokeren

16

3MF

Marc Millecamps

(1950-10-09)9 October 1950 (aged 29)

 

Waregem

17

3MF

Raymond Mommens

(1958-12-27)27 December 1958 (aged 21)

 

Lokeren

18

3MF

Guy Dardenne

(1954-10-19)19 October 1954 (aged 25)

 

Lokeren

19

4FW

Willy Wellens

(1954-03-29)29 March 1954 (aged 26)

 

Standard Liège

20

1GK

Michel Preud’homme

(1959-01-24)24 January 1959 (aged 21)

 

Standard Liège

21

2DF

Jos Heyligen

(1947-06-30)30 June 1947 (aged 32)

 

Beringen

22

4FW

Ronny Martens

(1958-00-22)22 December 1958 (aged 22)

 

Anderlecht

Belgium was not impressive even on picture: some hillbillies. Little class – Francois van der Elst and Jan Ceulemans. Van Moer was seemingly of symbolic value – just a link between the last successful team and the current one. At his age seemingly he was not good for anything else and very likely would not even play. One recognizable name was missing – van Gool. And rightly so – after he moved from FC Brugge to 1.FC Koln, he no longer the same. The team list was almost a diagnosis: only 5 players of Anderlecht and FC Brugge. The success of the Belgian clubs was clearly not due to Belgian players. Nobody knew yet Pfaff and Preud’homme – burly Theo Custers was seemingly the number one goalkeeper and he was not much. Belgium was tough to beat, nobody was thinking playing against them a picnic, but the fear was mostly of possible disturbance the plans of others. The whole role of Belgium was perhaps to decide the group winner, not to win.

Spain was not seen as favourite, but it was not dismissed either. Traditionally, the Spaniards were tough opponent and depending on results of other games, they had a chance to reach the final. Not a big chance, though. The team was not much, judging not only by their mediocre performance in the months before the finals. Spain was not impressive at the 1978 World Cup and this so far was the only appearance at major tournaments in the 1970s. And Spanish clubs lost their superiority long time ago on the European scene: the only cup they won was in 1979, when painful to watch Barcelona won the Cup Winners Cup. Spanish teams also lost two European finals – internationally, the 1970s were low decade for the Spaniards. And to make things worse, the Federation made a big blunder as the European finals neared: they sent a note to Ladislao Kubala, the national team coach for his birthday. Along with congratulations, he was informed that his contract was not going to be extended.

Kubala expected that, so in itself, it was not news – the manner and the timing were wrong. To a point, Kubala’s next step could be seen as retaliation: he immediately signed with Barcelona. In a way, it looked like he was not concerned about the national team anymore. The split, however, was long time coming. The media, the Federation, and the general public were critical of the coach for a long time: first, he was at the helm of the national team since 1969. Football changed in the 1970s, but the Spanish national team did not adapt the changes. Results aggravated the matter – there were none, so the coach was increasingly seen as hopelessly old-fashioned, belonging to another era. Spain was reduced to second-rate team – one happy to reach the finals of the World Cup. Ones! The European finals were the same kind of success: just appearing at the final stage. Kubala was blamed for too much experimenting – he used 97 players in 56 matches. 29 of them were used only ones, and 20 – twice. It was neither here, nor there – it seemed that Kubala used a core of players, who obviously failed to achieve anything, and in the same time meddled with the team too much, without building a new one. He used too many players of smaller clubs, which also went against him: looked like he favoured second-rate players.

The coach had his own grievances: he was fed up with stars, who had huge pretensions, but routinely placed their club above the national team and underperformed. There was objective problem – Kubala tried new players in the hope they would be different, but the young newcomers were just the same as the older stars. Especially the strikers. It was a team lacking chemistry, lacking inspiration, easily going into useless physicality, and very inefficient in attack – the strikers constantly preferred individual raids, leading to nothing. Kubala was quite happy to leave the national team. The European finals were his last duty – it is difficult to say how serious or not he was selecting and preparing the team.

 

 

1

1GK

Luis Arconada

(1954-06-26)26 June 1954 (aged 25)

17

Real Sociedad

2

2DF

José Ramón Alexanko

(1956-05-19)19 May 1956 (aged 24)

10

Athletic Bilbao

3

2DF

Migueli

(1951-12-19)19 December 1951 (aged 28)

29

Barcelona

4

2DF

Diego

(1954-11-21)21 November 1954 (aged 25)

1

Real Sociedad

5

2DF

Francisco Javier Uría

(1950-02-01)1 February 1950 (aged 30)

13

Sporting Gijón

6

3MF

Juan Manuel Asensi (c)

(1949-09-23)23 September 1949 (aged 30)

39

Barcelona

7

3MF

Dani

(1951-06-28)28 June 1951 (aged 28)

18

Athletic Bilbao

8

3MF

Julio Cardeñosa

(1949-10-27)27 October 1949 (aged 30)

7

Real Betis

9

3MF

Francisco José Carrasco

(1959-03-06)6 March 1959 (aged 21)

6

Barcelona

10

4FW

Quini

(1949-09-23)23 September 1949 (aged 30)

28

Sporting Gijón

11

2DF

Vicente del Bosque

(1950-12-23)23 December 1950 (aged 29)

17

Real Madrid

12

3MF

Juanito

(1954-11-10)10 November 1954 (aged 25)

14

Real Madrid

13

1GK

Urruti

(1952-02-17)17 February 1952 (aged 28)

5

Español

14

2DF

Rafael Gordillo

(1957-02-24)24 February 1957 (aged 23)

7

Real Betis

15

3MF

Antonio Olmo

(1954-01-18)18 January 1954 (aged 26)

12

Barcelona

16

4FW

Santillana

(1952-08-23)23 August 1952 (aged 27)

22

Real Madrid

17

4FW

Jesús María Satrústegui

(1954-02-12)12 February 1954 (aged 26)

10

Real Sociedad

18

4FW

Enrique Saura

(1954-08-02)2 August 1954 (aged 25)

7

Valencia

19

3MF

Cundi

(1955-04-13)13 April 1955 (aged 25)

7

Sporting Gijón

20

2DF

Miguel Tendillo

(1961-02-01)1 February 1961 (aged 19)

1

Valencia

21

3MF

Jesús María Zamora

(1955-01-01)1 January 1955 (aged 25)

7

Real Sociedad

22

1GK

Pedro María Artola

(1948-09-06)6 September 1948 (aged 31)

0

Barcelona

To a point, this was typical Kubala squad: only 8 players from Real Madrid and Barcelona. A whole bunch of little known players from not exactly leading clubs. The key players were old… According to Kubala, only Asensi was capable of keeping the pace and pressure of modern teams. There was plenty to question and criticize, but there was also a real problem: there was hardly anybody else to include. The only missing player was Camacho and not because of Kubala, but because of heavy injury. Quini represents the objective problem best: at 30, he still played for Sporting Gijon. None of the big clubs considered the top Spanish center-forward good enough for them. Of the younger players, none was even competing with Asensi, Del Bosque, Santillana, even Migueli. The really promising newcomers were defenders – Alexanko, Gordillo, Tendillo. They were also alike… tough fighters, but nothing like Beckenbauer, Krol, Pezzey. Only Zamora was promising of the younger strikers. The real discovery was the goalkeeper Arconada, but his best days were yet to come. It was not a team capable of winning the group – unless lucky. It was team difficult to beat, so taken seriously by opponents.

 

Italy was the other favourite, a tiny bit lesser than England. Reasons: because Italy is always favourite, they were hosts, which always is considered a big advantage, and most importantly – the impressive performance at 1978 World Cup. Against Italy: the team did not play official games since 1978, therefore its strength was doubted, and the Tottonero scandal just unfolding. After 1978 the big news from Italy were rather damaging for the national team. First the soap opera about Paolo Rossi. He was hugely impressive at the World Cup, which immediately created a problem: Rossi was not a star before the world cup. A few years back he was Juventus player, but did not make the first eleven and was moved away. Apparently, Juventus did not have big hopes for him, which created unique situation as a result: Rossi was jointly owned by Juventus and L.R. Vicenza. When he soared to stardom both clubs wanted him for themselves. The bitter fight ended with blind bidding and predictably Juventus won. But Rossi ended loaned to Peruggia as a result – whether moving to Peruggia was a result of complicated legal problems or Juventus did not really trusted the player fit for them is not important. Important is the saga, no doubt distracting the player from his game. Unfortunately, this was not the only problem Rossi – and therefore the national team – was having. The next problem was the issue of foreign players. Import was banned since 1964. The big clubs were not happy at all, but the Federation stayed firm – more important was development of domestic stars. There was no clear argument either for or against: Italian football struggled in the 1970s on every level. Local talent obviously was not so great – hence, foreigners were needed. But if foreigners took the key positions certainly Italian football was not going to improve either. The solution came from unexpected corner: the Common Market, the predecessor of European Union, ruled that citizens of member countries can move and work freely everywhere in the realm of the organization. Italian clubs, especially the big ones, were happy – players were labour, thus, they cannot be restricted any longer, and as soon as foreigners were free to play in Italy, why not all foreigners? The prohibition was dead, the market was open as from the summer of 1980, and the order of the day was ‘get the foreign stars’. The Federation had no choice and allowed 1 foreigner per club. The restriction was not going to last – everybody was sure of that. The end of prohibition unfortunately changed the focus from the Italian players at hand to the race for getting international stars. And then the Totonero scandal started in the spring of 1980, the worst possible time, for investigation soon reached big clubs and national team players. Milan was found involved and guilty, so the new champions were punished with relegation to second division. As for individual players, Paolo Rossi came under investigation. And one of the top scorers at the time – Bruno Giordano (Lazio). Both were suspended for three months, until their court appearance. Under suspension, the players were out of the national team. Now, Giordano was rarely called and hardly a regular, but he was attached to Rossi, the real loss, in order of making stronger case that the investigation hurts badly the national team. Antognoni was also investigated – and found innocent – but Bearzot was grumbling: nobody was safe, hence, it was more than probable that Juventus will be investigated and the national team was based on Juventus. Bearzot called press conference to protest, threatening with resignation, if the national team players were not left in peace. However, Juventus was not under suspicion – but this very fact put fans in arms: Milan’s fans were outraged that their club was punished and the enemy from Turin was let free. It did not matter who was and was not guilty of bribing for the fans of Milan – and Bearzot had new big problem at his hand: unfortunately, Italy had to play two matches in Milan and there was big fear that the local fans will turn against the national team. The atmosphere in the national team was not great anyway – the players worried about the investigation and had difficulty concentrating on the European finals. Which also fueled old media criticism… Bearzot depended on Juventus players. He also favoured older players. The media thought the approach wrong: the Juventus stars had so much success, they no longer cared. They were not hungry. That was the judgment. Bearzot needed new and younger team – but he made only small changes, was extra-careful, and constantly preached that experience was most important. The media continued to attack him, but in the same time circumstances killed their argument. Yugoslavia completely destroyed somewhat experimental Italian team – it worked for Bearzot’s point of view and the media had to agree. In direct practical terms, Dino Zoff was re-established as untouchable goalkeeper – any other was more than a risk. With Rossi and Giordano suspended, there was no point arguing replacing the remaining strikers, no matter how old and in what form. With Milan relegated and some of the squad suspended, there was no other option but using Juventus. To a point, the Tottonero scandal worked in favour of Bearzot.

Bearzot worried, but at the end he repeated his mantra: ‘most important is experience’. And even more so at this moment, because the Tottonero scandal really taxed the nerves of the players.

 

1

1GK

Dino Zoff (c)

(1942-02-28)28 February 1942 (aged 38)

 

Juventus

2

2DF

Franco Baresi

(1960-05-08)8 May 1960 (aged 20)

 

Milan

3

2DF

Giuseppe Baresi

(1958-02-07)7 February 1958 (aged 22)

 

Internazionale

4

2DF

Mauro Bellugi

(1950-02-07)7 February 1950 (aged 30)

 

Napoli

5

2DF

Antonio Cabrini

(1957-10-08)8 October 1957 (aged 22)

 

Juventus

6

2DF

Fulvio Collovati

(1957-05-09)9 May 1957 (aged 23)

 

Milan

7

2DF

Claudio Gentile

(1953-09-27)27 September 1953 (aged 26)

 

Juventus

8

2DF

Aldo Maldera

(1953-10-14)14 October 1953 (aged 26)

 

Milan

9

2DF

Gaetano Scirea

(1953-05-25)25 May 1953 (aged 27)

 

Juventus

10

3MF

Giancarlo Antognoni

(1954-04-01)1 April 1954 (aged 26)

 

Fiorentina

11

3MF

Romeo Benetti

(1945-10-20)20 October 1945 (aged 34)

 

Roma

12

1GK

Ivano Bordon

(1951-04-13)13 April 1951 (aged 29)

 

Internazionale

13

3MF

Ruben Buriani

(1955-03-16)16 March 1955 (aged 25)

 

Milan

14

3MF

Gabriele Oriali

(1952-11-25)25 November 1952 (aged 27)

 

Internazionale

15

3MF

Marco Tardelli

(1954-09-24)24 September 1954 (aged 25)

 

Juventus

16

3MF

Renato Zaccarelli

(1951-01-18)18 January 1951 (aged 29)

 

Torino

17

4FW

Alessandro Altobelli

(1955-11-28)28 November 1955 (aged 24)

 

Internazionale

18

4FW

Roberto Bettega

(1950-12-27)27 December 1950 (aged 29)

 

Juventus

19

4FW

Franco Causio

(1949-02-01)1 February 1949 (aged 31)

 

Juventus

20

4FW

Francesco Graziani

(1952-12-16)16 December 1952 (aged 27)

 

Torino

21

4FW

Roberto Pruzzo

(1955-04-01)1 April 1955 (aged 25)

 

Roma

22

1GK

Giovanni Galli

(1958-04-29)29 April 1958 (aged 22)

 

Fiorentina

Almost the final’s squad: from left – Causio, Sala, Cabrini, Schirea, Bettega, Gentile, Maldera, Antognoni, Cuccureddu, Rossi, Zoff. 1978 version, which remained intact in 1980 and except unfortunate Rossi, was actually improved on. Sala and Cuccureddu were the only players out.

Essentially, it was the same selection used at the 1978 World Cup – two years older, but perhaps ripe for success. It was the perfect squad for the moment – no stars left out, except the suspended Rossi. Bettega was perhaps beyond his prime, but still strong. Bearzot’s constantly repeated emphasis on experience masked the changes he made in the team: they were not many, but important ones. By now Collovati and Cabrini were firm regulars. Guieseppe Baresi was also firm team member. That was the next generation – the trio was under 23 years of age, but already experienced. Oriali was more or less the only really new name, but at the 27 he was at his prime. It was not the quality of the team making people skeptical – it was the psychological burden of the Tottonero scandal which made observers to rate Italy slightly weaker than England. Still, Italy was one of the major favourites.

Group B was much tougher than Group A and it was more difficult to predict therefore, but England was chosen as the likelier winner. The arguments in favour were strong: England was England – always a favourite and even more so because it was the first time since 1970 the team reached the finals. The 1970s were terrible disappointment, England was unable to find the right players for a successful team, played old kind of football no longer effective against those practicing total football. Yet, there were great payers, including the best European footballer of the last two years Kevin Keegan. Younger generation was also pushing ahead. Nobody ever doubted the great fighting spirit of any English team, but now there was more to it: it was hungry team, full of stars determined to restore English pride. English clubs were the best in Europe and they provided the bulk of very experienced squad, which was very familiar with the strength of the continental teams and their game. It was the right blend of young and old, the core players were at their prime, and it was the only team among the finalists having no troubles: at every post there were two equal players. The only missing players was Trevor Francis, who was unfortunately injured, but his absence was not big deal – there were others. England was the only country having enough depth to replace any member of the squad with another of similar quality.

Ron Greenwood was at the helm since 1977 and under him England played consistently strong football – they lost only 3 of their 28 matches under Greenwood. Two were friendlies. The third was official – 1-4 to Wells in the Championship of Great Britain. The qualification group, although a weak one, was a breeze. Greenwood seemingly was the right coach, the players had no problems with him. He claimed that England not only was in great form, but also successfully changed her style – combining the typical British football with European innovations. It was not one-man team, but a good collective. Kevin Keegan was of the same mind, praising Greenwood. Picky English press agreed. Continental media was more reserved on the issue of style, but still saw England as prime candidate for the title.

 

1

1GK

Ray Clemence

(1948-08-05)5 August 1948 (aged 31)

 

Liverpool

2

2DF

Phil Neal

(1951-02-20)20 February 1951 (aged 29)

 

Liverpool

3

2DF

Kenny Sansom

(1958-09-26)26 September 1958 (aged 21)

 

Crystal Palace

4

2DF

Phil Thompson

(1954-01-21)21 January 1954 (aged 26)

 

Liverpool

5

2DF

Dave Watson

(1946-10-05)5 October 1946 (aged 33)

 

Southampton

6

3MF

Ray Wilkins

(1956-09-14)14 September 1956 (aged 23)

 

Manchester United

7

4FW

Kevin Keegan (c)

(1951-02-14)14 February 1951 (aged 29)

 

Hamburg

8

3MF

Steve Coppell

(1955-07-09)9 July 1955 (aged 24)

 

Manchester United

9

4FW

David Johnson

(1951-10-23)23 October 1951 (aged 28)

 

Liverpool

10

3MF

Trevor Brooking

(1948-10-02)2 October 1948 (aged 31)

 

West Ham United

11

4FW

Tony Woodcock

(1955-12-06)6 December 1955 (aged 24)

 

Köln

12

2DF

Viv Anderson

(1956-07-29)29 July 1956 (aged 23)

 

Nottingham Forest

13

1GK

Peter Shilton

(1949-09-18)18 September 1949 (aged 30)

 

Nottingham Forest

14

2DF

Trevor Cherry

(1948-02-23)23 February 1948 (aged 32)

 

Leeds United

15

3MF

Emlyn Hughes

(1947-08-28)28 August 1947 (aged 32)

 

Wolverhampton Wanderers

16

2DF

Mick Mills

(1949-01-04)4 January 1949 (aged 31)

 

Ipswich Town

17

3MF

Terry McDermott

(1951-12-08)8 December 1951 (aged 28)

 

Liverpool

18

3MF

Ray Kennedy

(1951-07-28)28 July 1951 (aged 28)

 

Liverpool

19

3MF

Glenn Hoddle

(1957-10-27)27 October 1957 (aged 22)

 

Tottenham Hotspur

20

4FW

Paul Mariner

(1953-05-22)22 May 1953 (aged 27)

 

Ipswich Town

21

4FW

Garry Birtles

(1956-07-27)27 July 1956 (aged 23)

 

Nottingham Forest

22

1GK

Joe Corrigan

(1948-11-18)18 November 1948 (aged 31)

 

Manchester City

To many these lads were the new European champions. No need to mention Keegan, but the rest were great on their own right. The midfield was a dream: Wilkins, Coppel, and Brooking. Emelyn Hughes and Trevor Cherry were not even starters – such a luxury was just a dream even for the West Germans. Yet, their presence proved the strength of England from another angle: the veterans were still so great, they beat younger competition and made the team. The reserves were just as strong as the chosen eleven. The first ever black player was included – Viv Anderson, one of the Nottingham Forest conquers of Europe. Relations were seemingly good, nobody was sulking because of sitting on the bench. The mood was optimistic and further boosted by Elton John, who visited the boys in Italy and entertained them with a song, written for the occasion. The group was tough, but everybody felt England was stronger than the other teams. Class, skill, form, long squad, great coach, the right spirit, pride, hunger for success, support from fans and media – everything was on English side.

 

Greece was the outsider not only of the group, but at the finals as a whole. During the 1970s Greek football steadily improved and qualifying for the 1980 European finals was not only a testimony of that , but the highest success of the country to date. So far, it was Panathinaikos playing at the final of the European Champions Cup in 1971. The national team surpassed that at the end of the decade. The only direct link was the defender Anthimos Kapsis – a young player in 1971 and now one of the most experienced stars in Greece at 29. Yet, the improvement of Greek football did not make it close to the best of Europe – there was still huge gap and Greece really was way bellow the rest of the finalists. The opinion was unanimous around Europe. At home it was different: the euphoria was out of proportion and the country not only expected, but demanded from the team to win the championship. To escape the hype Alketas Panagoulias rushed his team to Italy earlier than the other teams. He wanted peace and quite, so to concentrate on preparation.

A colourful figure, involved with much more than football, Panagoulias was good coach, but, unfortunately, also given to bombast. His statements were not realistic at all. ‘I am directly linked to Alexander the Great and can’t stand to lose’ was stated before the championship. ‘We are the moral winners’ after the team was eliminated. The players had realistic approach. ‘If it was so good, as Panagoulias says, we would be champions’, said Maik Galakos. He knew all too well, because he grew up in West Germany and was a product of the German youth system. A big star in Greece, he failed twice in the Bundesliga – he played a total of 2 matches there, both for Fortuna (Dusseldorf). In his second attempt with lowly St. Pauli (Hambourg) he was never fielded. That was the reality. Greek football was getting better, but was still far behind the leading nations and reaching the finals was a bit lucky – Hungary and especially USSR were in bad shape. If Greece was in any qualification group, the finals would have been just a dream.

 

1

1GK

Vasilis Konstantinou

(1947-11-19)19 November 1947 (aged 32)

 

Panathinaikos

2

2DF

Ioannis Kyrastas

(1952-10-25)25 October 1952 (aged 27)

 

Olympiacos

3

2DF

Konstantinos Iosifidis

(1952-01-14)14 January 1952 (aged 28)

 

PAOK

4

2DF

Anthimos Kapsis

(1950-09-03)3 September 1950 (aged 29)

 

Panathinaikos

5

2DF

Giorgos Foiros

(1953-11-08)8 November 1953 (aged 26)

 

Aris

6

3MF

Spiros Livathinos

(1955-01-08)8 January 1955 (aged 25)

 

Panathinaikos

7

3MF

Christos Terzanidis

(1945-02-13)13 February 1945 (aged 35)

 

Panathinaikos

8

3MF

Takis Nikoloudis

(1951-08-26)26 August 1951 (aged 28)

 

Olympiacos

9

4FW

Christos Ardizoglou

(1953-05-25)25 May 1953 (aged 27)

 

AEK Athens

10

4FW

Maik Galakos

(1951-11-23)23 November 1951 (aged 28)

 

Olympiacos

11

3MF

Ioannis Damanakis

(1952-10-02)2 October 1952 (aged 27)

 

PAOK

12

2DF

Ioannis Gounaris

(1952-07-06)6 July 1952 (aged 27)

 

PAOK

13

4FW

Charalambos Xanthopoulos

(1956-08-29)29 August 1956 (aged 23)

 

Iraklis

14

3MF

Giorgos Koudas (c)

(1946-11-23)23 November 1946 (aged 33)

 

PAOK

15

4FW

Thomas Mavros

(1954-03-31)31 March 1954 (aged 26)

 

AEK Athens

16

3MF

Dinos Kouis

(1955-06-05)5 June 1955 (aged 25)

 

Aris

17

2DF

Petros Ravousis

(1954-10-01)1 October 1954 (aged 25)

 

AEK Athens

18

2DF

Lakis Nikolaou

(1949-07-17)17 July 1949 (aged 30)

 

AEK Athens

19

4FW

Giorgos Kostikos

(1958-04-26)26 April 1958 (aged 22)

 

PAOK

20

4FW

Nikos Anastopoulos

(1958-01-22)22 January 1958 (aged 22)

 

Panionios

21

1GK

Eleftherios Poupakis

(1946-12-28)28 December 1946 (aged 33)

 

OFI Crete

22

1GK

Stelios Papafloratos

(1954-01-27)27 January 1954 (aged 26)

 

Aris

Few Greek players were known around Europe, but the squad reveals objective problem without solution: the pool of good players was very small. Not enough even for a full squad, so entirely anonymous players were selected as well. There was also something peculiar – the biggest Greek stars tended to be also very old. Terzanidis was 35 and most of the key players were pushing 30. Compared to the other teams, the Greeks were not expected even to be able to sustain physically a full game. The shortage of quality players made one wish Domazos, Antoniadis, Ikonomopoulos were born a few years later and were now fresh 35-years old and in the team. Yet, even if those instrumental for rise of Greek football were still playing the team would have been too weak compared to the other finalists.

Czechoslovakia nobody counted. They were the reigning European champions, though – and because of that there was interest and inevitable evaluations of the current team compared to the one of 1976. Czechoslovakia followed curious path of highs and lows: after the 1970 World Cup there was sharp decline, then they soared and won the European championship in 1976, then missed the 1978 World Cup, and again moved up to the 1980 European finals. In a way, Czechoslovakia was in the same difficult situation West Germany was after winning the 1974 World Cup – the winners aged, and were replaced by players almost of their generation, who were already established at the time of triumph, but were inferior to the stars. Second-stringers, who never reached the class of the champions, but were the top players when the champions started their exit. West Germany was not great with the second-stringers and similarly Czechoslovakia was not. Both countries did not make radical coaching changes either – Derwall was uprgraded from assistant to head coach when Schon stepped down in 1978. In the same year Jozef Venglos replaced Vaclav Jezek, whose assistant he was since 1973.

Like Derwall, Venglos did not introduce radical changes, but fiddled with the same players Jezek used, continued the same tactics and training methods, and carefully called new players now and then. And like Derwall, Venglos moved to new options only when there was no choice because of retirement or heavy injury. The only difference between West Germany and Czechoslovakia was that the Germans faced the problem earlier – in 1980 was more or less West Germany of 1975-78. They had the most of the 1976 champions at hand, but it was not the same team and hardly made any news. Opinions were almost uniform: Czechoslovakia had no chance. Venglos himself said so. Czechoslovakian media too: ‘the same players, only 4 years older’ was the judgment. People like Ruud Krol, who considered Czechoslovakia strong and dangerous were tiny minority and were not taken seriously. Reality was speaking loudly: there were no new exciting talent in Czechoslovakia. The best players were still the 1976 European champions and those,who were not able to make the national team back then. Venglos tried the same approach used in 1976 – a long, secluded training camp and many friendly matches against various not so great opponents. Like before, results were not great, which, like before, assured most observers that Czechoslovakia is not strong indeed. That was costly mistake in 1976. And just like before, the rather big group of players was trimmed to the final list.

 

1

1GK

Jaroslav Netolička

(1954-03-03)3 March 1954 (aged 26)

11

Dukla Prague

2

2DF

Jozef Barmoš

(1954-08-28)28 August 1954 (aged 25)

28

Inter Bratislava

3

2DF

Ladislav Jurkemik

(1953-07-20)20 July 1953 (aged 26)

31

Inter Bratislava

4

2DF

Anton Ondruš (c)

(1950-03-27)27 March 1950 (aged 30)

54

Slovan Bratislava

5

2DF

Koloman Gögh

(1948-01-07)7 January 1948 (aged 32)

51

Slovan Bratislava

6

2DF

František Štambachr

(1953-02-13)13 February 1953 (aged 27)

15

Dukla Prague

7

3MF

Ján Kozák

(1954-04-17)17 April 1954 (aged 26)

34

Lokomotiva Košice

8

3MF

Antonín Panenka

(1948-12-02)2 December 1948 (aged 31)

43

Bohemians Praha

9

4FW

Miroslav Gajdůšek

(1951-09-20)20 September 1951 (aged 28)

45

Dukla Prague

10

4FW

Marián Masný

(1950-08-13)13 August 1950 (aged 29)

57

Slovan Bratislava

11

4FW

Zdeněk Nehoda

(1952-05-09)9 May 1952 (aged 28)

64

Dukla Prague

12

2DF

Rostislav Vojáček

(1949-02-23)23 February 1949 (aged 31)

24

Baník Ostrava

13

3MF

Werner Lička

(1954-02-15)15 February 1954 (aged 26)

2

Baník Ostrava

14

2DF

Jan Fiala

(1956-05-19)19 May 1956 (aged 24)

12

Dukla Prague

15

4FW

Ladislav Vízek

(1955-01-22)22 January 1955 (aged 25)

15

Dukla Prague

16

2DF

Oldřich Rott

(1951-05-26)26 May 1951 (aged 29)

3

Dukla Prague

17

3MF

Jaroslav Pollák

(1947-07-11)11 July 1947 (aged 32)

49

Sparta Prague

18

3MF

Jan Berger

(1955-11-27)27 November 1955 (aged 24)

1

Dukla Prague

19

2DF

Karol Dobiaš

(1947-12-18)18 December 1947 (aged 32)

67

Bohemians Prague

20

3MF

Petr Němec

(1957-06-07)7 June 1957 (aged 23)

0

Baník Ostrava

21

1GK

Stanislav Seman

(1952-08-08)8 August 1952 (aged 27)

1

Lokomotiva Košice

22

1GK

Dušan Kéketi

(1951-03-24)24 March 1951 (aged 29)

7

Spartak Trnava

Top row, from left: Ruzicka – masseur, Nehoda, Netolicka, Ondrus, Seman, Janecka, Kundrat – team doctor.

Middle row: Masny, Jurkemik, ?, Venglos – coach, Gogh, Radimec, Brumovsky – assistant coach.

First row: Vizek, Vojacek, Fiala, Gajdusek, Panenka, Barmos.

This is partial version of the squad called to the training camp and there is a bit of lesson in it: Janecka and Radimec did not make the final team. Both will be key players of the national team in the first half of the 1980s. 10 players from the 1976 team were selected. Most of the rest were well known already in 1976, some with many caps, but they were the second stringers: those, who did not make the champion squad, who were not fully trusted back then. Four years later they were no better for sure – some were already old (Vojacek – 31, Gajdusek – 28, Rott – newcomer to the team at 29). Frantisek Stambachr, 27, was of the same ilk – he was part of the 1976 squad, but deep reserve not expected to play at all. By now he had only 15 caps. The team had huge problem, readily admitted by Venglos – goalkeeping. This was the last and may be the most telling similarity with West Germany after 1974: after Ivo Viktor, who retired, there was nobody. The same was in West Germany – Sepp Maier played ‘forever’ and his contemporaries were doomed (Nigbur, Cleff, Franke). When Maier stepped down, they were too old too – and there was nobody else. The back-up of Ivo Viktor shared the fate of the German keepers: he was of similar age and when Viktor retired Alexander Vencel was already at the end of his career, playing his last days for a small club. There was nobody else… Once upon a time promising players aged in the dark shadow of the great goalkeeper and never really developed their potential: back in 1971-72 Dusan Keketi was young, bright talent, expected to become really strong keeper with time. By 1980 he was 29 years old with 7 matches for the national team and still third choice. Other keepers were tried during and especially after Viktor and none satisfied. There was no firm starter. Venglos settled for Netolicka perhaps because he had many years ahead of him to play and was part of the strong at the time Dukla (Prague) team. But he was no better than his reserves, not even than those who also played for the national team, but were not selected this time – Michalik (Banik Ostrava) and Hruska (Bohemians Prague). Stanislav Seman, the 2nd goalie, had played for the national team only once so far… Venglos had no way of finding solution, honestly acknowledged the problem, and blamed his keeper eventually for costly mistake. And at the end the last similarity with West Germany, this one at the same time: Bonhof got injury too late to be replaced and the Germans went to Italy with 21 players. Czechoslovakia went with only 19. Dobias was unable to restore his form after injury and was left home. Nemec and Rott were also found out of shape too late and dropped. But the squads were already deposited and there was no way to make changes. Two champions of 1976 did not make the squad at all – Svehlik and Bicovsky. One may wonder what would have been the fate of West Germany, if Bonhof was fit and the team was shaped around him. The same wonder what if Dobias, Svehlik, and Bicovsky were at hand for Czechoslovakia. Very likely the results were not to be good, for with these players both teams would be firmly based on the old approach, which lead to failure. Failure was not in the books for the Czechoslovaks, though: they were considered too weak already by everybody, including their coach. Realistically, third in Group A. Happy to be at the finals, nothing more.

 

West Germany was may be the second favourite. Of course, everybody lists the Germans as favourites ever, but there were serious doubts this time too. To a point, the actual strength of the team was a bit unknown, for West Germany had the easiest qualifying group and few paid close attention. The 1978 fiasco was well remembered, though – fueling doubts. It was not the exciting German team of the first half of the 1970s, decline was noticed since 1974, the great stars aged and retired, and there were no equal to them youngsters emerging. But Germans are never dismissed, for it is also well remembered that they always rise to the occasion. Well, except in 1978… well, they lost the European final in 1976 too… well, Beckenbauer warned about coming crisis right after the 1974 triumph. And the the team sunk at the 1978 World Cup… Schon was sacked. Or resigned. The press was very vocal about it – only to change its view after the fact.

The German Federation appointed Jupp Derwall and there were plenty of critics: he never coached seriously, he was too liberal with the players, he lacked the intellectual capacity of Schon, he was Schon’s assistant after all, so what kind of new thinking one cane expect? Now it was felt that Schon should have stayed for few more years. The national team was under close scrutiny – and merciless criticism. On the other hand Derwall was natural choice – thus, the right choice. So far, West Germany was coached by only two men: Sep Hepberger was replaced by his assistant Schon. Following the established tradition, it was natural he to be replaced by his own long-time assistant. Derwall knew the workings of the national team in and out, he had enormous experience. Smooth replacement worked wonderfully before – that was the way. Nothing dramatic happened with the change: Derwall continued using players Schon included in the national team. Changes were natural – retirements – and new players were gradually and carefully introduced. But the first steps were rocky – West Germany started badly in the qualification group, hitting rock bottom in Malta. As time moved on, the real problems became clearer: careful, step-by-step reshaping of the team was unsatisfactory – Derwall appeared gutless by depending on well known players, who did not make the great teams of Schon and failed miserably in Argentina. In the same time youngsters lacked more than experience: they were not as good as the previous generation. If Derwall risked entirely new team, criticism would have been murderous. No-win situation, in which the coach steered in strange, but admirable way – a mixture of continuing Schon’s legacy with slow introduction of young players. Non-confrontational way, it appeared to be: the reason of someone becoming a starter was the retirement of a great veteran. Nobody can really protest… circumstances. And it was circumstances helping Derwall at the end – injuries of key players, or at least players Derwall, fearing risk, considered essential. Yet, the team strong, there were plenty of candidates for a place in it, there were first-rate European stars of the time, there was new talent already impressing keen observers and specialists. West Germany was a favourite, many a specialist considered it playing the final, if not a winner. The German Federation lifted the stupid ban on foreign-based players, which handicapped the team at the 1978 World Cup. On the surface, it was laughable matter – back in 1978 it was only Stielike playing abroad. In 1980 there were 2 players – Stielike and Bonhof. The picture was revealing the real problem of West German football: there was no great play-maker. The absence of Stielike immediately reduced West Germany to toothless team. Bonhof was the other option, but he was not exactly a play-maker – he was similar to Neeskens: great player, but only when having someone greater than him. Not a leader in terms of conducting and shaping the game. Stielike was universal player – the dream of the original total football: a player equally at home at any position. It was Derwall who moved him back as a libero – it was a copy of the original: Schon moving Beckenbauer back in defense to give him bigger creative freedom. But it was not the same… for ahead of Beckenbauer were Overatt or Netzer. Now… Derwall lamented that he needs two Stielikes and there is only one. Bonhof was perhaps the closest approximation of much needed creative midfielder. So it looked like… Stielike was back and Bonhof was also at hand. Until he suffered injury and was out – it was so late in the season, the squad lists for the finals were already deposited and changes were impossible. West Germany arrived in Italy with 21 players. Two more injuries happened earlier – Norbert Nigbur and Klaus Fischer. Sep Mayer retired in 1979 and Nigbur was his replacement. Already 31 years old, he was in and out of the national team for years, playing very little, because. Nigbur was reserve in 1974. Fischer had similar fate – because of Gerd Muller in his case – but eventually became the regular center-forward of West Germany around 1978. These two were the very heart of the German problem: second-stringers during the days of the great generation. They replaced the stars not that much on merit, but because they retired. By now the former second-stringers were quite old… experience was on their side. They were also the current top players. But with them the team struggled – and now it was clear why they were not starters before, but Mayer, Muller, Beckenbauer, etc. Something was missing… a bit of leadership, a bit of skill, a bit of consistency, a bit of nerve… and as a result, the team was not winning, was not exciting, and looked without future. But it was also impossible to dismiss them, for they were the top current stars. Nigbur and Fischer were good example: they were key players of the team under normal circumstances – behind them were either known veterans, tried and dismissed for those two were slightly better, if nothing else. The other options were… dangerous. The three goalkeepers Derwall brought to Italy had a grand total of 3 matches for the national team, which belonged to Toni Schumacher. Only one of them was full match… No coach will deliberately play such players at finals. Derwall was not thinking either – it was just because Nigbur and Fischer were injured Schumacher and Hrubesch became starters. It was because Culmann was in shaky form and Bonhof out Bernd Schuster got a chance. It was not Derwall, but circumstances making the stars of 1980s – one can make support such a claim quite easily. That was why West Germany was not seen as a overwhelming favourite and considered weaker then Holland.

 

 

 

1

1GK

Harald Schumacher

(1954-03-06)6 March 1954 (aged 26)

 

Köln

2

2DF

Hans-Peter Briegel

(1955-10-11)11 October 1955 (aged 24)

 

Kaiserslautern

3

2DF

Bernhard Cullmann

(1949-11-01)1 November 1949 (aged 30)

 

Köln

4

2DF

Karlheinz Förster

(1958-07-25)25 July 1958 (aged 21)

 

Stuttgart

5

2DF

Bernard Dietz (c)

(1948-03-22)22 March 1948 (aged 32)

 

Duisburg

6

3MF

Bernd Schuster

(1959-12-22)22 December 1959 (aged 20)

 

Köln

7

2DF

Bernd Förster

(1956-05-03)3 May 1956 (aged 24)

 

Stuttgart

8

4FW

Karl-Heinz Rummenigge

(1955-09-25)25 September 1955 (aged 24)

 

Bayern Munich

9

4FW

Horst Hrubesch

(1951-04-17)17 April 1951 (aged 29)

 

Hamburg

10

3MF

Hansi Müller

(1957-07-27)27 July 1957 (aged 22)

 

Stuttgart

11

4FW

Klaus Allofs

(1956-12-05)5 December 1956 (aged 23)

 

Fortuna Düsseldorf

12

3MF

Caspar Memering

(1953-06-01)1 June 1953 (aged 27)

 

Hamburg

13

3MF

Rainer Bonhof

(1952-03-29)29 March 1952 (aged 28)

 

Valencia

14

3MF

Felix Magath

(1953-07-26)26 July 1953 (aged 26)

 

Hamburg

15

3MF

Uli Stielike

(1954-11-15)15 November 1954 (aged 25)

 

Real Madrid

16

2DF

Herbert Zimmermann

(1954-07-01)1 July 1954 (aged 25)

 

Köln

17

3MF

Karl Del’Haye

(1955-08-18)18 August 1955 (aged 24)

 

Borussia Mönchengladbach

18

3MF

Lothar Matthäus

(1961-03-21)21 March 1961 (aged 19)

 

Borussia Mönchengladbach

19

3MF

Miroslav Votava

(1956-04-24)24 April 1956 (aged 24)

 

Borussia Dortmund

20

2DF

Manfred Kaltz

(1953-01-06)6 January 1953 (aged 27)

 

Hamburg

21

1GK

Walter Junghans

(1958-10-26)26 October 1958 (aged 21)

 

Bayern Munich

22

1GK

Eike Immel

(1960-11-27)27 November 1960 (aged 19)

 

Borussia Dortmund

The squad made people skeptical and critical – this is one of youngest German selections, averaging a bit over 24 years. Two players were barely 19 years old. Most names were little known outside Germany. Some appeared even wild – Caspar Memmering for sure. Many had played only a handful matches for the national team. For those lamenting the lost purity of the German team nowadays: Miroslav (Mirko) Votava was born in Czechoslovakia and arrived in West Germany after some years in Australia – his parents left their native country in 1968, thanks to the Soviet-led invasion. At a glance, one may think Derwall was a radical, introducing entirely new team. But it was circumstance again – by now only two 1974 World Champions remained: Bonhof and Culmann. Nigbur was out because of injury. Eventually, Bonhof was also out. It was not Derwall’s wish… and he persevered and played Culmann. Retirement and injuries ‘revolutionized’ the squad. Before the finals it was very sucpicious squad… During the finals it was not a happy squad both on and off the field. It was not a squad without problem after the championship either. There was promise, but so far it was very difficult to see in these names the big stars of the 1980s. What was quite visible at first was dulness… Culmann again, the ever-present ultra-reliable dull player, usually a reserve, but year after year in the team. A prime example of the ugly change of free, creative total football into physical battle of the fittest, in which those who run the most win.

 

Group A was the easier, but more puzzling group. West Germany and Holland were the favourites, yet, the pros and cons were many. As arbitrary as it is, let’s start with Holland. Strong at the 1978 World Cup, but not good enough to win. Very experienced squad, but lacking the quality of Cruijff’s era. The key figures were dangerously aging and there were no replacements of similar class. The team’s play became more physical and lacking the flair of the original ‘flying Dutchmen’, but they were tough and concentrated when needed: they had problems in the qualification group, but when it mattered most delivered, beating DDR as visitors in the very last group match and thus winning the group. Ruud Krol, the team’s captain, was very critical of the team, saying to France Football that he does not see any chance for Holland. West Germany and Czechoslovakia he considered stronger and Holland lacked quality players. Many considered his opinion typically Dutch underapreciation of their own. Many considered Holland prime favourite. But still not overwhelming one: Jan Zwartkruis was good coach, but he was replaced for the World Cup finals and success came with temporary big name – Happel. The same tactic as in 1974, when Michels was brought for the finals. Curiously, the Dutch did not change the coach for 1976 European finals and repeated the same in 1980. In 1976 they failed… There was also the old problem with pigheaded players, who often refused to play for the national team – quarrels and refusals were old story, so Holland hardly ever had the best team at hand. This time the problem was relatively small, but still existed: Neeskens refused to come back from USA for the finals. Arie Haan, however, accepted to join the team in which he was not to be a key figure as he was in 1978. Zwartkruis included many little known players – as much as risky experiment as it was a testimony of the short pool of talent. But the squad had enough class, plenty of experience, and had strong collective approach which compensated for evident shortage of superstars in 1978. It was high time for Holland to win something – perhaps this was the time, considering that the group was weaker and West Germany had perhaps more problems than Holland. And Krol, somewhat contradicting himself, spoke that it is time for revenge.

Jan Zwartkruis was at the helm of the team since 1976 – he shaped the team as he wanted. As he wanted to a point: he never got what he really wanted. Players whims plus the strong pressure from the leading clubs, which always argued against the needs of the national team, reduced his options for preparing the squad. Friendlies were particularly lacking and when they were scheduled, then key players were not available. But he adjusted to the circumstances and managed to qualify the team to two consecutive finals. This time he was not to be replaced for the real thing – a comfortable situation.

 

1

GK

Piet Schrijvers

(1946-12-15)15 December 1946 (aged 33)

32

Ajax

2

DF

Ben Wijnstekers

(1955-08-31) (aged 24)

4

Feyenoord

3

DF

Michel van de Korput

(1956-09-18) (aged 23)

3

Feyenoord

4

DF

Hugo Hovenkamp

(1950-10-05)(aged 29)

18

AZ

5

DF

Ruud Krol (c)

(1949-03-24)(aged 31)

72

Vancouver Whitecaps

6

DF

Jan Poortvliet

(1955-09-21) (aged 24)

15

PSV

7

FW

René van de Kerkhof

(1951-09-16) (aged 28)

36

PSV

8

FW

Willy van de Kerkhof

(1951-09-16) (aged 28)

36

PSV

9

FW

Kees Kist

(1952-08-07)(aged 27)

16

AZ

10

MF

Arie Haan

(1948-11-16) (aged 31)

32

Anderlecht

11

MF

Heini Otto

(1954-08-24)(aged 25)

1

Twente Enschede

12

FW

Johnny Rep

(1951-11-25) (aged 28)

35

Saint-Étienne

13

MF

Dick Nanninga

(1949-01-17)aged 31)

11

Roda Kerkrade

14

MF

Adrie Koster

(1954-11-18) (aged 25)

3

PSV

15

DF

Huub Stevens

(1953-11-29) (aged 26)

10

PSV

16

GK

Pim Doesburg

(1943-10-28)(aged 36)

3

Sparta Rotterdam

17

FW

Martien Vreijsen

(1955-11-15) (aged 24)

0

NAC Breda

18

MF

Frans Thijssen

(1952-01-23) (aged 28)

7

Ipswich Town

19

MF

Romeo Zondervan

(1959-03-03)(aged 21)

0

Twente Enschede

20

GK

Hans van Breukelen

(1956-10-04) (aged 23)

0

Utrecht

21

DF

Ernie Brandts

(1956-02-03)aged 24)

17

PSV

22

DF

John Metgod

(1958-02-27) (aged 22)

7

AZ

 

Third row: Vreijsen, Thijssen, Schrijvers, Stevens, Hovenkamp,Wijnstekers.

Middle row: Zondervan, van de Korput, Rep, Doesburg, Krol, Poortvliet, assistant coach Baan, coach Zwartkruis.

Sitting: Willie van de Kerkhof, Haan, Rene van de Kerkhof, Van Breukelen, Nanninga, Kist, Koster, Brandts.

A curious selection: on one hand, this was aging team, based on the stars of 1974 – 6 of the great team were here. But Schrijvers and van de Kerkhof twins were reserves back then. The other three were aging and by 1980 only Ruud Krol was world class. Rep was fading away and Haan was somewhat underapreciated. Even Krol was perhaps doubted by now: at 31, he just moved to play abroad and it was not one the big Spanish, German, or English clubs, but the Canadian Vancouver Whitecaps. Going to NASL was a sign of nearing the end. Zwartkruis also used players from 1978 – Nanninga and Brandts were heroes back than ,but the first was accidental hero and not a real star. He was 31 years old – hardly in his prime. Brandts unfortunately went downhill since the World Cup and it was already clear that he was not to be a great star. Hovenkamp, who left the team just before the finals in 1978 was back – this time a regular. Haan was to be a sustitute too, a sign his days were over – at least in the national team. The goalkeeping problem was painfully familiar – no classy keeper. Schrijvers was number one, and Doesburg – his back up. At 36, Doesburg had played only 3 matches for Holland… The third goalie was unheard of and was to remain so, for he was just making the numbers: Hans van Breukelen. Given his illustrious career and success later in the 1980s, one can guess that the talent was there already – but apparently Zwartkruis did not have the guts for taking a risk with youngster playing for lowly Utrecht. So far, van Breukelen had 0 matches for Holland – as well as Zondervan and Vreijsen. Seven players had less than 10 matches for the national team, some of them starters. And that in the most experienced and old team at the finals! It was not entirely clear what Zwartkruis wanted – the team was clearly based on Krol, which was fine since he was perhaps the best in the world at the moment and capable of much more than defending. But Haan – always reliable, Thijssen – in great form and key player of Ipswich Town at its best, Kist – the top European goalscorer, and van de Kerkhof twins – still the top Dutch midfielders, were not regulars. It looked like Zwartkruis wanted a physical, collective-minded team, spurred and influenced by Krol, and depending heavily on Rep to finish the attacks. Did not look great, but there was not much to say against such approach either – it was more than possible to reach the final and then whatever happens. Contrary to the photo above, there were no players using individual kits this time. As ever before, there were players not included who knows why – Tahamata (Ajax), for instance.