Group C

Group C.

01.06.86 (16.00) Leon, Estadio Sergio Leon

 

FRA – CAN 1:0 (0:0)

 

(-36000) Silva CHI, Ulloa COS, Méndez GUA

 

FRA: Bats – Amoros, Battiston, Bossis, Tusseau – Fernandez, Tigana, Platini (c), Giresse – Papin, Rocheteau (69 Stopyra)

CAN: Dolan – Lenarduzzi, Samuel, Bridge, Wilson (c) – Ragan, James (82 Segota), Norman, Sweeney (54 Lowery) – Valentine, Vrablic

 

1:0 Papin 79 h

No reason even to watch the match, it was that clear – the European champions against team made of unknown players, who did not play for any clubs. The only question was how many goals the French will score – perhaps 10? It was very different on the pitch – the French perhaps thought to take a leisurely walk, the Canadians decided to try to play. And succeeded – at the end of the first half it looked like major sensation was brewing: Canada was the better team and had a good chance to win the game. Nothing much changed in the second half, but experience won the game – Canadian misjudgment helped France to score a goal. There were 10 minutes left and in them the jaded European champions managed to preserve the fragile lead. Henry Michel said that 2 points is 2 points, but the quality of football his team played was low. The Canadian coach was modest – Canadian football had some abilities to fight back against the strongest in the world.

02.06.86 (12.00) Irapuato, Estadio Revolución

 

ZSR – HUN 6:0 (3:0)

 

(-17000) Agnolin ITA, Courtney ENG,

 

ZSR: Dassajev – Larionov, Bessonov, Kuznetsov, Demianenko (c) – Yaremchuk,

Aleinikov, Yakovenko (72 Yevtushenko), Rats – Belanov (70 Rodionov), Zavarov

HUN: P.Disztl – Sallai, Garaba, Péter (63 Dajka), Kardos – Bognar, Nagy (c),

Détári, Roth (13 Burcsa) – Kiprich, Esterházy

 

1:0 Yakovienko 2, 2:0 Aleinikov 4, 3:0 Belanov 25 p, 4:0 Yaremchuk 65, 5:0

Yaremuchuk 73, 6:0 Rodionov 80 (77 Yevtushenko missed penalty)

 

booked: Larionov

This match was expected to go for USSR, but with some caution – the Soviets changed their coach not long before the finals and their was some skepticism about the replacement. There were missing players (Chivadze and Baltacha, both injured, and Cherenkov, left out), Lobanovsky was both ruthlessly pragmatic and leaning heavily towards his own club players. And many of them had no experience with such high level championship. The Soviets often looked formidable, but in reality were not much and their qualification campaign was far from great. Hungary may not have been great either, but not long ago they dismantled Brazil. Whatever the speculations, the game destroyed them all – from the first minute USSR went into dazzling attacks and scored 2 goals before the 5th minute. And never looked back, just adding goal after goal. Hungary was plain nothing, but a big part of excitement came from the fact that this was the first interesting to watch match – fans and observers were already grumbling and getting tired from dull and ugly football. The Soviet superiority was great and more importantly the team looked perfectly balanced and eager to play. Six goals were joyfully scored, a lot of other opportunities were missed, even a penalty was missed, and suddenly USSR grew to a new status: now it was not just the team to watch, but a candidate for the title. Perhaps too much praise… it was almost forgotten that USSR destroyed toothless squad. The Canadian coach Tony Waiters said after the game that Canada could beat Hungary – so bad they were. There was no denying USSR was bright and strong, but they played only one match so far. There was something overlooked in the big excitement: the Soviets had improvised defence which was not tested yet.

 

05.06.86 (12.00) Leon, Estadio Sergio Leon

 

FRA – ZSR 1:1 (0:0)

 

(+36000) Arppi FIlho BRA, Takada JAP, Sánchez ESP

 

FRA: Bats – Amoros, Battiston, Bossis, Ayache – Fernandez, Tigana,

Platini (c), Giresse (83 Vercruysse) – Papin (77 Bellone), Stopyra

ZSR: Dassajev – Larionov, Bessonov, Kuznetsov, Demianenko (c) – Yaremchuk,

Aleinikov, Yakovenko (70 Rodionov), Rats – Belanov, Zavarov (80 Blokhin)

 

0:1 Rats 54, 1:1 Fernandez 62

 

booked: Fernandez, Amoros / Rats, Belanov

This was the principle duel in the group and France was not Hungary. Very quickly the French managed to move the game into the midfield and although there were sparkling moments and both opponents tried to create something dangerous, the goalkeepers had almost nothing to do. In the second half the Soviets managed to score, but France equalized rather quickly. The problem in the center of the Soviet defence was noticed… and used by Giresse. It was also a matter of maturity – the Soviets missed opportunities, which were not to be missed. The French were sturdy and as a whole the match was equal. Which satisfied both coaches and if one wants to look for wrongness, perhaps Lobanovsky made crucial mistake here: he was satisfied by the performance of his team, but France was beatable – a missed opportunity perhaps very important for building true fighting spirit.

06.06.86 (12.00) Irapuato, Estadio Revolución

 

HUN – CAN 2:0 (1:0)

 

(-14000) Al-Sharif SYR, Bambridge AUS, Petrović JUG

 

HUN: Szendrei – Sallai, Garaba, Varga, Kardos – Bognár, Nagy (c – 63 Dajka),

Détári, Burcsa (29 Róth) – Kiprich, Esterházy

CAN: Lettieri – Lenarduzzi, Samuel, Bridge, Wilson (c – 41 Sweeney) – Ragan,

James (56 Segota), Norman, Valentine – Gray, Vrablic

 

1:0 Esterházy 2, 2:0 Détári 76

 

booked: Sweeney, Lenarduzzi

sent off: Sweeney (86)

Canadian hopes were not fulfilled – Hungary was pretty bad, but Canadian lack of experience was decisive. It was most evident after Hungary got s lead and Canada went into attacks, trying to equalize, but forgetting to take care of defence. Both Hungarian goals were scored after Canadian mistakes. And those mistakes suddenly brought Hungary back in the game, making the last two group games important – theoretically, Hungary had a chance even of winning the group.

 

09.06.86 (12.00) Leon, Estadio Sergio Leon

 

FRA – HUN 3:0 (1:0)

 

(+31000) Valente POR, Daina SUI, Ponnet BEL

 

FRA: Bats – Amoros, Battiston, Bossis, Ayache – Fernandez, Tigana,

Platini (c), Giresse – Papin (62 Rocheteau), Stopyra (71 Ferreri)

HUN: P.Disztl – Sallai, Garaba (c), Varga, Kardos – Róth, Détári, Hannich

(46 Nagy), Dajka – Kovacs (66 Bognár), Esterházy

 

1:0 Stopyra 30 h, 2:0 Tigana 64, 3:0 Rocheteau 85

 

booked: Ayache, Rocheteau

Say what you like, but Hungary had no chance – yes, France did not look good, and yes, Hungary was better on the pitch for almost one hour, but it was chaotic play. Desire was not enough – France chose sound defensive approach, but with an eye on counterattacks, which were more dangerous than the Hungarian efforts. The French used their opportunities well and won 3-0.

09.06.86 (12.00) Irapuato, Estadio Revolución

 

ZSR – CAN 2:0 (0:0)

 

(+14000) Traoré MLI, González PAR, Al-Shanar ARS

 

ZSR: Chanov – Morozov, Bubnov, Kuznetsov, Bal – Aleinikov, Litovchenko,

Rodionov, Yevtushenko – Protasov (57 Belanov), Blokhin (c – 61 Zavarov)

CAN: Lettieri – Lenarduzzi, Samuel, Bridge, Wilson (c) – Ragan, James

(65 Segota), Norman, Valentine – Gray (69 Pakos), Mitchell

 

1:0 Blokhin 59, 2:0 Zavarov 75

Later, after the end the World Cup, this match was singled out by Soviet specialists as the key reason for the team’s failure in the long run. Lobanosky, certain that his team already qualified to the next stage, chose to field reserves. Later this was seen negatively: the team’s rhythm was broken. The reserve players had difficulties against Canada, that’s true, but as a whole motivation was low – Canada was too weak and the Soviets were already going to the next stage, so even the regulars most likely were not going to play in full force. If Canada permitted them to play in full force, for Canada once again was determined to give its best. Thus, they played pretty much equal to the Soviets and the match was not going well for Lobanovsky. Especially when the Canadians had scoring opportunities. USSR won, but not before Lobanovsky put on the pitch two regulars in the second half – Zavarov and Belanov. Was the coach wrong to field reserve team? Well, he complaiend after the match with France that his players were tired – Mexican summer was not easy for most teams, Dynamo Kiev players had long and busy season… but still why the Soviets were tired after playing one match? For Lobanovsky was speaking of tired team after the match with Hungary. In any case, giving a break to the regulars made sense: USSR did not need points, the opponent was not real trouble, but waiving tiredness aside, a match is always risky – one may get injured, especially against a team with British attitudes. Keep the best fresh and healthy for the next important game, it was sound idea. It was not a wrong decision. The wrong decision was perhaps made earlier: when Lobanovsky excused his team for not prvailing over France with the argument that the boys were tired. No big deal, then… we tied France tired. France! Tired! It was better to think why France had good scoring opportunities when looking quite out of form. The moment for building character was most likely lost in that match, not against Canada.

 

1. ZSR^ 3 2 1 0 5 9-1

2. FRA^ 3 2 1 0 5 5-1

3. HUN 3 1 0 2 2 2-9

4. CAN 3 0 0 3 0 0-5

Canada, as expected, was out, but left good impression. It was a team going home without shame – true, their aim was minimal and not accomplished (scoring a goal at the finals), but the boys did well. They played almost as equals to any opponent. Lack of experience was well known, so no drama in losing bravely. Lovely underdogs they were, especially when compared to mighty teams playing dull and out of shape football. The real trouble of Canada was not their performance at the World Cup, but the future – there was little hope for developing new players in a country where football was still an exotic sport. There was little hope even to keep this squad, for the players had to play regularly and many had no clubs. Playing indoor soccer was not the same. A national team program was limited in time. Some players were already getting old. Canada was nice at the finals, but also looked like one-time affair. Well, enjoy the moment.

Group B

Group B.

03.06.86 (12.00) Mexico City, Estadio Azteca

 

MEX – BEL 2:1 (2:1)

 

(~110000) Esposito ARG, Valente POR, Méndez GUA

 

MEX: Larios – Trejo, Felix Cruz, Quirarte, Servin – Aguirre, Negrete, Muñoz, Boy (c – 69 Espana) – Flores (79 J.Cruz), Sánchez

BEL: Pfaff – Gerets, Broos, F.van der Elst, de Wolf – Vercauteren,Van der Eycken, Scifo, Ceulemans (c) – van den Bergh (66 Demol), Desmet (60 Claesen)

 

1:0 Quirarte 23 h, 2:0 Sánchez 39 h, 2:1 van den Bergh 45 h

 

booked: Sánchez, Muñoz / F.van der Elst

Home team at last came to the pitch, heavily supported by excited crowd. This is the principle game of the group and also the first group match. May be the Mexicans crumbled under pressure, as often happens to host teams, may be caution was the order of the day, but it was equal match, generally fought in midfield. Experienced and well balanced Belgium pretty much canceled the Mexican creative efforts, but was also unable to do more. The goals did not arrive from some great attacks, but from set-pieces and mistakes. At the end of the first half Mexico was leading 2-0 after free kick and corner kick, both times set by Boy. Meantime Larios hardly had anything to do, but the match was far from over. And right after the start of the second half Belgium scored one goal back – Gerets set the ball deep in the Mexican half after an out, Larios made big mistake and van den Bergh scored. And there was still the whole second half to be played… but nothing more happened in it, it was pretty much like the first half, both teams careful not to give chances to the opponent and never shy from kicking each other. Mexico won 2-1, which was a relief, but Mexican fans and journalists were not happy. Milutinovic emphasized the victory in realistic way – never mind it was not pretty, the team showed character and got 2 points; Thys shrugged it off – he was unhappy with the result, of course, especially after his team, in his view, dominated the last 30 minutes, but it was not the end of the world, it was the first match, there was still a lot ahead, etc, etc.

04.06.86 (12.00) Toluca, Estadio Bombonera

 

PAR – IRK 1:0 (1:0)

 

(~24000) Picon-Ackong MRS, Socha USA, Ulloa COS

 

PAR: Fernandez – Torales, Zabala, Schettina, Delgado (c) – Nunez, Ferreira, Romero, Cabañas – Canete, Mendoza (88 Guasch)

IRK: Salman (c) – Allawe, Mahmoud, Salim, Al-Roubai – Abidoun, Amaiesh, Hanna, Mohammed (82 Bassim) – Hassan (68 Aufi), Shihab

 

1:0 Romero 36

 

booked: Schettina / Mahmoud

Paraguay – Iraq attracted small audience and it was not surprising: Paraguay was not much, Iraq was nothing, easy victory for the South Americans, but nothing to watch. The lack of expectations served the Iraqis better – they played somewhat better than Paraguay and had a goal disallowed. It was curious decision, very likely a result of referee’s ignorance of the rules – in the last seconds of the first half Iraq had a corner kick, which went directly in the Paraguayan net, deliberate or lucky direct score from the corner, the ball untouched by any player. Uncertain what to do, the referee claimed that he blew the whistle for the end of the half when the ball was still in the air. That was the crucial moment – Romero scored for Paraguay 10 minutes earlier and an equalizer would have been great boost for Iraq, already certain that the devil is not so black. Iraq was better in the second half, but Paraguay had experience on its side and generally was busy killing Iraqi attacks at early stage.

07.06.86 (12.00) Mexico City, Estadio Azteca

 

MEX – PAR 1:1 (1:1)

 

(+114000) Courtney ENG, Igna ROM, Fredriksson SWE

 

MEX: Larios – Trejo, F.Cruz, Quirarte, Servin – Aguirre, Negrete, Mu&nitlde;oz, Boy (c – 89 Espana) – Flores (76 J.Cruz), Sánchez

PAR: Fernandez – Torales (81 Hicks), Zabala, Schettina, Delgado (c) – Nunez, Ferreira, Romero, Cabañas – Canete, Mendoza (63 Guasch)

 

1:0 Flóres 3, 1:1 Romero 86 h (88 Fernandez saved a penalty by Sánchez)

 

booked: Trejo, Negrete, Sánchez / Schettina, Mendoza

Mexico – Paraguay was an ugly clash. Points were at stake – whoever won would have its worries over before the third round. So, nobody won… instead the opponents kicked and slashed each other from start to finish. Mexico had wonderful start, scoring in the 3rd minute and very likely this goal triggered the following ugliness: Mexico eager to preserve its fragile lead, Paraguay enraged by the goal. The Englsih referee, used to tough, but fair British football, lost control of the game. Perhaps he was thinkimg that the players will calm down and concentrate on football, if he does not interfere much, but hose were Latin-American players: seeing murder goes unpunished, they only became more vicious. It was counted the game was stopped about 80 times for various infractions. At the end 5 players were booked, but none expelled. Paraguay, much more experienced in ugliness than Mexico, got what it wanted: the Mexicans lost themselves in brutality, but for the Paraguayans it was business as usual, so they kept cold heads and never forgot that they had to score equalizer at least. Eventually, they managed to score it in the 86th minute. But nothing was over yet – two minutes later Mexico got a penalty kick. Now it was over… Hugo Sanchez stepped in and Fernandez saved. The game ended 1-1. Later the Paraguayan keeper candidly revealed his secret: he watched TV and on TV there was constant commercials showing Sanchez scoring a penalty. Intrigued, Fernandez ask for videotapes of Sanchez’ penalties and learned that the striker always shoots the same, and was prepared. In his view, it was a big mistake using Sanchez as a prime penalty kicker: commerce made him an easy prey for any alert keeper. Bora Milutinovic took the blame on himself, which was mostly diplomacy, for Mexico still stayed strong and had an easy match ahead.

08.06.86 (12.00) Toluca, Estadio Bombonera

 

BEL – IRK 2:1 (2:0)

 

(~20000) Diaz COL, Sánchez ESP, Christov CZE

 

BEL: Pfaff – Gerets, Demol (69 Grun), F.van Der Elst, de Wolf – Vercauteren, Vandereycken, Scifo (67 Clijsters) – Ceulemans (c), Desmet, Claesen

IRK: Salman (c) – Allawe, Mahmoud, Salim, Al-Roubai – Abidoun, Amaiesh, Minshid (82 Aufi), Hanna – Hassan, Shihab

 

1:0 Scifo 16, 2:0 Claesen 22 p, 2:1 Ammaiesh 67

 

booked: Salman, Salim, AL-Roubai, Abidoun, Haman, Mahmoud (after match)

sent off: Hanna (51)

Ugliness spread around like a viral infection – as if not to be left behind, Iraq and Belgium staged their own slaughterhouse. Belgium got early lead and at last looked like that the anonymous outsiders will get their thrashing, but it was not to be. Economical Belgium very likely was prepared just to keep the comfortable advantage to the end of the game, but Iraq decided to fight back. And in very curious manner at that: instead of attacking and trying to score, they furiously started kicking the Belgians. There was a shower of yellow cards and even red one, although it was shown not to the actual culprit. And curiously again, after Iraq was left with 10 men, they suddenly remembered that the ball, not Belgian legs, is for kicking around and started playing football. And were rewarded for that with a goal, not a bad one too. But they still lost 1-2. Thys shrugged it off again: yes, his team did not play at its full force. There was no need for that, the boys had to keep their strength for the next games. Fans, though, never appreciate coach’s wisdom – they want excitement, not economy. They want a show – and there was none. There was plenty of hacking and very little football.

11.06.86 Toluca, Estadio Bombonera

 

BEL – PAR 2:2 (1:0)

 

(~16000) Dochev BUL, Silva CHI, Ben Naceur TUN

 

BEL: Pfaff – Broos, Demol, Grun (89 L.van der Elst), Renquin – Vercauteren, Vervoort, Scifo, Ceulemans (c) – Veyt, Claesen

PAR: Fernandez – Torales, Zabala, Delgado (c), Nunez – Ferreira, Romero, Cabañas, Canete – Mendoza (68 Hicks), Guasch

 

1:0 Vercauteren 32, 1:1 Cabañas 50, 2:1 Veyt 60, 2:2 Cabañas 76

 

booked: Ceulemans / Romero (82 the Paraguaian coach expulsed from the bench)

A note on the general rules of this finals is needed to explain this match. Because of the shameful ‘fixing’ of West German and Austria in 1982, it was decided that the last games in every group will be played at the same time in 1986. But another thing was not taken into account… 4 of the 6 3rd-placed teams were going ahead, depending on points. And groups had different dates, so calculations were still important – some things were already known, so scheme the best for yourself. Presently, both Paraguay and Belgium were practically sure of their going to the next round and the match itself was rather meaningless, so expected to be boring affair, aimed at a tie. Paraguay had 3 points, Belgium – 2, but two groups were already finished and Bulgaria and Hungary had worse records than either Paraguay and Belgium. Take it easy, save strength for later, walk around 90 minutes for 0-0… except the 3rd-placed here was going to meet USSR in the next stage, which so far was the most feared team… there was some intrigue after all, but not all that great. In the first half Belgium managed to score, which seemingly enraged the Paraguayans. However, the rage was expressed only after the break, in the second half – Paraguay suddenly increased the tempo and went into attack. They equalized, but continued to attack and were caught by counterattack. Belgium was leading again… and Paraguay continued its drive ahead, but the mood was different: kicking started. To the end of the match it was battling and hacking, with curious involvement of the Paraguayan coach – he went to the pitch to tell the referee what to do and how to do it. The coach was send off. Paraguay eventually equalized, but the bitterness remained to the final whistle – and nobody could tell why the game became suddenly ugly and why so many arguments: at the end, it was exactly the ending both teams were seeking.

11.06.86 (12.00) Mexico City, Estadio Azteca

 

MEX – IRk 1:0 (0:0)

 

(+103000) Petrović JUG, Agnolin ITA, Nemeth HUN

 

MEX: Larios – Amador (63 Dominguez), F.Cruz, Quirarte, Servin – Aguirre, Negrete, Boy, Espana – Flóres, de los Cobos (79 J.Cruz)

IRK: Jassim – Allawe (c), Majeed, Salim, Al-Roubai – Abidoun (61 Aufi), Amaiesh, Tweresh (69 Hamza), Basim – Minahid, Shihab

 

1:0 Quirarte 54

 

booked: Allawe, Minahid

This match was a matter of prestige: Mexico had to win only to satisfy their fans, Iraq – to end its firs World Cup with dignified performance, for only a miracle could make them winners here. Even the absence of suspended Hugo Sanchez was not closing the gap between the opponents: Mexico was superior by far and sure winner. One expects some free and nice football from games like this one, but… it was entirely mediocre match, leaving no memories at all. Mexico was looking heavy and uninspired. Worse, against clearly inferior Iraq, the Mexicans chose individual actions, leading nowhere. Iraq was not motivated either. Eventually, Mexico managed to score a goal and that was the end of everything – to the great displeasure of their own fans, the Mexican players just started killing time with long simulations after every minimal contact with Iraqi player. The torture lasted about 35 minutes until the referee counted the last second and ended it. Milutinovic was not happy either, only tried to stay ‘positive’ – after the match, he said that his team won the group and has 4 days before the next match to think something better, especially in the attacking aspects.

1. MEX^ 3 2 1 0 5 4-2

2. PAR^ 3 1 2 0 4 4-3

3. BEL^ 3 1 1 1 3 5-5

4. IRK 3 0 0 3 0 1-4

Iraq arrived as an anonymous squad and left Mexico anonymous again. No player made impression, the team left no memory of itself. What was recognized was minimal: they were not exactly a punching bag, but how good was suspect: the group was weak, Iraq did not face formidable opponents. Against somewhat uninspired teams, Iraq proved only one thing – when it came to nasty attitudes, to hacking and kicking around, they were pretty equal to the masters. No points came out of that, though.

Group A

Group A

31.05.86 (12.00) Mexico City, Estadio Azteca

 

(-100000) Fredriksson SWE, Codesal MEX, Roth GER

 

ITA: Galli – Bergomi, Vierchowod, Scirea (c), Cabrini – de Napoli, Bagni, di Gennaro, Conti (66 Vialli) – Galderisi, Altobelli

BUL: Mikhailov – Zdravkov, Dimitrov (c), Arabov, A.Markov – Sadkov, Sirakov, Getov, Gospodinov (74 Zheliazkov) – Iskrenov (66 Kostadinov),

Mladenov

 

1:0 Altobelli 44, 1:1 Sirakov 85 h

 

booked: Bergomi, Cabrini / A.Markov

 

The opening match, traditionally playing the reigning world champion and right after the grand opening ceremony. And, traditionally by now, an anticlimax to the ever more elaborated and dazzling openings. A bit alarming – Italy was rather worrisome and Bulgaria displayed problems, which could only build up. Some dismissed the poor performance on the pressure, on nerves. Many saw the Italian display as a sign that Italy was going to play big role in the finals: they started poorly in Spain, only to win the championship, as opposed to great start and then going down in Argentina. Italy, however, started poorly and finished poorly in 1974… As for Bulgaria, nothing to say either way: they got a point from the world champions, which was an achievement in itself. May be some of the problems – cautious approach with prevailing defensive concept and lack of creative ideas – would be solved somewhat.

 

02.06.86 (12.00) Mexico City, Estadio Olimpico ’68

 

ARG – KOR 3:1 (2:0)

 

(~60000) Sánchez ESP, González PAR, Diaz COL

 

ARG: Pumpido – Clausen, Brown, Ruggeri, Garre – Giusti, Batista (75 Olarticoechea), Burruchaga, Pasculli (74 Tápia) – Maradona (c), Valdano

KOR: Oh Yung-kyo – Park Kyung-hoon, Chung Yong-hwan, Cho Min-kook, Kim Yong-se

(46 Byun Byung-ok) – Huh Jung-moo, Kim Pyung-suk (23 Cho Kwang-rae), Park Chang-sun (c), Kim Joo-sung – Choi Soon-hoo, Cha Bum-keun

 

1:0 Valdano 8, 2:0 Ruggeri 19 h, 3:0 Valdano 47, 3:1 Park Chang-sun 72

 

booked: Huh Jung-moo, Park Chang-sun

Argentina was expected to win and it did, but it was not convincing performance. South Korea proved to be tough cookie, somewhat of the German mold: physically fit, running constantly, battling for the ball, hacking left and right. Having the ball, the Koreans did not know what to do with it, but they made plenty of difficulties for the opposing team. The opening match was rough, but perhaps this one set the tone for the championship: nobody realized it yet, but brutal and ugly was going to be this championship. For the moment, though, it was kind of routine: Argentina got its points, the South Koreans scored a goal, which was seemingly their highest aim, quickly satisfied. 05.06.86 (12.00)

Puebla, Estadio Cuauhtemoc

ARG – ITA 1:1 (1:1)

 

(~32000) Keizer HOL, Snoddy NIR, Márquez MEX

 

ARG: Pumpido – Cuciuffo, Brown, Ruggeri, Garré – Giusti, Batista (50 Olarticoechea), Burruchaga, Borghi (75 Enrique) – Maradona (c), Valdano

ITA: Galli – Bergomi, Vierchowod, Scirea (c), Cabrini – de Napoli (65G.Baresi), Bagni, di Gennaro, Conti (87 Vialli) – Galderisi, Altobelli

 

0:1 Altobelli 7 p, 1:1 Maradona 34

 

booked: Giusti, Garré / Bergomi

 

The key match in the group, naturally expected with hopes, but in the same time the drop of attendees was big – true, Puebla was smaller venue, but after 60 000 attended Argentina – South Korea, 30 000 going to see Italy – Argentina was somewhat like a judgment of so-so games played so far. Fans were right… the match was rather poor, but peppered with nasty tackles and the referee’s whistle constantly stopped the game. Italy got a very suspect penalty early in the game, which Altobelli scored, but Maradona equalized soon enough – it was beautiful goal, but also pretty much the only moment having anything to do with football. In the second half there was no football at all, just hacking and butchering, but that were the 80s… instead of 4-5 red cards, three players reluctantly got yellow cards. After the game both Bearzot and Bilardo were pragmatic: each team got a point, it was nervous day with so much at stake, so there was no show.

05.06.86 (16.00) Mexico City, Estadio Olimpico ’68

BUL – KOR 1:1 (1:0)(~45000) Al-Shanar ARS, Butenko ZSR, Igna ROM

BUL: Mikhailov – Zdravkov, Dimitrov (c), Arabov, Petrov – Sadkov, Sirakov, Getov (87 Zheliazkov), Gospodinov – Iskrenov (46 Kostadinov), Mladenov

KOR: Oh Yung-kyo, Park Kyung-hoon, Chung Yong-hwan, Cho Young-jeung, Huh Jung-moo – Cho Kwang-rae (71 Cho Min-kook), Park Chang-sun (c), Noh Soo-jin (46 Kim Jong-boo), Byun Byung-joo – Kim Joo-sung, Cha Bum-keun

 

1:0 Getov 12, 1:1 Kim Jong-boo 70

 

booked: Gospodinov / Cho Young-jeung, Kim Joo-sung

Bulgaria slightly changed its starters, a clear sign that the original concept, whatever it was, did not work. The changes were, as it turned out, cosmetic – there was no concept, so the only solution seemed to be just rotate players with the hope that some combination miraculously might work. But fear was stronger… and changes were not radical enough and some dead weight was stubbornly preserved. This was the match Bulgaria was going to win ‘for sure’… but weather played a cruel joke: heavy rain was pouring down, the pitch became a muddy pond. At first, Bulgaria was better – her players were superior , if playing without any idea. Getov scored early goal and the work was over… But with time and worsening conditions, the South Koreans proved that they were not some yokels: they red the playing conditions better than the Bulgarians – skill was not a decisive factor in the water. The Koreans continued to battle and when getting the ball shoot it from far away towards the Bulgarian net. Simple concept, but methodically following it, the Koreans equalized. And the clueless Bulgarian team could do nothing… 1-1. After the game Ivan Voutzov pontificated ‘Once again I was convinced that there are no weak teams at World Cup finals’. Such old wisdom should have been used before the game… or at least for the next game. Otherwise is just a joke. South Korea got its first point at World Cup finals, that is, they already achieved more than they aimed for.

10.06.86 (12.00) Mexico City, Estadio Olimpico ’68

 

ARG – BUL 2:0 (1:0)

 

(~65000) Ulloa COS, Martinez URU, Arppi Filho BRA

 

ARG: Pumpido – Cuciuffo, Brown, Ruggeri, Garré – Giusti, Batista (46 Olarticoechea), Burruchaga, Borghi (46 Enrique) – Maradona, Valdano

BUL: Mikhailov – A.Markov, Dimitrov (c), Petrov, Sadkov – Sirakov (72 Zdravkov), Getov, Zheliazkov, Yordanov – P.Markov, Mladenov (53 Velitchkov)

 

1:0 Valdano 4 h, 2:0 Burruchaga 77 h

 

booked: Cuciuffo

 

One may expect some change of strategy or at least some motivational pep-talk after the South Korean fiasco, but Voutzov made only new changes in its starting eleven. Changes looking panicky and desperate by now. It was also clear now, that Voutzov’s selection was hardly well thought, but the whole idea was to make the numbers: a number of suspect players clearly were not going to be used, but when taken out, there was little left to rotate and change – so, some players were moved from one position to another, even to positions they never played before. Weirdly, against Argentina Voutzov chose skillful, but not physically strong players in the offensive lines. There were no real wingers but no tough center-forward either. How such midfield and attack could intimidate tough and nasty Argentinian defence was a mystery. Given the clear defensive approach of Bilardo, it was clear that the most dangerous thing would be counterattacks – Voutzov’s idea to prevent fast deadly counterattacks was to move old, slow, and out of breath Zhelyazkov to the defensive line… Bilardo changed nothing. The match was chaotic and aimless battle, which served Argentina well – a tie was quite fine. But the Argentines were more alert than the Bulgarians and did not miss opportunities. The left full-back Aleksandr Markov made stupid mistake, lost the ball, and out of nothing Argentina scored a goal. Bulgaria had no answer to that – whatever passed for ‘attacks’ was killed far away from the penalty area, Pumpido had nothing to do. Mikhaylov had nothing to do too, but Argentina was leading. And even managed to score a second goal, thanks to Zhelyazkov, who was not only slow to react, but decided to give up chasing Maradona. After the finals Mikhaylov singled out this goal, scored by Burruchaga, as his only mistake at the finals. But the goalkeeper was too tough on himself: he was uncertain and misjudged the situation, but it was defensive mistake at the first place and the goalie was put in very difficult situation. Mistake or not, Argentina was winning anyway. Not playing much either, only lucky to benefit from Bulgarian sloppiness. Voutzov was entirely out of touch with reality after the game: he blamed the make of the group for the failure – it was too tough, unfairly tough group. Bilardo was satisfied, but unlike Voutzov, he made his conclusions and looked for remedies. Borghi and Garre were replaced. It was sound change: Borghi hardly contributed, perhaps because of redundancy: he was a Maradona-type of player, thus, useless in the presence of the real thing. Argentina moved ahead, but, curiously, Bulgaria had a chance to go ahead too.

10.06.86 (12.00) Puebla, Estadio Cuauhtemoc

 

ITA – KOR 3:2 (1:0)

 

(~20000) Socha USA, Urres MEX, Al-Sharif SYR

 

ITA: Galli – Collovati, Vierchowod, Scirea (c), Cabrini – de Napoli, Bagni (67 G.Baresi), di Gennaro, Conti – Galderisi (88 Vialli), Altobelli

KOR: Oh Yung-kyo – Park Kyung-hoon, Chung Yong-hwan, Cho Young-jeung, Huh Jung-moo – Cho Kwang-rae, Choi Soon-ho, Park Chang-sun (c), Byun Byung-joo (71 Kim Jong-hoo) – Kim Joo-sung (46 Chung Jong-soo), Cha Bum-keun

 

1:0 Altobelli 18, 1:1 Choi Song-hoo 62, 2:1 Altobelli 73, 3:1 Choi Kwang-rae

82 o, 3:2 Huh Jung-moo 89 (26 Altobelli missed penalty)

Another match leaving no memories. The last group matches were played at the same time, in order of avoiding schemes, but that had little to do with actual improvement of football. Bearzot studied well the opposition and knew perfectly what his squad was capable of doing. And what he needs. Italy needed 2 points to kill any weird option, coming out of Argentina – Bulgaria, and South Korea was beatable. Without extra effort, just play enough to get the points. It worked at the beginning of the match – Altobelli scored early. Then Italy got a penalty and Altobelli missed, but no worry – the game was over. Game is over as soon as the result is 1-0 Italy… Perhaps South Korea was still too ignorant of big teams habits, for the Asians did not give up, but continued to run methodically and even tried to attack. To their big displeasure, the Italians had to run and fight for the ball – it was not going to be economic game of mild possession and walking in the center of the pitch. In the second half South Korea equalized. It was too late for Italy to change its approach, but they stepped up a bit and class helped – South Korea was still naive and chased a possible victory. Which was exactly what Italians liked best: now they had opportunity for counterattacks and used them well. Altobelly scored his second goal, then own goal made it 3-1 in the 82nd minute. South Korea continued to attack and managed to score a second goal, but there was no time for something more.

 

1. ARG^ 3 2 1 0 5 6-2

2. ITA^ 3 1 2 0 4 5-4

3. BUL^ 3 0 2 1 2 2-4

4. KOR 3 0 1 2 1 4-7

South Korea was out, but did well at the 1986 finals. By their own standards, it was satisfying participation: played almost like equals against 2 world champions, scored goals, got a point. All this was good stepping stone for development, going up. Internationally, it was recognized that South Korea is no joke – not much, but tough enough team, which would be dangerous to ignore. The Koreans were physically fit and had the right fighting spirit. Compact team, still beatable, but not without effort. It was shaping in German mode, which was not pleasant, but at that time advanced football was like that, so nothing to blame the Koreans for following the leading approach. It was serious, disciplined approach to the game and greatly beneficial for technically inferior players. In terms of Asian football, South Korea was already a few steps ahead of everybody else and they were closing the gap with European football.

As a whole, Group A was disappointment. Not a single bright and entertaining match. Italy and Argentina were not only no fun, but the way they played it was doubtful either team could go far. South Korea was no fun either – the only excuse for them was that were developing and not very weak, but they were out, and that was a relief in some way. As for Bulgaria… that was the team leaving no memories at all. Just blank… The group ended according to prediction: Italy and Argentina were expected to be on top and they were, no surprises.

Group F

Group F. England, Portugal, Poland, Morocco, playing mostly in Monterrey and one match in Guadalajara. A tough group too, but with one undisputed leader.

England.

Third row from left: Francis, Stevens, Dixon, Hoddle, Martin, Waddle, Watson, Fenwick, Lineker.

Middle row: Edwards – doctor, Strigg (?) – masseur, Anderson, Hateley, Shilton, Bailey, Woodcock, Barnes, Howe – assistant coach, Madura (?) – masseur.

Sitting: Sansom, Wilkins, Bryan Robson, Bobby Robson – coach, Wright (?), Steven, Brayswell (?)

Head coach: Bobby Robson

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Peter Shilton

18 September 1949 (aged 36)

81

Southampton

2

DF

Gary M. Stevens

27 March 1963 (aged 23)

9

Everton

3

DF

Kenny Sansom

26 September 1958 (aged 27)

65

Arsenal

4

MF

Glenn Hoddle

27 October 1957 (aged 28)

33

Tottenham Hotspur

5

DF

Alvin Martin

29 July 1958 (aged 27)

15

West Ham United

6

DF

Terry Butcher

28 December 1958 (aged 27)

40

Ipswich Town

7

MF

Bryan Robson (Captain)

11 January 1957 (aged 29)

51

Manchester United

8

MF

Ray Wilkins

14 September 1956 (aged 29)

80

Milan

9

FW

Mark Hateley

7 November 1961 (aged 24)

18

Milan

10

FW

Gary Lineker

30 November 1960 (aged 25)

13

Everton

11

MF

Chris Waddle

14 December 1960 (aged 25)

16

Tottenham Hotspur

12

DF

Viv Anderson

29 July 1956 (aged 29)

21

Arsenal

13

GK

Chris Woods

14 November 1959 (aged 26)

4

Norwich City

14

DF

Terry Fenwick

17 November 1959 (aged 26)

15

Queens Park Rangers

15

DF

Gary A. Stevens

30 March 1962 (aged 24)

5

Tottenham Hotspur

16

MF

Peter Reid

20 June 1956 (aged 29)

6

Everton

17

MF

Trevor Steven

21 September 1963 (aged 22)

10

Everton

18

MF

Steve Hodge

25 October 1962 (aged 23)

3

Aston Villa

19

FW

John Barnes

7 November 1963 (aged 22)

27

Watford

20

FW

Peter Beardsley

18 January 1961 (aged 25)

5

Newcastle United

21

FW

Kerry Dixon

24 July 1961 (aged 24)

6

Chelsea

22

GK

Gary Bailey

9 August 1958 (aged 27)

2

Manchester United

 

It should be said right away, that the photo is not the World Cup squad and not even from 1986. Strangely enough, the English magazines did not really decide on publishing actual photo of the squad and they were not alone: the record the national team cut also shows the wrong squad, the same photo. Why was that is anybody’s guess: England was always a favourite, but there was special hope this time. Seemingly, Bobby Robson’s England was bound to return to glory. There was departure of the old English ways, now it was more up to date and more European-playing team. The biggest change was in the relation between midfield and strikers: at last England had creative players – Robson, Hoddle, and Waddle – able to orchestrate the attacks, and in front was wonderful Lineker, not at all the typical burly English center-forward stationed in front of the gate and waiting for sweeping balls from the wings. It was no more kick and run, or so it looked like. England was expected to go far. The only problem was health – all midfielders were prone to injuries. Without one or two of them it was possible the team returning to old kick and run way, habits don’s die in a day. Predictable English game would make the central defenders a liability for certain – Butcher and Fenwick were strong no nonsense fighters, but a bit dull and slow-turning – quick, imaginative strikers could beat them, especially if England lost the midfield. But, as a whole, England was the group favourite and expected to finish on top.

Portugal

Top row from left: ?, Andre, ?, ?, Fernando Mendes, Morato, Mario Jorge, Jaime, Nunes, Jose Antonio, Alvaro, Samuel, ?.

Middle row: ?, ?, ?, ?, Damas, Bento, Vital, Jorge Martins, ?, Rui Aguas, ?, Jose Torres – coach.

Sitting: Frederico, Oliveira, Venancio, Inacio, Jaime Pacheco, Sousa, Gomes, Diamantino, Joao Pinto, Futre, Veloso.

Head coach: José Torres

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Manuel Bento (Captain)

25 June 1948 (aged 37)

62

Benfica

2

DF

João Pinto

21 November 1961 (aged 24)

22

Porto

3

MF

António Sousa

28 April 1957 (aged 29)

17

Sporting CP

4

MF

José Ribeiro

2 November 1957 (aged 28)

2

Boavista

5

DF

Álvaro

3 January 1961 (aged 25)

11

Benfica

6

MF

Carlos Manuel

15 January 1958 (aged 28)

39

Benfica

7

MF

Jaime Pacheco

22 July 1958 (aged 27)

21

Sporting CP

8

DF

Frederico

6 April 1957 (aged 29)

5

Boavista

9

FW

Fernando Gomes

22 November 1956 (aged 29)

42

Porto

10

FW

Paulo Futre

28 February 1966 (aged 20)

10

Porto

11

DF

Fernando Bandeirinha

26 November 1962 (aged 23)

0

Académica de Coimbra

12

GK

Jorge Martins

22 August 1954 (aged 31)

0

Belenenses

13

DF

António Morato

6 November 1964 (aged 21)

4

Sporting CP

14

MF

Jaime Magalhães

10 July 1962 (aged 23)

7

Porto

15

DF

António Oliveira

8 June 1958 (aged 27)

1

Benfica

16

DF

José António

29 October 1957 (aged 28)

2

Belenenses

17

MF

Diamantino

3 August 1959 (aged 26)

19

Benfica

18

DF

Luís Sobrinho

5 May 1961 (aged 25)

0

Belenenses

19

FW

Rui Águas

28 April 1960 (aged 26)

3

Benfica

20

DF

Augusto Inácio

1 February 1955 (aged 31)

22

Porto

21

MF

António André

24 December 1957 (aged 28)

5

Porto

22

GK

Vítor Damas

8 October 1947 (aged 38)

22727 Sporting Lisbon

Not exactly a favourite, but the wonderful performance of Portugal at the 1984 European finals was supposed not to carry on to 1986 – it was largely promising performance of bright, but not yet at its peak team. Now the team was supposed to be peaking and it was talented generation, especially in attack. Chalana’s absence was severe handicap, but new extremely talented boy popped up: Paulo Futre. Portugal was the likeliest candidate for second place.

Poland

Head coach: Antoni Piechniczek

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Józef Młynarczyk

20 September 1953 (aged 32)

38

Porto

2

DF

Kazimierz Przybyś

11 July 1960 (aged 25)

9

Widzew Łódź

3

DF

Władysław Żmuda

6 June 1954 (aged 31)

90

Cremonese

4

DF

Marek Ostrowski

22 November 1959 (aged 26)

26

Pogoń Szczecin

5

DF

Roman Wójcicki

8 January 1958 (aged 28)

49

Widzew Łódź

6

MF

Waldemar Matysik

27 September 1961 (aged 24)

42

Górnik Zabrze

7

MF

Ryszard Tarasiewicz

27 April 1962 (aged 24)

12

Śląsk Wrocław

8

FW

Jan Urban

14 May 1962 (aged 24)

13

Górnik Zabrze

9

FW

Jan Karaś

17 March 1959 (aged 27)

6

Legia Warsaw

10

DF

Stefan Majewski

31 January 1956 (aged 30)

36

1. FC Kaiserslautern

11

FW

Włodzimierz Smolarek

16 July 1957 (aged 28)

48

Widzew Łódź

12

GK

Jacek Kazimierski

17 August 1959 (aged 26)

16

Legia Warsaw

13

MF

Ryszard Komornicki

14 August 1959 (aged 26)

14

Górnik Zabrze

14

DF

Dariusz Kubicki

6 June 1963 (aged 22)

11

Legia Warsaw

15

MF

Andrzej Buncol

21 September 1959 (aged 26)

49

Legia Warsaw

16

MF

Andrzej Pałasz

22 July 1960 (aged 25)

34

Górnik Zabrze

17

FW

Andrzej Zgutczyński

1 January 1958 (aged 28)

4

Górnik Zabrze

18

DF

Krzysztof Pawlak

12 February 1958 (aged 28)

22

Lech Poznań

19

GK

Józef Wandzik

13 August 1963 (aged 22)

3

Górnik Zabrze

20

MF

Zbigniew Boniek (Captain)

3 March 1956 (aged 30)

74

Roma

21

FW

Dariusz Dziekanowski

30 September 1962 (aged 23)

33

Legia Warsaw

22

FW

Jan Furtok

9 March 1962 (aged 24)

4

GKS Katowice

Poland was not a favourite largely because the team developed little after the 1982 World Cup – Boniek and Smolarek were lethal duo, but most key players, Boniek included, aged and among the new crop only Jan Furtok was truly classy. Plenty of experience, but somewhat uninspired squad and then there was tradition… the pattern was already established: bronze medalists in 1974, mediocre in 1978, again surprise bronze in 1982 – now it was time for mediocrity. Poland was not to be outsider, of course, but third place was likelier than second. One important thing should be said: Wladyslaw Zmuda was coming to his 4th World Cup. Few players were members of this club and he was expected to really join them, for so far true membership meant not just making the roster, but actually playing at the finals – Zmuda was constant regular, so it was unlikely he would sit on the bench. And he was not even 32 years old yet – the way Poland was going, he had the chance to become the first player to appear at 5 World Cups, but that concerned the 1990 finals.

Morocco

First row from left: Rakhji (?), Fidadi, Bidane, Barbori, Labied, Haidamou, Timoumi, Lamriss, Kadani (?).

Standing: Souleimani, Fadili, Bouyahyaoui, Sahil, Zaki, Moudani, Rhiati, Yakdani (?), El Biyaz, Hcina El Ourdi.

Head coach: José Faria

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Badou Zaki (Captain)

2 April 1959 (aged 27)

N/A

Wydad Casablanca

2

DF

Labid Khalifa

1 January 1955 (aged 31)

N/A

Kenitra

3

DF

Abdelmajid Lamriss

12 February 1959 (aged 27)

N/A

FAR Rabat

4

DF

Mustafa El Biyaz

12 December 1960 (aged 25)

N/A

KAC Marrakesh

5

DF

Noureddine Bouyahyaoui

7 January 1955 (aged 31)

N/A

Kenitra

6

MF

Abdelmajid Dolmy

19 April 1953 (aged 33)

N/A

Raja Casablanca

7

MF

Mustafa El Haddaoui

28 July 1961 (aged 24)

N/A

Lausanne

8

MF

Aziz Bouderbala

26 December 1960 (aged 25)

N/A

Sion

9

FW

Abdelkrim Merry “Krimau”

13 January 1955 (aged 31)

N/A

Le Havre

10

MF

Mohamed Timoumi

15 January 1960 (aged 26)

N/A

FAR Rabat

11

FW

Mustafa Merry

21 April 1958 (aged 28)

N/A

Valenciennes

12

GK

Salahdine Hmied

1 September 1961 (aged 24)

N/A

FAR Rabat

13

FW

Abdelfettah Rhiati

25 February 1963 (aged 23)

N/A

Maghreb Fez

14

DF

Lahcen Ouadani

14 July 1959 (aged 26)

N/A

FAR Rabat

15

MF

Mouncif El Haddaoui

21 October 1964 (aged 21)

N/A

AS Sale

16

MF

Azzedine Amanallah

7 April 1956 (aged 30)

N/A

Besançon

17

FW

Abderrazak Khairi

20 November 1962 (aged 23)

N/A

FAR Rabat

18

MF

Mohammed Sahil

11 October 1963 (aged 22)

N/A

KAC Marrakesh

19

MF

Fadel Jilal

4 March 1964 (aged 22)

N/A

Wydad Casablanca

20

DF

Abdellah Bidane

10 September 1965 (aged 20)

N/A

CODM Meknes

21

MF

Abdelaziz Souleimani

30 April 1958 (aged 28)

N/A

Maghreb Fez

22

GK

Abdelfettah Mouddani

30 July 1956 (aged 29)

N/A

Kenitra

Morocco was outsider, yet, not precisely an outsider – because of the rise of African football in the 1980s, teams like Morocco were waited with caution by now: everybody remembered well the performance of Cameroon and Algeria four years earlier. Surprises were more than possible, the Brazilian coach Faria not only did a good job qualifying the team to the finals, but the Moroccans were wise – his hiring was not fly-by-night affair: unlike the rather typical African approach to hire foreign coach just for the finals and fire him right after, Faria was working in Morocco for quite a long time, he made the team, shaped it into the style he wanted it to be. And it did not look like the coach was to be sacked and blamed for everything after the finals. Thus, Morocco was on solid ground, there was no hysteria and fantastic expectations. The calm surrounding the team was very likely productive and if there was a team expected to make a surprise performance, it was Morocco. The squad was largely unknown, it did not have known players like Algeria, and less European-based professionals than same Algeria, but still they had quite a few, enough to provide experience. Timoumi was the star, but it was possible that some others would make their names at the finals – there was good reason to try one’s best: European contract. And the group was opportune: with some luck, Morocco could have its day against current Poland and Portugal. Yet, mostly favourable impressions were the most expected from Morocco, most likely they to finish last.

Group E

 

Group E. West Germany, Uruguay, Denmark, and Scotland, playing in Queretaro and Nezahualcoyotl. The group of death. Every World Cup has such group and Group E was the 1986 sample. Anything could happen in such group, but some predictions were possible nevertheless.

Denmark


Head coach: Sepp Piontek

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Troels Rasmussen

4 July 1961 (aged 24)

15

AGF

2

DF

John Sivebæk

25 October 1961 (aged 24)

36

Manchester United

3

DF

Søren Busk

10 April 1953 (aged 33)

46

MVV

4

DF

Morten Olsen (Captain)

14 August 1949 (aged 36)

79

Anderlecht

5

DF

Ivan Nielsen

9 October 1956 (aged 29)

31

Feyenoord

6

MF

Søren Lerby

1 February 1958 (aged 28)

51

Bayern Munich

7

MF

Jan Mølby

4 July 1963 (aged 22)

20

Liverpool

8

FW

Jesper Olsen

20 March 1961 (aged 25)

26

Manchester United

9

MF

Klaus Berggreen

3 February 1958 (aged 28)

32

Pisa

10

FW

Preben Elkjær Larsen

11 September 1957 (aged 28)

56

Hellas Verona

11

MF

Michael Laudrup

15 June 1964 (aged 21)

30

Juventus

12

MF

Jens Jørn Bertelsen

15 February 1952 (aged 34)

58

Aarau

13

MF

Per Frimann

4 June 1962 (aged 23)

10

Anderlecht

14

FW

Allan Simonsen

15 December 1952 (aged 33)

53

Vejle

15

MF

Frank Arnesen

30 September 1956 (aged 29)

45

PSV

16

GK

Ole Qvist

25 February 1950 (aged 36)

38

KB

17

DF

Kent Nielsen

28 December 1961 (aged 24)

4

Brønshøj

18

FW

Flemming Christensen

10 April 1958 (aged 28)

10

Lyngby

19

FW

John Eriksen

20 November 1957 (aged 28)

5

Feyenoord

20

MF

Jan Bartram

6 March 1962 (aged 24)

3

AGF

21

DF

Henrik Andersen

7 May 1965 (aged 21)

6

Anderlecht

22

GK

Lars Høgh

14 January 1959 (aged 27)

3

Odense

Denmark was no longer a miracle – it was the team praised for coming the closest to total football in the first half of the 1980s, and by now the inconsistencies of the earlier developmental stages were thought over: the squad was experienced, constant, full of stars playing for the leading European clubs and not just playing, but having key roles. The Danes played dazzling football and thanks to Troels Rasmussen had no weak post anymore – goalkeeping has been big problem, but no more. Sepp Piontek had no problems with his players, there was no great pressure on the team to succeed, and one can always depend on Morten Olsen and Simonsen to spur and lead by example their younger teammates. So far, transition was going smoothly, for new talent was coming up – Peter Schmeichel for instance, was considered and left out. Denmark was very likely to win the group of death, they were just ripe for success.

West Germany

Head coach: Franz Beckenbauer

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Harald Schumacher

6 March 1954 (aged 32)

67

1. FC Köln

2

DF

Hans-Peter Briegel

11 October 1955 (aged 30)

66

Hellas Verona

3

DF

Andreas Brehme

9 November 1960 (aged 25)

23

1. FC Kaiserslautern

4

DF

Karlheinz Förster

25 July 1958 (aged 27)

74

VfB Stuttgart

5

DF

Matthias Herget

14 November 1955 (aged 30)

21

Bayer Uerdingen

6

DF

Norbert Eder

7 November 1955 (aged 30)

2

Bayern Munich

7

FW

Pierre Littbarski

16 April 1960 (aged 26)

40

1. FC Köln

8

MF

Lothar Matthäus

21 March 1961 (aged 25)

41

Bayern Munich

9

FW

Rudi Völler

13 April 1960 (aged 26)

31

Werder Bremen

10

MF

Felix Magath

26 July 1953 (aged 32)

37

Hamburger SV

11

FW

Karl-Heinz Rummenigge (Captain)

25 September 1955 (aged 30)

88

Internazionale

12

GK

Uli Stein

23 October 1954 (aged 31)

6

Hamburger SV

13

MF

Karl Allgöwer

5 January 1957 (aged 29)

10

VfB Stuttgart

14

DF

Thomas Berthold

12 November 1964 (aged 21)

12

Eintracht Frankfurt

15

DF

Klaus Augenthaler

26 September 1957 (aged 28)

11

Bayern Munich

16

MF

Olaf Thon

1 May 1966 (aged 20)

10

Schalke 04

17

DF

Ditmar Jakobs

28 August 1953 (aged 32)

14

Hamburger SV

18

MF

Uwe Rahn

21 May 1962 (aged 24)

9

Borussia Mönchengladbach

19

FW

Klaus Allofs

5 December 1956 (aged 29)

40

1. FC Köln

20

FW

Dieter Hoeneß

7 January 1953 (aged 33)

4

Bayern Munich

21

MF

Wolfgang Rolff

26 December 1959 (aged 26)

17

Hamburger SV

22

GK

Eike Immel

27 November 1960 (aged 25)

4

Borussia Dortmund

It was stormy time – along with Brazil and Argentina, West Germany was the most mercilessly criticized team at home. In their case, though, domestic criticism was shared with international opinions. Beckenbauer succeeded somewhat to pacify public opinion – this was the first time in modern times when West Germany was going to the finals without big expectations and everybody was seemingly resigned to the fact the team was far from great – but was unable to stop the scandals, the internal fighting, and bad mouthing. No matter how much he tried and how diplomatic he was, Beckenbauer was unable to convince Schuster to join the squad. The pact he made with Schumacher to keep his mouth shut at the finals was broken by the goalkeeper. The atmosphere in the team was sick and Beckenbauer had to make heroic efforts just to keep the team going. Going was rather difficult and certainly unpleasant, so West Germany was not in great shape to win the group. It was more than possible they were not going even to reach the second phase of the finals, but one can hardly dismiss a German team – if anything, they were fighters. Ugly or not, they were going to fight and possibly succeed. Succeed in reaching second stage. Very likely second in the group.

Scotland

Head coach: Alex Ferguson

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Jim Leighton

24 July 1958 (aged 27)

26

Aberdeen

2

DF

Richard Gough

5 April 1962 (aged 24)

23

Dundee United

3

DF

Maurice Malpas

3 August 1962 (aged 23)

10

Dundee United

4

MF

Graeme Souness (Captain)

6 May 1953 (aged 33)

52

Sampdoria

5

DF

Alex McLeish

21 January 1959 (aged 27)

43

Aberdeen

6

DF

Willie Miller

2 May 1955 (aged 31)

48

Aberdeen

7

MF

Gordon Strachan

9 February 1957 (aged 29)

34

Manchester United

8

DF

Roy Aitken

24 November 1958 (aged 27)

20

Celtic

9

MF

Eamonn Bannon

18 April 1958 (aged 28)

9

Dundee United

10

MF

Jim Bett

25 November 1959 (aged 26)

17

Aberdeen

11

MF

Paul McStay

22 October 1964 (aged 21)

14

Celtic

12

GK

Andy Goram

13 April 1964 (aged 22)

3

Oldham Athletic

13

DF

Steve Nicol

11 December 1961 (aged 24)

8

Liverpool

14

DF

David Narey

12 June 1956 (aged 29)

28

Dundee United

15

DF

Arthur Albiston

14 July 1957 (aged 28)

13

Manchester United

16

FW

Frank McAvennie

22 November 1959 (aged 26)

2

West Ham United

17

FW

Steve Archibald

27 September 1956 (aged 29)

26

Barcelona

18

FW

Graeme Sharp

16 October 1960 (aged 25)

6

Everton

19

FW

Charlie Nicholas

30 December 1961 (aged 24)

15

Arsenal

20

FW

Paul Sturrock

10 October 1956 (aged 29)

17

Dundee United

21

FW

Davie Cooper

25 February 1956 (aged 30)

14

Rangers

22

GK

Alan Rough

25 November 1951 (aged 34)

53

Hibernian

Twice unlucky – 1974 and 1978 – so it was high time… but the team was weaker than the versions of the 1970s. Nothing to be done about it, it was objective situation. And Dalglish retired. But Alex Ferguson was coaching and that was a big asset. Souness, Strachan, Archibald, Nicholas – small, but impressive group of talent. Fighting spirit never lacked anyway. With some luck, Scotland could go ahead, but more likely taking third place.

Uruguay

Head coach: Omar Borrás

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Rodolfo Rodríguez

20 January 1956 (aged 30)

78

Santos

2

DF

Nelson Gutiérrez

13 April 1962 (aged 24)

31

River Plate

3

DF

Eduardo Mario Acevedo

25 September 1959 (aged 26)

37

Defensor Sporting

4

DF

Víctor Diogo

9 April 1958 (aged 28)

31

Palmeiras

5

MF

Miguel Bossio

10 February 1960 (aged 26)

27

Peñarol

6

DF

José Batista

6 March 1962 (aged 24)

N/A

Deportivo Español

7

FW

Antonio Alzamendi

7 June 1956 (aged 29)

N/A

River Plate

8

MF

Jorge Barrios (Captain)

24 January 1961 (aged 25)

53

Olympiacos

9

FW

Jorge da Silva

11 December 1961 (aged 24)

N/A

Atlético Madrid

10

MF

Enzo Francescoli

12 November 1961 (aged 24)

22

River Plate

11

MF

Sergio Santín

6 August 1956 (aged 29)

14

Atlético Nacional

12

GK

Fernando Alvez

4 September 1959 (aged 26)

N/A

Peñarol

13

DF

César Vega

2 September 1959 (aged 26)

7

Danubio

14

DF

Darío Pereyra

19 October 1956 (aged 29)

30

São Paulo

15

DF

Eliseo Rivero

27 December 1957 (aged 28)

6

Peñarol

16

MF

Mario Saralegui

24 April 1959 (aged 27)

26

Peñarol

17

MF

José Zalazar

26 October 1963 (aged 22)

N/A

Peñarol

18

MF

Rubén Paz

8 August 1959 (aged 26)

N/A

Internacional

19

FW

Venancio Ramos

20 June 1959 (aged 26)

N/A

Lens

20

FW

Carlos Aguilera

21 September 1964 (aged 21)

38

Nacional

21

FW

Wilmar Cabrera

31 July 1959 (aged 26)

24

Valencia

22

GK

Celso Otero

1 February 1958 (aged 28)

0

Montevideo Wanderers

 

An enigma of some special kind: at home Borras was heavily criticized and dark predictions were abundant, but if somebody from the outside criticized the team, the whole country united in defence. Some of the domestic criticism was a bit weird too: Borras used mostly foreign-based players and he was criticized for that, a left-over from 1970s attitudes. By mid-80s, it was common for almost every national team to have foreign-based players and some were practically made of such. Uruguay hardly had a choice – its best players played abroad for years. Domestic criticism was picked-up by foreign observers to the tune of considering the squad hastily arranged rag-tag bunch, which was not true. What was true was that two key players were left out largely for political reasons, a Borras’s whimsicality, but in the case of Hugo de Leon it was not even substantial loss – Uruguay had decent defenders even without him. More crucial criticism was the inclination towards rough play, but nothing new in that. Borras more or less promoted defensive approach, but it was his uncertainty the biggest problem: it looked like he was unable to make a sound tactical scheme based on the great abilities of Francescoli, just voted the best South American player. But the Uruguayans were fighters and the dark 1970s were over – Uruguay won Mondialito and after that the South American championship, it was not a team to be dismissed. They were not outsiders – only tentatively they could be seen as finishing last in the group: they could win the group just as well. Even if they were not suddenly inspired, their kind of rough play could be difficult to beat and very intimidating for unimaginative teams like West Germany and Scotland, but also for the crafty, yet, a bit fragile total-football team, like Denmark.

Again, in this group there were no outsiders and anything could happen.

Group D

Group D. Brazil, Spain, Northern Ireland, Algeria. Playing in Guadalajara and one match in Monterrey.

Brazil.

Head coach: Telê Santana

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Carlos

4 March 1956 (aged 30)

16

Corinthians

2

DF

Édson

3 July 1959 (aged 26)

17

Corinthians

3

DF

Oscar

20 June 1954 (aged 31)

59

São Paulo

4

DF

Edinho (Captain)

5 June 1955 (aged 30)

40

Udinese

5

MF

Falcão

16 October 1953 (aged 32)

26

São Paulo

6

MF

Júnior

29 June 1954 (aged 31)

56

Torino

7

FW

Müller

31 January 1966 (aged 20)

7

São Paulo

8

FW

Casagrande

15 April 1963 (aged 23)

16

Corinthians

9

FW

Careca

5 October 1960 (aged 25)

28

São Paulo

10

MF

Zico

3 March 1953 (aged 33)

68

Flamengo

11

FW

Edivaldo

13 April 1962 (aged 24)

2

Atlético Mineiro

12

GK

Paulo Vítor

7 June 1957 (aged 28)

8

Fluminense

13

DF

Josimar

19 September 1961 (aged 24)

0

Botafogo

14

DF

Júlio César

8 March 1963 (aged 23)

1

Guarani

15

MF

Alemão

22 November 1961 (aged 24)

14

Botafogo

16

DF

Mauro Galvão

19 December 1961 (aged 24)

1

Internacional

17

DF

Branco

4 April 1964 (aged 22)

9

Fluminense

18

MF

Sócrates

19 February 1954 (aged 32)

55

Flamengo

19

MF

Elzo

22 January 1961 (aged 25)

6

Atlético Mineiro

20

MF

Silas

27 August 1965 (aged 20)

3

São Paulo

21

MF

Valdo

12 January 1964 (aged 22)

0

Grêmio

22

GK

Leão

11 July 1949 (aged 36)

80

Sport Recife

 

May be under heavy criticism at home, but Brazil is always prime favourite. The change of style was recognized and also the aging of the team, but Brazil is Brazil. Even the scandals plaguing Tele Santana and his selection were taken only with caution abroad: the prevailing believe was that Brazil will try to compensate for its failure in 1982, when it was the best team, and could succeed this time. On the negative side was aging: Zico, Socrates, Junior, Falcao, and Oscar were well over 30 and on top of it Zico was not in good shape, not fully recovered from heavy injury. The absence of Renato, Eder, and the last minute refusal of Leandro to go to Mexico in protest were noted as minuses. The return of Leao was recognized as a sign of major tactical change – he refused for the free-spirited adventurous football Santana insisted on in 1982, but now it was exactly what Leao wanted: cautious, defensive approach., never liked by Brazilian fans and journalists. However, either because of old grudges or lack of solid form the veteran goalkeeper was not a first choice. Remembering pathetic goalkeeping at the previous World Cup, goalkeeping was automatically suspect: Leao was the best by far during the 1970s, but now he was out – not good. Some players without any experience were included – Josimar, Valdo, Julio Cesar, Mauro Galvao, Edivaldo, Silas – which was unusual for Brazil and looked like improvised in the last second making the numbers after stars were left out. Of course, Brazil surely had plenty of talent, but these boys were too young and hardly heard of before and, thus, suspect – looked like Santana will use well known names, but if they underperformed there were no other options. Yet, Brazil was expected to win its group – it was Brazil and opposition was quiet convenient. Even if they stumbled, they were the likeliest group winners.

Spain

Head coach: Miguel Muñoz

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Andoni Zubizarreta

23 October 1961 (aged 24)

9

Athletic Bilbao

2

DF

Tomás

9 August 1960 (aged 25)

5

Atlético Madrid

3

DF

José Antonio Camacho (Captain)

8 June 1955 (aged 30)

64

Real Madrid

4

DF

Antonio Maceda

16 May 1957 (aged 29)

35

Real Madrid

5

MF

Víctor

15 March 1957 (aged 29)

36

Barcelona

6

DF

Rafael Gordillo

24 February 1957 (aged 29)

62

Real Madrid

7

MF

Juan Antonio Señor

26 August 1958 (aged 27)

29

Real Zaragoza

8

DF

Andoni Goikoetxea

23 August 1956 (aged 29)

29

Athletic Bilbao

9

FW

Emilio Butragueño

22 July 1963 (aged 22)

11

Real Madrid

10

FW

Francisco José Carrasco

6 March 1959 (aged 27)

30

Barcelona

11

DF

Julio Alberto

7 October 1958 (aged 27)

22

Barcelona

12

MF

Quique Setién

27 September 1958 (aged 27)

3

Atlético Madrid

13

GK

Urruti

17 February 1952 (aged 34)

5

Barcelona

14

MF

Ricardo Gallego

8 February 1959 (aged 27)

26

Real Madrid

15

DF

Chendo

12 October 1961 (aged 24)

1

Real Madrid

16

FW

Hipólito Rincón

28 April 1957 (aged 29)

20

Real Betis

17

MF

Francisco

1 November 1962 (aged 23)

14

Sevilla

18

MF

Ramón Calderé

16 January 1959 (aged 27)

6

Barcelona

19

FW

Julio Salinas

11 September 1962 (aged 23)

3

Athletic Bilbao

20

FW

Eloy

10 July 1964 (aged 21)

3

Sporting Gijón

21

MF

Míchel

23 March 1963 (aged 23)

5

Real Madrid

22

GK

Juan Carlos Ablanedo

2 September 1963 (aged 22)

0

Sporting Gijón

Spain was a fiasco in 1982 and a pleasant surprise in 1984, but somewhat returned to its old way after that, so it was hard to imagine what could be at the World Cup. There were some players who were not up to the promise they showed in 1984, notably Real Sociedad players. The wonderful goalkeeper Arconada was out, but exciting new star – Butragueno – was in. But murderers were regulars – Goikoetxea and Gordillo – so it was likelier that Spain, full of Basque fighters, would be rough soldiering team. Most likely, second in the group.

Northern Ireland.

Head coach: Billy Bingham

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Pat Jennings

12 June 1945 (aged 40)

116

Everton

2

DF

Jimmy Nicholl

28 December 1956 (aged 29)

70

West Bromwich Albion

3

DF

Mal Donaghy

13 September 1957 (aged 28)

42

Luton Town

4

DF

John O’Neill

11 March 1958 (aged 28)

36

Leicester City

5

DF

Alan McDonald

12 October 1963 (aged 22)

5

Queens Park Rangers

6

MF

David McCreery

16 September 1957 (aged 28)

53

Newcastle United

7

MF

Steve Penney

16 January 1964 (aged 22)

7

Brighton & Hove Albion

8

MF

Sammy McIlroy (Captain)

2 August 1954 (aged 31)

84

Manchester City

9

FW

Jimmy Quinn

18 November 1959 (aged 26)

11

Blackburn Rovers

10

MF

Norman Whiteside

7 May 1965 (aged 21)

26

Manchester United

11

FW

Ian Stewart

10 September 1961 (aged 24)

26

Newcastle United

12

GK

Jim Platt

26 January 1951 (aged 35)

23

Coleraine

13

GK

Philip Hughes

19 November 1964 (aged 21)

0

Bury

14

FW

Gerry Armstrong

23 May 1954 (aged 32)

62

Chesterfield

15

DF

Nigel Worthington

4 November 1961 (aged 24)

8

Sheffield Wednesday

16

MF

Paul Ramsey

3 September 1962 (aged 23)

9

Leicester City

17

FW

Colin Clarke

30 October 1962 (aged 23)

3

AFC Bournemouth

18

DF

John McClelland

7 December 1955 (aged 30)

38

Watford

19

FW

Billy Hamilton

9 May 1957 (aged 29)

38

Oxford United

20

DF

Bernard McNally

17 February 1963 (aged 23)

1

Shrewsbury Town

21

MF

David Campbell

2 June 1965 (aged 20)

1

Nottingham Forest

22

FW

Mark Caughey

31 August 1960 (aged 25)

2

Linfield

Naturally limited, but courageous team, which was seen as one of possible surprises. Northern Ireland had small number of really good players and was the only team having to look in second and lower divisions in order to complete a squad, but scarce resources they compensated with spirit. Pat Jennings already challenged Dino Zoff as the older player to appear at World Cup finals. Northern Ireland was expected to finish third, though – spirit is spirit, but ability is another matter, even when a team is free from the pressure of great expectations. Scoring was a big and traditional problem for the Irish and they were not better than Algeria, but they were capable of getting a point, even two, from a team like Spain and coming ahead of the Algerians.

Algeria.

First row from left: Chaib, Mansouri, Benkhalidi, Kacim (?) – masseur, Madjer, Assad, Belloumi, Megichi (?), Sadmi, Yahi (?), Menad, Drid, Bouiche.

Standing: Faral (?) – physio, Guendouz, Bensalem (?) – doctor, Kourichi, Abdelwahid (?) – goalkeeping coach, Bensour (?), Sadak (?), Said, Kachi (?) – masseur, Cerbah, Megharia, Maroc, Isaad (?) – chairman of the Football Federation, Mokhdadi (?) – assistant coach, Saadane – coach.

Head coach: Rabah Saâdane

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Nacerdine Drid

22 January 1957 (aged 29)

N/A

MP Oran

2

DF

Mahmoud Guendouz (Captain)

24 February 1953 (aged 33)

N/A

JS El Biar

3

MF

Fathi Chebal

19 August 1956 (aged 29)

N/A

Rouen

4

DF

Nourredine Kourichi

12 April 1954 (aged 32)

N/A

Lille

5

DF

Abdellah Medjadi Liegeon

1 December 1957 (aged 28)

N/A

Monaco

6

MF

Mohammed Kaci Said

2 May 1958 (aged 28)

N/A

RS Kouba

7

FW

Salah Assad

13 March 1958 (aged 28)

N/A

Mulhouse

8

MF

Karim Maroc

5 March 1958 (aged 28)

N/A

Montpellier

9

FW

Djamel Menad

22 July 1960 (aged 25)

N/A

JE Tizi-Ouzou

10

MF

Lakhdar Belloumi

29 December 1958 (aged 27)

N/A

GCR Mascara

11

FW

Rabah Madjer

15 December 1958 (aged 27)

N/A

Porto

12

FW

Tedj Bensaoula

1 December 1954 (aged 31)

N/A

Le Havre

13

FW

Rachid Harkouk

16 May 1956 (aged 30)

N/A

Notts County

14

FW

Djamel Zidane

28 April 1955 (aged 31)

N/A

Waterschei Thor

15

DF

Abdelhamid Sadmi

1 January 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

JE Tizi-Ouzou

16

DF

Faouzi Mansouri

17 January 1956 (aged 30)

N/A

Montpellier

17

MF

Fawzi Benkhalidi

3 February 1963 (aged 23)

N/A

WKF Boufarik

18

MF

Halim Benmabrouk

25 June 1960 (aged 25)

N/A

Racing Paris

19

DF

Mohammed Chaib

20 May 1957 (aged 29)

N/A

RS Kouba

20

DF

Fodil Megharia

23 May 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

ASO Chlef

21

GK

Larbi El Hadi

27 May 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

WKF Boufarik

22

GK

Mourad Amara

19 February 1959 (aged 27)

N/A

JE Tizi-Ouzou

Algeria was not to be dismissed out of hand – it was the first African country to qualify to two consecutive World Cup finals. It left pleasant memories in 1982 and if not for shameful arrangement of West Germany and Austria, they were going to reach the second stage back then. There was continuity – a lot of players were coming to their second world cup (Madjer, Mansouri, Maroc, to name but a few) and a good number of players were well established in European clubs and no longer in the French leagues – Madjer was key player of FC Porto and Rachid Harkouk was still playing for Notts County, as he did in 1982. Nots County may not have been much to brag about, but one have to keep in mind that foreign players hardly made it in England at that time – Harkouk made it, though. Algeria was also faithful to local coaching – unlike the typical African practice of using foreign coaches. The team had at least two stars – Belloumi and Madjer – to lead their teammates. It was not hopeless outsider by no means, but most likely to finish last in the group anyhow – Algeria was beatable by both Brazil and Spain and most likely going to lose the battle for third place to Northern Ireland by little.

Group C

Group C. France, USSR, Hungary, and Canada, playing in Leon and Irapuato.

France

Top row, from left: Thierry Tusseau, William Ayache, Yannick Stopyra, Michel Bibard, Bernard Genghini, Phillipe Vercruysse, Daniel Xuereb.

Middle row: Phillipe Bergeroo, Maxime Bossis, Yvon Le Roux, Patrick Battiston, Joel Bats, Jean Tigana, Luis Fernandez, Manuel Amoros, Albert Rust.

Bottom: Alain Giresse, Jean-Pierre Papin, Jean-Marc Ferreri, Henri Michel – coach, Bruno Bellone, Dominique Rocheteau, Michel Platinin.

Head coach: Henri Michel

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Joël Bats

4 January 1957 (aged 29)

23

Paris Saint-Germain

2

DF

Manuel Amoros

1 February 1962 (aged 24)

32

Monaco

3

DF

William Ayache

10 January 1961 (aged 25)

9

Nantes

4

DF

Patrick Battiston

12 March 1957 (aged 29)

42

Bordeaux

5

DF

Michel Bibard

30 November 1958 (aged 27)

5

Paris Saint-Germain

6

DF

Maxime Bossis

26 June 1955 (aged 30)

69

Racing Paris

7

DF

Yvon Le Roux

19 April 1960 (aged 26)

18

Nantes

8

DF

Thierry Tusseau

19 January 1958 (aged 28)

18

Bordeaux

9

MF

Luis Fernández

2 October 1959 (aged 26)

28

Paris Saint-Germain

10

MF

Michel Platini (Captain)

21 June 1955 (aged 30)

63

Juventus

11

MF

Jean-Marc Ferreri

26 December 1962 (aged 23)

14

Auxerre

12

MF

Alain Giresse

2 September 1952 (aged 33)

41

Bordeaux

13

MF

Bernard Genghini

18 January 1958 (aged 28)

25

Monaco

14

MF

Jean Tigana

23 June 1955 (aged 30)

40

Bordeaux

15

MF

Philippe Vercruysse

28 January 1962 (aged 24)

2

Lens

16

FW

Bruno Bellone

14 March 1962 (aged 24)

24

Monaco

17

FW

Jean-Pierre Papin

5 November 1963 (aged 22)

1

Club Brugge

18

FW

Dominique Rocheteau

14 January 1955 (aged 31)

45

Paris Saint-Germain

19

FW

Yannick Stopyra

9 January 1961 (aged 25)

16

Toulouse

20

FW

Daniel Xuereb

22 June 1959 (aged 26)

3

Lens

21

GK

Philippe Bergeroo

13 January 1954 (aged 32)

3

Toulouse

22

GK

Albert Rust

10 October 1953 (aged 32)

0

Sochaux

Numbers were given alphabetically, except to goalkeepers, where tradition was continued – France used 1, 21, and 22 for the goalies – and Platini and Giresse, who used their favourite numbers 10 and 12. Nothing really important, just like the numbers Argentina used, and the fuss made over that was mostly related to the conservatism in vogue by mid-80s – so, the frivolity of the 1970s was forgotten… Apart from nonsense news, France was favourite, at least in the this group. Reigning European champions, experienced, solid, playing fascinating football, led by Platini – they were expected to go far, why not even winning the championship? But there were skeptics as well: key players were getting old, long-lasting problems with the attacking line, newcomers, who were well known, but hardly on the level of the players they replaced, somewhat unlucky tradition of playing great football, but soft when really mattered and losing under real pressure. Most of that, rightly or wrongly, was amalgamated around increasing journalistic anger with Platini, who acted as a spoiled brat in their view, when dealing with journalists. He was accused of running the team and telling Michel what to do, in the same time concerned only with making more money and not with his ‘patriotic’ duties. Some of it was true, but it became focus and central point around which everything else was piled up. Objectively, France did not play very well after winning the European championship, had traditional problems with its strikers, and was beatable in crucial games, but the midfield and Platini were capable to overcome other weaknesses in a good day. Henri Michel did not introduce any conceptual changes, which was reasonable, for having Platini, one better structure the game around him. France was the favourite of this group.

USSR.

Sitting from left: S. Myshalov – doctor, O. Protassov, N. Larionov, A. Bal, I. Yaremchuk, V. Bessonov, V. Evtushenko, A. Zavarov, V Ratz, I. Belanov.

Second row: ?, S. Aleynikov, O. Kuznetzov, S. Krakovsky, R. Dassaev, S. Rodionov, S. Mosyagin – assistant coach, Yu. Morozov – assistant coach, N. Simonyan – team chief, V. Lobanovsky – coach, G. Litovchenko, P. Yakovenko, A. Demyanenko, A. Bubnov, V. Chanov, O. Blokhin, G. Morozov.

Head coach: Valeri Lobanovsky

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Rinat Dasayev

13 June 1957 (aged 28)

58

Spartak Moscow

2

DF

Vladimir Bessonov

5 March 1958 (aged 28)

53

Dinamo Kyiv

3

DF

Aleksandr Chivadze

8 April 1955 (aged 31)

42

Dinamo Tbilisi

4

DF

Genady Morozov

30 December 1962 (aged 23)

9

Spartak Moscow

5

DF

Anatoliy Demyanenko (Captain)

19 February 1959 (aged 27)

46

Dinamo Kyiv

6

DF

Aleksandr Bubnov

10 October 1955 (aged 30)

32

Spartak Moscow

7

MF

Ivan Yaremchuk

19 March 1962 (aged 24)

2

Dinamo Kyiv

8

MF

Pavel Yakovenko

19 December 1964 (aged 21)

1

Dinamo Kyiv

9

MF

Aleksandr Zavarov

24 April 1961 (aged 25)

7

Dinamo Kyiv

10

DF

OlehgKuznetsov

22 March 1963 (aged 23)

5

Dinamo Kyiv

11

FW

Oleg Blokhin

5 November 1952 (aged 33)

104

Dinamo Kyiv

12

MF

Andrey Bal

16 February 1958 (aged 28)

17

Dinamo Kyiv

13

MF

Genady Litovchenko

11 September 1963 (aged 22)

18

Dnepr Dnepropetrovsk

14

FW

Sergey Rodionov

3 September 1962 (aged 23)

17

Spartak Moscow

15

DF

Nikolay Larionov

19 January 1957 (aged 29)

15

Zenit Leningrad

16

GK

Viktor Chanov

21 July 1959 (aged 26)

1

Dinamo Kyiv

17

MF

Vadim Evtushenko

1 January 1958 (aged 28)

7

Dinamo Kyiv

18

FW

Oleg Protasov

4 February 1964 (aged 22)

19

Dnepr Dnepropetrovsk

19

MF

Ihog Belanov

25 September 1960 (aged 25)

4

Dinamo Kyiv

20

MF

Sergey Aleinikov

7 November 1961 (aged 24)

23

Dinamo Minsk

21

MF

Vassily Ratz

25 April 1961 (aged 25)

2

Dinamo Kyiv

22

GK

Sergey Krakovsky

11 August 1960 (aged 25)

0

Dnepr Dnepropetrovsk

Once again Lobanovsky was trusted with the national team, hence, it was saturated with Dinamo (Kiev) players – 12 – but it was different than similar tries going back 10 years. Now Dinamo (Kiev) was again in excellent from, fresh from European success. And Ukrainian football, leading the Soviet game for a long time, had another very strong club, so the total of Ukranian players was 15. The rest were well known players from recent Soviet champions, all already well established in the national team. It was a squad generally at the perfect age – roughly, around 25 years old. The conceptual duel Dinamo (Kiev) vs Spartak (Moscow) was seemingly settled to satisfaction: there were Spartak players, but only truly strong, nothing experimental and causing doubts. Traditionally, the Soviets were taken seriously and this was a vintage particularly strong, but in the same time there was reluctance to consider them a big favourite: yes, the memories of 1982 were good, but the team was quickly eliminated. Did not reach the European finals in 1984. Had difficulties qualifying to the 1986 finals. Lobanovsky was a great coach, but it was also well known that his despotic methods not always worked and in recent years rebellions against him surfaced. Using his own Dinamo (Kiev) as the national team was tried and it was a big failure before. This time, though, it was selection of the truly tested and proven best Soviet players, so there was little to argue against Lobanovsky’s selection and at least back-room battles and stabbing were seemingly absent – good for moral. In any case, Spartak had pitiful record of failing to win a title for years and inability to make a really strong balanced squad, so there was nothing to accuse Lobanovsky of favoritism: the three Spartak players were pretty much all the opposition had to offer no matter who was coaching the Soviet team. Two of them – Dassaev and Bubnov – were regular starters, so there was absolutely nothing the Moscow critics could use against the Ukrainian domination. The only problem was the checkered record of the national team. USSR was expected to finish 2nd in the group and depending on how they played in the group, some other predictions could emerge, but not before that. It was an easy group, there was no doubt the team will go ahead to the next stage.

Hungary

Head coach: György Mezey

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Péter Disztl

30 March 1960 (aged 26)

13

Videoton

2

DF

Sándor Sallai

26 March 1960 (aged 26)

31

Budapest Honvéd

3

DF

Antal Róth

14 September 1960 (aged 25)

18

Pécsi Munkás

4

DF

József Varga

9 October 1954 (aged 31)

29

Denizlispor

5

DF

József Kardos

22 March 1960 (aged 26)

27

Újpesti Dózsa

6

DF

Imre Garaba

29 July 1958 (aged 27)

53

Budapest Honvéd

7

FW

József Kiprich

6 September 1963 (aged 22)

14

Tatabányai Bányász

8

DF

Antal Nagy (Captain)

17 October 1956 (aged 29)

25

Budapest Honvéd

9

MF

László Dajka

29 April 1959 (aged 27)

19

Budapest Honvéd

10

MF

Lajos Détári

24 April 1963 (aged 23)

17

Budapest Honvéd

11

FW

Márton Esterházy

9 April 1956 (aged 30)

21

AEK Athens

12

DF

József Csuhay

12 July 1957 (aged 28)

9

Videoton

13

DF

László Disztl

4 June 1962 (aged 23)

5

Videoton

14

DF

Zoltán Péter

23 March 1958 (aged 28)

21

Zalaegerszeg

15

MF

Péter Hannich

30 March 1957 (aged 29)

23

Rába ETO Győr

16

MF

József Nagy

20 October 1960 (aged 25)

1

Szombathelyi Haladás

17

MF

Győző Burcsa

13 March 1954 (aged 32)

11

Auxerre

18

GK

József Szendrei

25 April 1954 (aged 32)

2

Újpesti Dózsa

19

MF

György Bognár

5 November 1961 (aged 24)

7

MTK Hungária

20

FW

Kálmán Kovács

11 September 1965 (aged 20)

8

Budapest Honvéd

21

MF

Gyula Hajszán

9 October 1961 (aged 24)

22

Rába ETO Győr

22

GK

József Andrusch

31 March 1956 (aged 30)

5

Budapest Honvéd

Hungary started the year with impressive 3-0 victory over Brazil, but the expectations were modest even at home. Unlike 1982 finals, this time it was not a squad heavily based on foreign-based players – Honved and Videoton, the best teams at the moment, provided the backbone of the national team. It was also slightly younger squad than the 1982 one, but quite short on great talent. Lajos Detari was the big star, Garaba, Kiprich, Hannich, Peter Disztl, and may be Esterhazy and Sallai were the best Hungary had at this time and it was not much. And, except Detari, all current stars paled in comparison with names from recent past. Short of miracle, Hungary was expected to finish third in the group.

Canada

Head coach: Tony Waiters

1

GK

Tino Lettieri

27 September 1957 (aged 28)

21

Minnesota Strikers

2

DF

Bob Lenarduzzi

1 May 1955 (aged 31)

44

Tacoma Stars

3

DF

Bruce Wilson (Captain)

20 June 1951 (aged 34)

54

no club

4

MF

Randy Ragan

7 June 1959 (aged 26)

32

no club

5

DF

Terry Moore

2 June 1958 (aged 27)

11

Glentoran

6

DF

Ian Bridge

18 September 1959 (aged 26)

20

La Chaux-de-Fonds

7

FW

Carl Valentine

4 July 1958 (aged 27)

3

Cleveland Force

8

MF

Gerry Gray

20 January 1961 (aged 25)

22

Chicago Sting

9

FW

Branko Šegota

8 June 1961 (aged 24)

11

San Diego Sockers

10

FW

Igor Vrablic

19 July 1965 (aged 20)

27

Seraing

11

MF

Mike Sweeney

25 December 1959 (aged 26)

26

Cleveland Force

12

DF

Randy Samuel

23 December 1963 (aged 22)

25

PSV Eindhoven

13

FW

George Pakos

14 August 1952 (aged 33)

22

Victoria Athletic Association

14

FW

Dale Mitchell

21 April 1958 (aged 28)

26

Tacoma Stars

15

MF

Paul James

11 November 1963 (aged 22)

30

Monterrey

16

MF

Greg Ion

12 March 1963 (aged 23)

5

Los Angeles Lazers

17

MF

David Norman

6 May 1962 (aged 24)

22

Tacoma Stars

18

MF

Jamie Lowery

15 January 1961 (aged 25)

5

no club

19

DF

Pasquale De Luca

26 May 1962 (aged 24)

19

Cleveland Force

20

DF

Colin Miller

4 October 1964 (aged 21)

7

Glasgow Rangers

21

GK

Sven Habermann

3 November 1961 (aged 24)

11

no club

22

GK

Paul Dolan

16 April 1966 (aged 20)

20

Edmonton Brickmen

 

Outsiders. Canada was just happy to reach World Cup finals, a miracle enough. Her squad presented curiosity mostly because there were so many players without any club – not a new thing, Tarantini after all became world champion having no club to play for, but in the past such anomalies were rare and exceptional. Canada elevated the anomaly to entirely new level, a level never to be reached and beaten: Kicker Magazine listed 10 players without a club, finally they were reduced to 4. Of those who played organized football, many played indor-football in the USA – not the real game. Those anomalies were a direct result of the collapse of NASL, where most Canadians used to play – now they were suddenly out of jobs. Which was not entirely negative situation: on one hand, those were professional players at heart, so now they had to look for new opportunity – going to play in Europe or hoping to do so. On the other hand, the Canadian Federation provided the clubless players with financial support and training facilities, so practically the national team operated like a club team – coach and players were together all the time, there is plenty of time to get to know each other both on the pitch and in general. It was familiar approach used by many developing countries and some times it worked. Canada was expected to play with heart and try the best they can – it was a team with British background, like Australia and New Zealand before, but with a difference somewhat in their favour: Aussies in 1974 and Qiwis in 1982 were essentially amateurs – the Canadians were professionals. Not great professionals, but still professionals, eager to get contracts. They had personal ambitions on their minds, for jobs were at stake – Canada was going to lose, no doubt about it, but it was a team expected to do its best, to provide lively opposition to any team. A miracle was unlikely to happen, but European contracts could be signed after Canada played her three games. That was the whole mood in the team: modest and happy. Sometimes its best to be like that – no expectations to worry you, no conflicts and raw nerves, no big pressures.

Group B

Group B. Playing in Mexico City and Toluca. Mexico, Belgium, Paraguay, Iraq.

Head coach: Guy Thys

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Jean-Marie Pfaff

4 December 1953 (aged 32)

51

Bayern Munich

2

DF

Eric Gerets

18 May 1954 (aged 32)

56

PSV

3

MF

Franky Van Der Elst

30 April 1961 (aged 25)

9

Club Brugge

4

DF

Michel de Wolf

19 January 1958 (aged 28)

17

Gent

5

DF

Michel Renquin

3 November 1955 (aged 30)

47

Standard Liège

6

MF

Franky Vercauteren

28 October 1956 (aged 29)

48

Anderlecht

7

MF

René Vandereycken

22 July 1953 (aged 32)

48

Anderlecht

8

MF

Enzo Scifo

19 February 1966 (aged 20)

13

Anderlecht

9

FW

Erwin Vandenbergh

26 January 1959 (aged 27)

39

Anderlecht

10

MF

Philippe Desmet

29 November 1958 (aged 27)

3

Waregem

11

MF

Jan Ceulemans (Captain)

28 February 1957 (aged 29)

56

Club Brugge

12

GK

Jacky Munaron

8 September 1956 (aged 29)

7

Anderlecht

13

DF

Georges Grün

25 January 1962 (aged 24)

15

Anderlecht

14

DF

Lei Clijsters

6 November 1956 (aged 29)

13

Waterschei Thor

15

MF

Leo Van Der Elst

7 January 1962 (aged 24)

6

Club Brugge

16

FW

Nico Claesen

7 October 1962 (aged 23)

14

Standard Liège

17

FW

Raymond Mommens

27 December 1958 (aged 27)

14

Lokeren

18

FW

Daniel Veyt

9 December 1956 (aged 29)

2

Waregem

19

DF

Hugo Broos

10 April 1952 (aged 34)

21

Club Brugge

20

GK

Gilbert Bodart

2 September 1962 (aged 23)

1

Standard Liège

21

DF

Stéphane Demol

11 March 1966 (aged 20)

2

Anderlecht

22

MF

Patrick Vervoort

17 January 1965 (aged 21)

2

Beerschot

Guy Thys and his well known boys were the strongest team in the group – by reputation. The troubles of 1984 were long gone, no more suspended players, so the revered coach had everybody at hand. ‘The Red Devils’ always tried their best, reliable team with massive experience, which so far made smooth transitions despite the obvious limits a small pool of players presented. Pfaff, Gerets, Ceulemans, Renquin, Vandereicken, Vercauteren, Vanderbergh, Broos were more than well known names and they had younger players of quality next to them including 20-years old Scifo, already an international star. The group was easy enough and even if Belgium did not finish on top, it was going to reach the next stage.

Mexico.


Head coach: Bora Milutinović

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Pablo Larios

31 July 1960 (aged 25)

N/A

Cruz Azul

2

DF

Mario Trejo

11 February 1956 (aged 30)

N/A

América

3

DF

Fernando Quirarte

17 May 1956 (aged 30)

N/A

Guadalajara

4

DF

Armando Manzo

16 October 1958 (aged 27)

N/A

América

5

FW

Francisco Javier Cruz

24 May 1966 (aged 20)

N/A

Monterrey

6

MF

Carlos de los Cobos

10 December 1958 (aged 27)

N/A

América

7

MF

Miguel España

4 April 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

UNAM Pumas

8

MF

Alejandro Domínguez

9 February 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

América

9

FW

Hugo Sánchez

11 July 1958 (aged 27)

N/A

Real Madrid

10

MF

Tomás Boy (Captain)

5 July 1953 (aged 32)

N/A

Tigres

11

FW

Carlos Hermosillo

24 August 1964 (aged 21)

N/A

América

12

GK

Ignacio Rodríguez

13 August 1959 (aged 26)

N/A

Atlante

13

MF

Javier Aguirre

1 December 1958 (aged 27)

N/A

América

14

DF

Felix Cruz

4 April 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

UNAM Pumas

15

FW

Luis Flores

8 August 1962 (aged 23)

N/A

UNAM Pumas

16

MF

Carlos Muñoz

8 September 1962 (aged 23)

N/A

Tigres

17

DF

Raúl Servín

29 April 1963 (aged 23)

N/A

UNAM Pumas

18

DF

Rafael Amador

16 February 1959 (aged 27)

N/A

UNAM Pumas

19

MF

Javier Hernández

1 August 1961 (aged 24)

N/A

Tecos

20

GK

Olaf Heredia

19 October 1957 (aged 28)

N/A

Tigres

21

FW

Cristóbal Ortega

25 July 1956 (aged 29)

N/A

América

22

MF

Manuel Negrete

15 May 1959 (aged 27)

N/A

UNAM Pumas

The hosts had a good chance to win the group, but more likely to finish second and go ahead. They were not seen as a big favourite and even at home seemingly nobody expected them to become world champions, but all measures were taken for solid performance. Bora Milutinovic already established himself as the best coach in Mexico, he was there for years – first as a player and then as a coach – so he knew Mexican football well, he was young coach with contemporary ideas and also was easy to work with. The strongest asset of his team was, of course, Hugo Sanchez at the peak of his form and fame, but there few other very good players as well: Boy, Quirarte, Larios, Negrete, Hermosillo. Perhaps goalkeeping was the weakness of the team, but there was nothing to do about it. Mexico was certainly not one of the big favourites, but were expected to reach 1/8 finals at least.

Paraguay.

Head coach: Cayetano Ré

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Roberto Fernández

9 July 1954 (aged 31)

43

Deportivo Cali

2

DF

Juan Torales

9 May 1956 (aged 30)

58

Libertad

3

DF

César Zabala

3 June 1961 (aged 24)

N/A

Cerro Porteño

4

DF

Vladimiro Schettina

8 October 1955 (aged 30)

N/A

Guaraní

5

DF

Rogelio Delgado (Captain)

12 October 1959 (aged 26)

N/A

Olimpia

6

MF

Jorge Amado Nunes

18 October 1961 (aged 24)

N/A

Deportivo Cali

7

MF

Buenaventura Ferreira

4 July 1960 (aged 25)

N/A

Deportivo Cali

8

MF

Julio César Romero

28 August 1960 (aged 25)

N/A

Fluminense

9

FW

Roberto Cabañas

11 April 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

América de Cali

10

MF

Adolfino Cañete

13 September 1956 (aged 29)

N/A

Cruz Azul

11

FW

Alfredo Mendoza

31 December 1963 (aged 22)

N/A

Independiente Medellín

12

GK

Jorge Battaglia

12 May 1960 (aged 26)

N/A

Sol de America

13

DF

Virginio Cáceres

21 May 1962 (aged 24)

N/A

Guaraní

14

DF

Luis Caballero

17 September 1962 (aged 23)

N/A

Guaraní

15

FW

Eufemio Cabral

21 March 1955 (aged 31)

N/A

Guaraní

16

MF

Jorge Guasch

17 January 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

Olimpia

17

FW

Francisco Alcaraz

4 October 1960 (aged 25)

N/A

Nacional

18

FW

Evaristo Isasi

26 October 1955 (aged 30)

N/A

Olimpia

19

MF

Rolando Chilavert

22 May 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

Guaraní

20

FW

Ramón Hicks

30 May 1959 (aged 27)

N/A

Libertad

21

FW

Faustino Alonso

15 February 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

Sol de America

22

GK

Julián Coronel

23 October 1958 (aged 27)

N/A

Guaraní

 

A mystery team. Apart from two internationally recognized stars – Romero and Cabanas – both the team and its coach were practically unknown outside South America. No big scandals surrounded the team, so it looked like Paraguay was preparing calmly for the finals, but how good or bad they were was anybody’s guess. Whatever reputation Paraguayan football had was very old and limited: sturdy fighters. Thus, more inclined to brutality than anything else. Romero rivaled Maradona, but that was in the late 1970s, when both were under 20 years of age. He had great season in 1985, playing in Brazil, but both he and Cabanas were a bit suspect to European observers, because the Paraguayan stars chose to play for Cosmos (New York) and it was easy to shine in the old-men resting home, what the now defunct NASL was. No current Paraguayan player was playing in Europe, the real test for quality. Little was known about Paraguayan football at all and it was not helpful: Olimpia (Asuncion) was the strongest team for years and they even won the Intercontinental Cup, but the national team had few players from Olimpia – looked like it was based on Guarani and mostly playing in Colombia foreign-based players. It was even a bit surprising that the squad was relatively young, including Romero and Cabanas. Somehow, Paraguay was seen as taking 3rd place in the group – may be tough opponent, but unlikely to surprise neither Mexico, nor Belgium.

Iraq.

Head coach: Evaristo de Macedo

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Raad Hammoudi (Captain)

20 April 1958 (aged 28)

N/A

Al-Shorta

2

DF

Maad Ibrahim

30 June 1960 (aged 25)

N/A

Al-Rasheed

3

DF

Khalil Allawi

6 September 1958 (aged 27)

N/A

Al-Rasheed

4

DF

Nadhim Shaker

13 April 1958 (aged 28)

N/A

Al-Tayaran

5

DF

Samir Shaker

28 February 1958 (aged 28)

N/A

Al-Rasheed

6

MF

Ali Hussein Shihab

5 May 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

Al-Talaba

7

MF

Haris Mohammed

3 March 1958 (aged 28)

N/A

Al-Rasheed

8

FW

Ahmed Radhi

21 March 1964 (aged 22)

N/A

Al-Rasheed

9

FW

Karim Saddam

26 May 1960 (aged 26)

N/A

Al-Jaish

10

FW

Hussein Saeed

21 January 1958 (aged 28)

N/A

Al-Talaba

11

FW

Rahim Hameed

23 May 1963 (aged 23)

N/A

Al-Jaish

12

MF

Jamal Ali

2 February 1956 (aged 30)

N/A

Al-Talaba

13

DF

Karim Allawi

1 April 1960 (aged 26)

N/A

Al-Rasheed

14

MF

Basil Gorgis

15 January 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

Al-Shabab

15

MF

Natiq Hashim

15 January 1960 (aged 26)

N/A

Al-Tayaran

16

MF

Shaker Mahmoud

5 May 1960 (aged 26)

N/A

Al-Shabab

17

MF

Anad Abid

3 August 1955 (aged 30)

N/A

Al-Rasheed

18

MF

Ismail Mohammed Sharif

19 January 1962 (aged 24)

N/A

Al-Shabab

19

MF

Basim Qasim

22 March 1959 (aged 27)

N/A

Al-Shorta

20

GK

Fatah Nasif

2 February 1951 (aged 35)

N/A

Al-Jaish

21

GK

Ahmad Jassim

4 May 1960 (aged 26)

N/A

Al-Rasheed

22

DF

Ghanim Oraibi

16 August 1961 (aged 24)

N/A

Al-Shabab

 

Well, outsiders. No matter how heroic was to reach world cup finals during war and unable to play any games at home, Iraq was non-entity in football. Pure exotica. Most of the background, the gruesome details of the background, surfaced after the World Cup finals, so at the moment it was taken for granted that the rulers of Iraq were pouring money and promises to the team – other African and Asian countries did it before, but there was no way to make weak team better just by that. Like many third-world countries, Iraq employed foreign coach and that was the biggest news about them. Yet, even that was uncertain thing… the West German magazine Kicker, one of the most reliable sources of information, introduced the Iraqi coach as Eduardo Antunes Coimbra, 39-years old Brazilian. The name meant nothing… but it was not nothing: to the football world he was known as Edu, when he was a player, and he was the older brother of Zico. Trivia… the player was a star, his brother was mega-star, the coach was unknown. However, he was not the coach of the team at the finals – it was another Brazilian: Evaristo de Macedo. In fact, there was more: the original Brazilian coach Jorge Vieira was sacked after qualifying Iraq to the finals, Edu was hired, and was sacked just a month before the finals and replaced with Evaristo de Macedo. Evaristo, if anything, had much more impressive background than Edu: as a player, he played for Flamengo, Barcelona, and Real Madrid, plus the Brazilian national team, and as coach had massive experience, including briefly coaching Brazil in 1985. Well, that was almost all what could be said about Iraq… But another thing was a problem, ever-lasting problem. Not a new one, but gradually getting bigger and bigger and never solved: how many games players of African and Asian teams actually played? A matter of statistics. To this very day there is no solution – the reason why the ISSF does not risk numbers and choosing ‘N/A’. Kicker, however, supplied numbers as given by Iraqi Federation – according to them, the goalkeeper Hammoudi played 92 games for Iraq. Impossible to confirm… FIFA already placed question marks and was not really recognizing such information, for if it was true, a large number of African and Asian players played astonishing number of national team games – much more than players form Europe and South America, but checking yearly schedules there were no enough international matches for so many appearances. The numbers were obviously doctored or entirely made up. What exactly were Asians and Africans counting? Nobody will ever know… but it was unbelievable. Just compare: Peter Shilton, already 37 years old and member of the English national team since 1971 arrived in Mexico with 78 caps. True, he had strong competition in the 1970s, but England also had busy international schedule. Which rarely went above 10 games per year. It was impossible Iraq had more yearly international games than England. Even if it did, it was still suspect, because the second Iraqi goalie, Nusseyef, was listed with 50 caps. Statistical mystery or not, Iraq was an outsider, destined to finish last in the group.

Group A

Group A. Played in Mexico City and Puebla and opening the championship, for Italy was there and by tradition the reigning world champion played the first game. Italy, Argentina, Bulgaria, and South Korea.

 

 

Head coach: Enzo Bearzot

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Giovanni Galli

29 April 1958 (aged 28)

15

Fiorentina

2

DF

Giuseppe Bergomi

22 December 1963 (aged 22)

28

Internazionale

3

DF

Antonio Cabrini

8 October 1957 (aged 28)

64

Juventus

4

DF

Fulvio Collovati

9 May 1957 (aged 29)

49

Internazionale

5

DF

Sebastiano Nela

13 March 1961 (aged 25)

2

Roma

6

DF

Gaetano Scirea (Captain)

25 May 1953 (aged 33)

74

Juventus

7

DF

Roberto Tricella

18 March 1959 (aged 27)

6

Hellas Verona

8

DF

Pietro Vierchowod

6 April 1959 (aged 27)

23

Sampdoria

9

MF

Carlo Ancelotti

10 June 1959 (aged 26)

11

Roma

10

MF

Salvatore Bagni

25 September 1956 (aged 29)

26

Napoli

11

MF

Giuseppe Baresi

7 February 1958 (aged 28)

15

Internazionale

12

GK

Franco Tancredi

10 January 1955 (aged 31)

12

Roma

13

MF

Fernando De Napoli

15 March 1964 (aged 22)

1

Avellino

14

MF

Antonio Di Gennaro

5 October 1958 (aged 27)

11

Hellas Verona

15

MF

Marco Tardelli

24 September 1954 (aged 31)

81

Internazionale

16

FW

Bruno Conti

13 March 1955 (aged 31)

43

Roma

17

FW

Gianluca Vialli

9 July 1964 (aged 21)

4

Sampdoria

18

FW

Alessandro Altobelli

28 November 1955 (aged 30)

39

Internazionale

19

FW

Giuseppe Galderisi

22 March 1963 (aged 23)

6

Hellas Verona

20

FW

Paolo Rossi

23 September 1956 (aged 29)

48

Milan

21

FW

Aldo Serena

25 June 1960 (aged 25)

5

Juventus

22

GK

Walter Zenga

30 April 1960 (aged 26)

0

Internazionale

Well, Italy is always seen as favourite. Reigning champions also are always seen as favourites. International observers overwhelmingly saw Italy as favourite – it was almost like before the finals in 1974. Back then Italian journalists and pundits saw Italy as candidate for the title, but now it was the opposite: Bearzot was heavily criticized and predictions were dark. Critics considered the team rather weak and were right to some degree: a whole bunch of key players were aging and no longer in top form, notably Paolo Rossi. Bearzot, true to his old promise and well known loyalty to his pupils, ignored some local favourites in favour of his old guard. Key positions were shaky at best – notably, the goalkeepers and playmakers. However, critics pretty much ignored offering solutions, for there were none – Zoff and Antognoni were no longer around and there were no similar players at hand. It was objective situation, nothing to be done about it. As for objections to the inclusion of some players and the absence of others… frankly, it was more or less comparing similar players and Bearzot, like almost every coach, chose experienced and familiar with teammates guys. There was no doubt Italy would be formidable in defence and for the rest… it was as ever: counterattacks could provide a goal or two. This Italian squad promised, at a glance, exactly what usually made Italy lethal: hard experienced team, not given to some extravagant play. One only had to recall the 1978 World Cup – wonderful play and nothing at the end. Of course, one may go back to 1974… dreadful play and nothing, but playing some painful football in 1982 made Italy world champions, the team eventually improving with time and at its best when mattered most. Italy was seen as the favourite in the group and certainly qualifying to the second round. And from there – sky was the limit.

Argentina.

Top row from left: trainer, Pumpido, Valdano, Giusti, Zelada, Clausen, Brown, Ruggeri, Islas, Maradona, trainer.

Middle row: Bochini, Tapia, Enrique, Pasculli, trainer, Bilardo – coach, Borghi, Cuciuffo, Trobbiani.

First row: trainer, Passarella, Olarticoechea, Garre, Almiron, Batista, Burruchaga, trainer.

 

Head coach: Carlos Bilardo

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

FW

Sergio Almirón

18 November 1958 (aged 27)

N/A

Newell’s Old Boys

2

MF

Sergio Batista

9 November 1962 (aged 23)

N/A

Argentinos Juniors

3

MF

Ricardo Bochini

25 January 1954 (aged 32)

N/A

Independiente

4

MF

Claudio Borghi

28 September 1964 (aged 21)

N/A

Argentinos Juniors

5

DF

José Luis Brown

10 November 1956 (aged 29)

N/A

Deportivo Español

6

DF

Daniel Passarella

25 May 1953 (aged 33)

70

Fiorentina

7

FW

Jorge Burruchaga

9 October 1962 (aged 23)

33

Nantes

8

DF

Néstor Clausen

29 September 1962 (aged 23)

N/A

Independiente

9

DF

José Luis Cuciuffo

1 February 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

Vélez Sársfield

10

MF

Diego Maradona (Captain)

30 October 1960 (aged 25)

47

Napoli

11

FW

Jorge Valdano

4 October 1955 (aged 30)

N/A

Real Madrid

12

MF

Héctor Enrique

26 April 1962 (aged 24)

N/A

River Plate

13

DF

Oscar Garré

9 December 1956 (aged 29)

N/A

Ferro Carril Oeste

14

MF

Ricardo Giusti

11 December 1956 (aged 29)

N/A

Independiente

15

GK

Luis Islas

22 December 1965 (aged 20)

N/A

Estudiantes La Plata

16

DF

Julio Olarticoechea

18 October 1958 (aged 27)

N/A

Boca Juniors

17

FW

Pedro Pasculli

17 May 1960 (aged 26)

N/A

Lecce

18

GK

Nery Pumpido

30 July 1957 (aged 28)

N/A

River Plate

19

DF

Oscar Ruggeri

26 January 1962 (aged 24)

19

River Plate

20

MF

Carlos Tapia

20 August 1962 (aged 23)

N/A

Boca Juniors

21

MF

Marcelo Trobbiani

17 February 1955 (aged 31)

N/A

Elche

22

GK

Héctor Zelada

30 April 1957 (aged 29)

N/A

América

With all the outrage against Bilardo and dark predictions that his team would not go beyond the first phase, hardly anybody in Argentina really thought that: the group was easy. Most likely Argentina was to finish second. As for the urgent calls ‘Bilardo, resign!’, perhaps nobody was taking this seriously either – changing coach just before the finals was suicidal move. Besides, in the great crusade against Bilardo 1982 was deliberately forgotten – the argument of ugly Bilardo football vs beautiful Menotti football did not hold water: Argentina was neither beautiful, nor successful in 1982 and Menotti had to go. And Bilardo made radical change of both philosophy and selection, so if he was sacked just before the World Cup, that meant making a new team from scratch. As for the team, it did not look much at first – only 5 players remained from the 1982 squad: Passarella, Maradona, Valdano, Pumpido, and Olarticoechea. Of them only Passarella amd Maradona were regulars. Valdano appeared in only one match, Olarticoechea was unused substitute and Pumpido never made even the game list. Of the 1978 world champions there was only Passarella left. The other radical departure from Menotti’s years was the massive inclusion of foreign-based players – 8 in total. True, Menotti stubbornly followed his believe that foreign-based players think mostly for their clubs and not for the country, but even if he was still at the helm ‘foreigners’ were going to be in the team, for by now the best Argentinians, including his own favourites, were playing abroad. However, Bilardo’s squad echoed the team of 1974 – practically no players from River Plate and Boca Juniors. The 1974 team was dreadful… and so was Bilardo’s. Scandals did not help either – Passarella compromised and decided to stay, perhaps driven by desire to play at third World Cup, but Fillol did not compromise and left the national team. Both played in the qualifications and suddenly looked like Bilardo was going to build anew – Passarella was in the squad, but was not going to be used. Perhaps – mostly because of his age – he was replaceable, but Fillol was a big loss. The best goalkeeper Argentina had and nobody even remotely close to him. Calling Zelada to replace Fillol produced justified outcry, but other members of the squad were similarly suspect: Almiron, Garre, Tapia… at least outside South America those were strange nobodies. To a point, the inclusion of Bochini was also suspect – a living legend, yes, but rarely called to play for Argentina. Already old… may be a legend, but Bochini was not included in the squads for 3 World Cups – 1974, 1978, and 1982. Why now? What for? Was he going to be used? To a point, Bochini was similar to Maradona player – one, who needs the rest of the team to play for him. This was Bilardo’s concept, of course, but based on Maradona. Maradona and Bochini could not play together, so unless thought of replacement, if Maradona fails, Bochini was going as a tourist. Claudio Borghi as well, for he was similar and compared to Maradona. There were too many suspicions and questions and Argentina was not seen as prime force, but expected to climb out of the group. Most likely second.

A trivia note: a point is usually made that Argentina used ‘unusual’ numbering at this World Cup. So fickle is the memory in the world of football – Argentina used alphabetical numbering in 1986, just like in 1982 and 1978. ‘Unusual’ numbering was used in 1974 too. And there were always some exceptions granted to the prime stars, so, following tradition, Maradona, Valdano, and Passarella were permitted to use their favourite numbers.

Bulgaria.

Sitting from left: Vassil Dragolov, Radoslav Zdravkov, Plamen Getov, Georgy Dimitrov, Stoycho Mladenov, Bozhidar Iskrenov, Kostadin Kostadinov.

Middle row: Iliya Dyakov, Zhivko Gospodinov, Anyo Sadkov (Ayan Sadakov), Georgy Yordanov, Georgy Vassilev – assistant coach, Ivan Voutzov – coach, Nikolay Arabov, Petar Petrov, Atanas Pashev, Plamen Markov.

Top row: Nasko Sirakov, Petar Aleksandrov, Boycho Velichkov, Nikolay Donev, Borislav Mikhaylov, Iliya Valov, Aleksandar Markov, Christo Kolev, Andrey Zhelyazkov.

Head coach: Ivan Vutsov

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Borislav Mikhailov

12 February 1963 (aged 23)

26

Vitosha Sofia

2

FW

Nasko Sirakov

26 April 1962 (aged 24)

18

Vitosha Sofia

3

DF

Nikolay Arabov

21 February 1953 (aged 33)

39

Sliven

4

DF

Petar Petrov

20 February 1961 (aged 25)

37

Vitosha Sofia

5

DF

Georgi Dimitrov (Captain)

14 January 1959 (aged 27)

65

Sredec Sofia

6

FW

Andrey Zhelyazkov

9 July 1952 (aged 33)

51

Strasbourg

7

MF

Bozhidar Iskrenov

1 August 1962 (aged 23)

33

Vitosha Sofia

8

MF

Ayan Sadakov

28 September 1961 (aged 24)

47

Lokomotiv Plovdiv

9

FW

Stoycho Mladenov

24 April 1957 (aged 29)

55

Sredec Sofia

10

MF

Zhivko Gospodinov

6 September 1957 (aged 28)

36

Spartak Varna

11

MF

Plamen Getov

4 March 1959 (aged 27)

18

Spartak Pleven

12

MF

Radoslav Zdravkov

30 July 1956 (aged 29)

65

Sredec Sofia

13

DF

Aleksandar Markov

17 August 1961 (aged 24)

18

Spartak Pleven

14

MF

Plamen Markov

11 September 1957 (aged 28)

37

Metz

15

MF

Georgi Yordanov

21 July 1963 (aged 22)

10

Vitosha Sofia

16

FW

Vasil Dragolov

17 August 1962 (aged 23)

2

Beroe Stara Zagora

17

MF

Hristo Kolev

21 September 1964 (aged 21)

7

Lokomotiv Plovdiv

18

FW

Boycho Velichkov

13 August 1958 (aged 27)

26

Lokomotiv Sofia

19

FW

Atanas Pashev

21 November 1963 (aged 22)

14

Trakia Plovdiv

20

FW

Kostadin Kostadinov

25 June 1959 (aged 26)

41

Trakia Plovdiv

21

DF

Iliya Dyakov

28 September 1963 (aged 22)

5

Dobrudzha Tolbuchin

22

GK

Iliya Valov

29 December 1961 (aged 24)

13

Vratsa

First of all, a note on names – Turks were forcefully renamed at that time, so Ayan Sadakov was listed as Anyo Sadkov in 1986. After the Cup final scandal in 1985, clubs were ‘disolved’ and renamed by the government: Vitosha is Levski (Sofia); Sredetz – CSKA (Sofia), Vratza – Botev (Vratza), Trakia – Botev (Plovdiv) today.

The photo perhaps describes best the uncertainty of coach Voutzov’s mind, which was characteristic of his spell as national team coach. This was the squad just before the last cut – 24 players, 2 had to be eliminated. These were the goalkeeper Nikolay Donev and the center-forward Petar Aleksandrov. Voutzov took a risk by going to Mexico with only 2 goalies – the wisdom of having 3 keepers at world cup finals is weird, but stubbornly popular. He went against it, taking a risk. But then he followed fear… Aleksandrov was young yet and not very stable player at the time, but he was typical strong center-forward and great scorer. With his elimination, the team had no typical center-forward left – and that happened when the opponents were already known! Physical, gritty teams like Italy, Argentina, and South Korea required strong, physical centers, capable to fight in the air and difficult to push around. Voutzov somehow chose to get rid of his only player suitable for such opponents, scared by his fragile age. But it was not only that – there were a quite a few questionable choices. Yes, Voutzov went to the head of the state to beg amnesty for heavily suspended players in 1985, because they were national team regulars, but the only really needed one was the goalkeeper Borislav Mikhaylov. Some of the restored just because he claimed he need them for the national team were not called at all – instead, some strange guys were included: the full backs Iliya Dyakov and Aleksandar Markov. Dyakov, playing in the Second Division, was universally seen just called to make the numbers. Markov was a little better, but his main quality was that he was tough fighter. Looked like Voutzov had no options for some positions… which was not true – there were a few better than those defenders, who he entirely ignored. Similar was the case with the strikers, particularly center-forwards – some good players were never even tried. Looked like Voutzov preferred more universal, lighter, and mobile players, but that led only to emphasis on defensive-minded players, saturation with midfielders, and piling up of players playing similar positions. Attacking midfielders like Getov, Gospodinov, Kolev, Yordanov tended to stay on the left side. Add Dragolov and Velichkov plus left-winger Pashev, plus universal strikers, often used as left-wingers like Mladenov and Iskrenov. Voutzov tended to use about 5 of them in a match, so… when things were going the wrong way and he had to look for different solutions, he had none. As the World Cup games proved. Andrey Zhelyazkov was another player Voutzov constantly used for reasons unknown – Zhelyazkov was, at the time, the most expensive and successful Bulgarian export and the first foreign-based player to play for the national team in the Communist era, but he was out of place on the field. Most likely Voutzov wanted him for his experience and Zhelyazkov tried to help,although had no idea how. He was running constantly, but he was entirely out of touch with the rest of the team, sometimes it was even funny when he suddenly made a run in the opposite direction of the flow of the game at the moment or pass awkwardly the ball in some known only to him direction. It was more like Zhelyazkov was playing for the other team, not his own. By now he was 34 years old and it started to show, especially when he was moved further back to help defence in Mexico – out of breath and speed, he often just gave up chasing an opponent near Mikhaylov’s net. It may be strange, but Bulgaria had a big number of talented players at the moment, yet, they somehow did not deliver in the national team, presenting constant problem establishing lines. Tactics and concepts were not the strongest points of Voutzov, so he constantly changed players, hoping that some combination could work, but always inclined to reinforce defence and saturate midfield. Hoping for some miracle, he took Kostadinov and Pashev, presumably, because they played together in Trakia and scored a lot. But they were tried and dismissed from the national team many times already, because they never performed well there – yet, Voutzov never tried the obvious: if calling them, to call their club playmaker, who provided them with great passes and their center-forward, who was ready to finish their crosses with a goal. This could be said for almost all his squads – they were somewhat piles of players to make the numbers, a rag-tag unfinished groups ill-fitted to play together. Bulgaria was expected to finish third, for South Korea was obvious outsider.

South Korea.

Head coach: Kim Jung-nam

No.

Pos.

Player

Date of birth (age)

Caps

Club

1

GK

Cho Byung-deuk

26 May 1958 (aged 28)

N/A

Hallelujah FC

2

DF

Park Kyung-hoon

19 January 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

POSCO Atoms

3

DF

Chung Jong-soo

27 March 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

Yukong Elephants

4

MF

Cho Kwang-rae

19 March 1954 (aged 32)

N/A

Daewoo Royals

5

DF

Chung Yong-hwan

10 February 1960 (aged 26)

N/A

Daewoo Royals

6

FW

Lee Tae-ho

29 January 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

Daewoo Royals

7

FW

Kim Jong-boo

3 November 1965 (aged 20)

N/A

Korea University

8

DF

Cho Young-jeung

18 August 1954 (aged 31)

N/A

Lucky-Goldstar Hwangso

9

FW

Choi Soon-ho

10 January 1962 (aged 24)

47

POSCO Atoms

10

MF

Park Chang-sun (Captain)

2 February 1954 (aged 32)

N/A

Daewoo Royals

11

FW

Cha Bum-kun

21 May 1953 (aged 33)

125

Bayer Leverkusen

12

DF

Kim Pyung-seok

22 September 1958 (aged 27)

N/A

Hyundai Horangi

13

MF

Noh Soo-jin

10 February 1962 (aged 24)

N/A

Yukong Elephants

14

DF

Cho Min-kook

5 July 1963 (aged 22)

N/A

Lucky-Goldstar Hwangso

15

DF

Yoo Byung-ok

2 March 1964 (aged 22)

N/A

Hanyang University

16

MF

Kim Joo-sung

17 January 1966 (aged 20)

N/A

Chosun University

17

MF

Huh Jung-moo

13 January 1955 (aged 31)

N/A

Hyundai Horangi

18

MF

Kim Sam-soo

8 February 1963 (aged 23)

N/A

Hyundai Horangi

19

FW

Byun Byung-joo

26 April 1961 (aged 25)

N/A

Daewoo Royals

20

FW

Kim Yong-se

21 April 1960 (aged 26)

N/A

Yukong Elephants

21

GK

Oh Yun-kyo

25 May 1960 (aged 26)

N/A

Yukong Elephants

22

MF

Kang Deuk-soo

16 August 1961 (aged 24)

N/A

Lucky-Goldstar Hwangso

Well, the outsiders. A mystery team, but no more – some improvement was registered, but it was mostly considered to be due to the fame of Cha Bum-kun, now playing for Bayer (Leverkusen). Inspirational player, certainly boosting moral, but he was 33 years old and aided by enthusiasm was still not enough. South Korea was to be considered lucky if they got a point. The only thing in their favour was that the were unknown and could surprise careless opponent – but even so, it was unlikely they could win even one match.

Before the World Cup

On the eve of the 1986 World Cup finals there were more problems and scandals than usually. One has to start from much earlier time – originally, Colombia was chosen to host the finals. But Colombia found itself unable and withdrew. In 1983 FIFA had to chose replacement. This was a problem started after 1974 and gradually getting bigger and bigger – replacement of Argentina was considered in 1978. The country was on the brim of withdrawal and there were also country urging a boycott for political reasons. It was heavily criticized championship – security was somewhat too heavy-handed and almost to the last minute stadiums were not ready. In 1982 Spain was severe criticism for late and insufficient preparedness and many feared that no stadium will be finished for the championship. And now Colombia called it quit. The problems were real: hosting a world cup was more and more expensive and overwhelming operation, stretching painfully almost every country wanting to host the big event – new stadiums had to be build, tourist lodging and attractions had to be organized in sufficient numbers, and security was looming almost as the central problem, because of ever increasing number of visiting fans and dangerously increasing fan violence. Colombia’s withdrawal was related to combination of domestic political problems and lack of enough cash. Replacement was not easy – as bad luck had it, it was American turn to host the finals. There were few countries able to host such an event to begin with and now even fewer candidates – originally, Brazil, USA, and Canada. Then Brazil withdrew and out of the blue Mexico stepped in. And Mexico was chosen, but there was bitter taste – it looked like Mexico was chosen in advance and no matter what USA and Canada would proposed, they were not going to win. Journalists dug a little and quickly discovered suspicious connections between Joao Havelange and some of the key Mexican bidders. The giant satellite TV company ‘Televisa’ was seen as the prime culprit, for it was going to take huge slice of the profits – it was the biggest TV supplier of the Spanish speaking world. Everybody was denying, of course, and nothing was proven, of course, but the sense of injustice, manipulations, scheming, bribing was very strong. Yes, it fitted well with Havelange’s determination to make the World Cup financially successful, generating enormous profits for FIFA. Corporate sponsorship was more than welcome and from this point of view ‘Televisa’ was important element, just like Coca-Cola: bring the game to every home, see the Coca-Cola add, run to get a bottle or two, and watch the second half sipping Coke. Everybody happy, right? FIFA get money from the sponsors for the privilege to peddle their products and money go to poor countries, so the kids there to be able to play football and develop the game further. No objections about that too.


Thus, Mexico became the first country in the world to host World Cup finals a second time. Good for the record book. On more mundane and closer to the game matters, Mexico was the best available choice: USA and Canada had no football infrastructure to speak of and everything had to be build from scratch. Mexico, on the other hand, already had relatively new stadiums, built for the 1970 World Cup and it was more of a case of cosmetic changes and repairs. Time was short, so the Mexican case was the better one. Secondly, this was the only country with developed football culture among the candidates. In 1983 it was plain that football in North America did not capture hearts and NASL was coming to its own bitter end. Both countries had the economic capacity for building new giant stadiums quickly and up to the modern requirements, but it was unlikely to happen, because it could be building useless facilities, a waste of money. Most likely both USA and Canada were going to twist the projects once chosen to host the finals and try to build something different – essentially, a baseball stadium instead of soccer stadium – and because of the time pressure they were going to get their way. Canada presented additional problem – just a few, but far away from each other, large cities. By now, FIFA demanded big tournaments to be played in as many as possible towns and Canada had no more than 4 possible candidates with enormous distances between them. May be even the 1976 Olympics were evoked as argument against: in 1976 most of football games were played on what FIFA did not even consider stadiums: University football fields and such. Canada had its own understanding of ‘spreading the game’ – it was on community level. Give the people a chance to see and then kick the ball a little at the neighbourhood park. It was quite possible Canada to propose some outlandish town as one of the venues, following its own spirit – a city like, say, Regina, which nobody heard of, relatively small and difficult to get to. Such proposition was horrifying for FIFA, wanting grand show and maximum exposure, ‘a big product’ to sell. Mexico had what USA and Canada lacked – football culture, large crowds, stadiums, tourist attractions, more or less enough hotels for accommodating visitors, and police better prepared to deal with fan troubles than USA and Canada, where fan violence was unheard of and supporters of opposing clubs sat peacefully next to each other, sipping beer and making jokes. North American television was unlikely customer too. Frankly, Mexico was the best choice, no matter how crooked the ‘choosing’ was. But that was in 1983.

In 1985 the World Cup was on the brink of collapse again: Mexico was devastated by massive earthquake. This time nature was the enemy, the damage was huge and Mexico was not that rich – looked like the country was forced to abandon the World Cup and use the money for recovery. And if so… there was no time left to get another host. Stadiums take time to build. But Mexico somehow decided to stage the World Cup. Relief. Qualifications were over by the end of 1985 and preparation was the focus in the early months of 1986. Speculations, hopes, criticism, scandals. Plenty of scandals…

 

The draw for the finals was perhaps the last happy moment. Everybody somehow got what they wanted – meaning, the usual favourites. On paper, everything looked just fine – Italy, Brazil, West Germany, France, Argentina, England were the favourites, most of them eternal favourites and France – because of what they displayed after 1978. Mexico had an easy group as well – but somehow hosts always get easy group. There were still spots for secondary teams to go ahead, no problem. Yet, never before world cup finals there was so much scandals and criticism of the usual leaders and there was severe doubt that the big football countries had the teams, the coaches, the attitude to play their ‘rightful’ role. Here are some of the big scandals:

Argentina. Menotti was sacked after the poor performance at the 1982 World Cup and Carlos Bilardo was appointed to coach the national team. He was not obvious choice and at first even did not look like he was hired for a long term: it was his recent success with Estudiantes (La Plata) central to his appointment. But the football his team played was disliked and even more disliked was his idea to make the national team play the same kind of football. Once upon a time Bilardo played for the very successful team of Estudiantes, coached by Osvaldo Subeldia, whose credo was ‘realistic football’. That was a concept of iron discipline, absolute following on the chosen tactic, defensive football, looking for opening for lightning counterattack. Ugly and brutal football, which made Estudiantes universally hated. Carlos Bilrado was key defender in this team and one the biggest villains. A team of brutal laborers was Subeldia’s Estudiantes and now Bilardo proclaimed that he will follow the same concept. After the artistic approach of Menotti, this was a huge step back. A step back to some ancient, pre-historic days of the sport. How possibly one can win in 1980s playing a football from the 1960s? Yes, Estudiantes was successful, but they won by 1-0, they were no fun, they spent most of the time kicking the opponents, fighting, arguing with referees. It was no football. That was one side of the problems with Bilardo, leading to bitter irony expressed in ‘El Grafico; just days before the World Cup was about to begin: ‘Bilardo finally managed to divide Argentina in two camps – those, who strongly dislike him, and those who hate him. There were open calls from all sides for his resignation – but he stubbornly did not. A French journalist, watching Argentina vs Colombia, was dismayed by the Argentinian fans – Bilardo was steadily whistled and booed during the whole match, the only moment the fans stopped was in the 24th minute,when Maradona dribbled around 9 Colombian players. That was the public side of the conflict – Bilardo had no friends in the country at all. Dealing with players was the other side – on one hand, Bilardo made clear that he was not going to follow Menotti, therefore, he had no use for players Menotti used. It was entirely different team, centered on Maradona. Two veterans were also included – Daniel Pasarella and Ubaldo Fillol. But it was not even a truce with them – Bilardo clashed with the stars over tactics, over teammates, finally over his making Maradona the team captain. Pasarella eventually bent and remained in the squad, despite the clear fact that he was not to play, but Fillol left the national team. Both were regulars in the qualification campaign, a part of Bilardo’s new team in 1985, but were out just before the World Cup. Fillol’s absence was seen as crucial: he was not only the best Argentine goalkeeper, but he was a regular for so long, there was practically no other keeper with international experience. Out of the blue Bilardo called the barely known Hector Zelada from his Mexican club and this move produced universal outrage: Zelada was 30-years old already and never played for Argentina. He spent most of his career in Mexico, hardly a championship where real stars play. Replacing Fillol with Zelada? Bilardo was out of his mind, surely. Resign, Bilardo! Give us a favour, get out! With you and your jokers we are going to be eliminated in the first round of the World Cup! Hardly ever before a coach faced such universal hostility in Argentina, the mood was dark, and disaster was expected. Outside Argentina opinions were also largely negative – it was shaky Argentina at best, a team with many problems, perhaps the bigger one was making Maradona the center of everything – Maradona’s failure at the 1982 World Cup was not forgotten and there were big doubts he will be better now.

Brazil. After the tragic end of the 1982 World Cup Tele Santana was not sacked, but he changed his approach. No more free improvising and fun – now it was to be careful tactical football, oriented on results only. But it was to be same squad as before. New approach, same players. Who were getting too old – it was repeatedly pointed out to Santana and he only shrugged, saying that age is not important in football. He felt it was his duty to give Zico and Socrates a chance to revenge themselves for 1982. How such free-spirited players were going to play tactical restricted football was unfathomable for fans and specialists. Santana was asking Brazil to play un-Brazilian football, a kind universally despised, and may be his new concept got only one supporter: four years ago Leao, the best Brazilian goalkeeper, refused to play for Santana, because of his undisciplined attacking concept. Defense was weakened in Leao’s view and he was somewhat proven right, for Brazil lost stupidly to Italy. Now it was defensive concept and Leao was back. But others were not and openly rebelled and criticized Santana, which led to their dismissal from the team. Eder was out – officially, for ‘weak legs’. That, for player kicking the ball with 175km per hour! Eder retaliated calling a press-conference with 200 journalists and telling them that Santana will lose his head in Mexico. More fuel for the fier. Renato was out – arguably, the best right winger at the moment. Officially, the reason was egoistic play, which did not serve the needs of the team. Santana dismissed the two best wingers in the country and disaster immediately followed: the last friendly before going to Mexico, against Chile, enraged the Brazilian fans and the team was showered with stones and rotten fruit at the end. ‘An agony and an insult!’ was the verdict of the press. Socrates, Zico, Dirceu, and Oscar were singled out as prime examples of Santana’s lunacy. The lats blow was just before leaving for Mexico – the plain for the team waited idly two hours, because Leandro refused to go at the last minute and Zico and Junior tried to persuade him to change his mind. Still, Leandro refused and immediately called press-conference to give his reasons: ‘Santana wants me to play a winger, but I am central defender. We have a winger – Renato – but Santana does not like him. That is why I don’t want to play for team coached by him.’ True enough… Leandro put his finger in the wound: Santana left out the two best wingers and now had none, so was looking for improvisation. It was stupid, it was a suicide. Best players out, but Zico, not even recovered from heavy injury and plainly out of form, was in… No wonder Santana received death threats and a funeral procession was led in front of his home with his coffin. And an effigy of him was publicly burned. Perhaps never before Brazil was in so dark mood before a world cup, expecting the worst and hoping only for some divine miracle.

West Germany. Usually, the most cruelly criticized team from domestic journalists. This time it was more than ever before – more scandals, more criticism, and also justified criticism, for it was plain fact that West Germany did not have enough classy players. The first scandal started quite early, but never went away: the West German Federation made a revolutionary move after the resignation of Derwall. It was long, iron-clad tradition… so far, West Germany had only 3 coaches, and the old one, after long serving, was replaced by his assistant. But it was not working anymore – partly, because football changed and there was need for somebody with fresher ideas, and partly because there were few really good players and perhaps only some radical change can make more from mediocre material. Franz Beckenbauer was appointed and that was very annoying: it was violation of the sacred – only am educated coach with proper professional license can coach, no exceptions. Beckenbauer had no license and no experience and there was massive professional outcry. It was a scandal not going away even after the Federation tried to compromise – Beckenbauer was not appointed as a coach, but as a ‘director’. Nobody was fooled – against this appointment were people knowing Beckenbauer for years: his former coach in Bayern Udo Lattek and his long-term teammate in the national team Heynckes, now licensed coach. Paul Breitner was merciless as well, although from another angle – now a journalist, but rebellious and iconoclastic as ever, he wrote that Beckenbauer’s team reminds one of old, falling apart, buggy, driven by drunk coachman. It was not far from reality, for the efforts of Beckenbauer to build some decent team at first looked quite clueless – he tried and dismissed Augentaller and Herget, before settling for Magath, who was clearly on downhill, too old, too slow. The efforts to bring Schuster again in the national team failed, but not before escalating into a scandal, this time between players: Schuster plainly said that the West German team is hopeless. His presence or absence would not make any difference. Rummenigge retaliated immediately, accusing Schuster of behaving like spoiled brat. The feud between the two was old, but now was rapidly spreading far and wide – relations in the national team will not be good during the Mexican finals, where Rummenigge will openly accuse ‘the Koln mafia’ of running the show. ‘The Koln mafia’ – Schumacher, Allofs, and Littbarski – had its own problems and grievances. Their problems with ‘the Muhchen mafia’ – Rummenigge and Breitner – in 1982 were not forgotten. Schumacher was particularly outspoken and increasingly feuding with anybody seeing things differently. He just managed to get fired Rinus Michels from 1.FC Koln and now was fighting with chief of the club. In Mexico he severely injured Herget during training match, which was seen as getting rid of him, for Beckenbauer wanted Herget to play libero and Schumacher did not. Beckenbauer used all his diplomatic skills to get a truce with Schumacher until the end of the World Cup – that was, not to give interviews. Schumacher promissed and then broke his promise. As well as his Koln teammates Allofs and Littbarski, who openly protested Beckenbauer’s view that his team has no champion qualities. And then it was almost open war against Rummenigge – not a superstar, in their opinion, but just favourite of Beckenbauer. And the reserve goalie Uli Stein contributed with his own complaints that Beckenbauer favours no-good Schumacher. It was everybody against everybody, never ending war and spat, and sober voices were almost lost in the battle cries. Beckenbauer constantly pointed at the real situation – there were no current German players capable of molding into champion team, that was the reality. Helmut Schon supported his old team captain: ‘the problem of Beckenbauer is that he has not a Beckenbauer in the team.’ Others tried to recall previous campaigns, which were shaky and uncertain at first, but with time the right team eventually shaped just when was needed – no need to attack Beckenbauer too much now. Among scandals and feuds sober realism somewhat prevailed: it was accepted that the current generation is far from great and no matter who coaches and who is in the national team, great expectations would be laughable. At least in West Germany, there were no expectations before the World Cup started, no great hopes, no ambitions. For the first time in years the expectations were modest.

Italy. Reigning world champions, thus, immediately a favourite and in Italy – that was the only concern. Nothing else could do, so the national team was scrutinized and criticized against grand expectations. Bearzot was the prime target – unlike Beckenbauer, Bilardo, and Santana, Bearzot had no problems with players. His team really liked him, the players were loyal to him. He was loyal to them too – it was mutual, but dangerous respect. Bearzot stated just after winning the World title in 1982 that he will use all of his players in 1986, provided they are under 40. Exception will be made for Dino Zoff – he could be at whatever age. Well, in 1982 Bearzot was God himself, but in football gods are transformed into devils incarnate the next day and in Italy – even quicker. The troublesome campaign for the 1984 European championship unleashed heavy criticism against Bearzot. He was accused of stupidly leaving out of the national team some stars, notably Pruzzo and Giordano, and time naturally was against the coach as well, for some of his beloved players retired or got too old, or lost form. By itself, aged players are not seen as something dangerous in Italy – not until they start losing. May be Bearzot made mistakes by not trying to construct younger team, but there was objective problem similar to the one West German faced: currently, there were not enough really talented youngsters. Whatever changes Bearzot did, was with more or less good knowledge that he was getting lesser quality and there was nobody else. He kept veterans as long as he could not just because he was stubbornly loyal, but because there was no equal to Scirea and Tardelli now. No matter what, Bearzot’s team was send to Mexico with open hostility – paradoxically, outside Italy the world press considered Italy as one of the biggest favourites for winning the world title.

France. Scandals gradually simmered and culminated during the World Cup finals, but they were mostly between Platini and journalists. France was going to the finals as one of the favourites and perhaps the most exciting team so far in the 1980s, but… that was largely based on the 1982 World Cup and the 1984 European finals. After that the team was shaky and there were some grumblings during the qualification rounds. There were some old problems – the attack – which never found solution, but on the other hand Platini was arguably the best player in the world in the last few years. But with time more and more was centered on Platini on and off the field and one negative result was growing tensions between him and the press. The superstar eventually got tired from the same questions, with the time lost to answer them and became ‘disrespectful’. Giving ironic, meaningless, ‘stupid’ answers, clearly showing that he wants the journalists out of his life, cutting them short. The journalists retaliated with sarcastic and negative reviews, increasing criticism and blaming him for every unfortune moment France had on the field. Hostility escalated and culminated during the World Cup, when he was accused that he influences the team coach Henry Michel and practically runs the team – to its peril. Prove? Easy… Michel was not substituting Platini even when he was in very poor form. So, Michel had to answer and defend himself. But it was easy to attack Michel further, using the traditional French weakness in attack – why this, and why not that, easy to scold and accuse, conveniently forgetting that France unfortunately had somewhat deficient strikers. Fragile Rochetetau, for instance, was almost permanently injured. Then recovering from injury and not at top form. So easy to ask both ways in the same time – why Rocheteau is not in the team and after that why Rocheteau is in the team? The French national team was hardly ever criticized as much as it was in 1986, but it was criticism born mostly from something different than the game itself – at the base was mutual irritation: football stars got fantastically high social status, which journalists, guilty of making the stars social celebrities, felt wrong and players had to be put back in their humble place. Thus, scrutinize them and expose whatever vile habits they have. Meantime the players felt they were constantly watched and never left in peace, losing privacy by the minute – they were angry of the intrusions, they were bored by stupid questions, and wanted to be left alone. But there was no way either side to get out of the circus, so conflicts and mutual hostility emerged. One of the biggest crimes Platini committed at the 1986 World Cup was ignoring the team of the French television and calling a Syrian journalists down the way, who was never hoping to get even close to the superstar to ask his questions. The French journalists retaliated immediately: ‘Michel Platini is anti-French!’ What started well before the World Cup continued after it, when Platini entirely stopped giving interviews – for that he was accused that never red a book in his life and his only interest is his banking account and he fell so low, that exchanged world success with France for money. 1986 was the undoing of Platini.

Uruguay. Again, most of the scandal started during the World Cup finals, but then the preliminaries were recalled in detail and relish. The national team coach Omar Borras was not exactly loved and was criticized often – but now he was villain number one, so everything happening before was unleashed. Was his title ‘ professor’ real or a fake? Can’t find which institution gave him the title… so better make him go to the beach and work there, for his diploma for beach lifeguard is at least real. He is more than your usual political right-wing lunatic – he collaborated with the murderous military junta! He has no guts and never sticks to anything, he is double-faced and never having real opinion – one minute brave, the next defeatist; one minute rejects all advice, the next takes it. No tactical skills to speak of. No vision. No selection – his ‘selection’ is just cramming whatever players with some names exist. But politically motivated, so whoever is on the left, is out of the squad. Some true to that – Ruben Sosa and Hugo de Leon were left out for political reasons. Both vastly popular in Uruguay and also top class players. Fernando Morena was one of the biggest critics – he predicted failure in Mexico: ‘The team does not play well, has no style, and no tactical concept – all because of the coach.’ However, with time it was more of a making Borjas a scapegoat than anything.

Bulgaria. Here everything was on a different plain, as always was in the Communist world – what and when happened was learned usually way after the actual event and was revealed partly by rumours, partly by half-truths. So, a big deal of problems were told after the World Cup and were piled on the heads of coach and players, although they were not the only culprits. It was scapegoating to a large degree, for some of the troubles were initiated by state and football officials. The coach was blamed for everything – for not listening to advice, for having no plan or concept, for favoritism, for wrong selection, for wrong preparation. To a large degree it was true Ivan Voutzov was not the best coach – at least two others were better in everything, but they were also ‘unsuitable’, they were not liked at all by various officials, so they not even considered. Well, it was not Voutzov fault that the Federation hired him and not the better ones. Nor was his fault that the same Federation did not fire him when some deficiencies became obvious. It was not his fault that the Communist Government crashed the best teams in 1985 and suspended national team regulars for life. Voutzov tried to make something after that – to more or less build a new national team with whatever players remained and it did not work. So he personally visited the head of state and Party Todor Zhivkov to plead for amnesty – and he got amnesty, no doubt singing concerns for national pride, for the glory of Socialist sport and fears that now we are giving the Capitalists free hand to mock us, for we have nothing to oppose them. It worked, suspensions lifted, everybody back in the pitch, but there was also bitter taste about it – what was the point? Penalizing, destroying clubs, and a few months later – the opposite. It was unprincipled situation, no matter what – particularly because after the penalties were voided very high expectations were expressed. As for the team, it was never convincing – some choices Voutzov made were more than suspect, perhaps the strangest one was the out of the blue inclusion in the Mexican squad of an unheard of Second Division player, who immediately sunk into obscurity after the finals. Voutzov had his favourites and they rarely played convincing game, but even that was perhaps secondary to the problem of tactics: there were no tactics really, seemingly, the whole ‘concept’ was to play heroically and, hopefully, prevail. Sometimes it worked, especially against teams having troubles at the moment. But when the clueless approach did not work… it happened at the World Cup and the result was disastrous: Voutzov rotated players, but the fixed number forced him to use some at unusual positions, where they were entirely lost and the chaos was only increasing. Why Voutzov ignored alternatives at particularly weak posts and insisted on combinations which plainly could not do anything was a mystery. All his selections had some curious players, contributing nothing and at odds with the opponent’s strength and even their own teammates. Most of it was obvious for years and even more so in the last months before the finals, when Bulgaria played a number of strange friendlies – it did not look like real preparation for world cup finals and later it was pointed out that the prime motivation for those friendlies was income. Later… it was too late ‘later’, the finals were over. And even ‘later’, it was more than doubtful the truth was told via criticism of the failed finals – ‘later’ everything was blamed on coach and players, but they were not guilty for everything, it was just the usual scapegoating, with the tacit agreement that if ‘you’ take the blame in the press, nothing will be done to ‘you’. With all blame piled on them, neither coach, nor a single player was punished, as suggested by official vitriol. Take the blame and for that you will be rewarded with foreign contract, even in violation of the transfer rules – the case of the national team captain Georgy Dimitrov, who went to St. Etienne right after the world finals. But most of it happened in Mexico, or was triggered by the performance there – in the spring of 1986 everything was quiet, except for some rumours and the plain idiocy of the preparations.

Of course, there were more difficulties and scandals, and problems, but those above were perhaps the biggest. Somehow the 1986 World Cup had too many scandals, more than the usual ones before, for there were always scandals before world finals. Perhaps the objective problem was universal depletion of good enough players – there was plenty of competent players, more than ever, but few were exceptional and even the strongest football nations had a dangerously limited number of options. A sharp contrast with, say, the Brazilian problems before the 1970 World Cup – back then Zagalo was asked what was he going to do with plenty, for he had Pele, Rivelino, Tostao, Gerson, and Jairzinho seemingly playing the same position. Too may, too great… he said he will use all of them, and he did. No such luxury now – the problem was not who to leave out, but who to put in at all. Beckenbauer spelled it out: ‘Don’t you understand that we don’t have a midfielder like Platini? Look at the Bundesliga – the best there are foreigners, the Dane Lerby and the Icelandic Sigurvinson.’ In his own way, Leandro said the same when he left the national team of Brazil – Eder and Renato are out, and there is nobody else, so Santana asks me, a defender, to play as a winger. Scarcity everywhere…or was just the fatal number 13?


The 13th World Cup was about to begin and perhaps – perhaps! – all earlier problems would be evaporated by excitement.

The format of the finals was changed again – 24 teams was weird number, difficult to structure to begin with – and this time there was no second group round. Instead, the formula was returned to direct elimination after the first stage: 1/8, ¼, ½, and a final. To make 16 teams for the second round the best 4 third-placed teams in the first round qualified to the 1/8 finals. By points or goal-difference, if points were equal. Not the best solution, but there was no best solution for a long time.